

FCO 82/280

**Foreign policy of the USA:
Kissinger press conferences
and diplomacy
(Folder 2)
(1973)**

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NORTH AMERICA

FILE No. AMU 2/5 **(Part** E **)**

TITLE: FOREIGN POLICY OF UNITED STATES

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*Mr Archer**42**25/6**R*
*Mr Archer**52**15/10**Mr Archer**59-7**22/1**R*
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*Mr Lewis**12/7**13/7**R*
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*Mr Archer**46**26/9**R*
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*Mr Archer**48**27/9**R*
*Mr Archer**57**10/12**Mr Archer**57**10/12**R*
*Mr Archer**50**28/9**R*
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Telephone (202) 462-1340

G R Archer Esq
North America Department
F C O
London SW1

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LAST PAPER

Your reference

Our reference

Date

19 December 1973

Dear Graham,

DR KISSINGER'S VIEWS ON REPORTING FROM THE FIELD

1. I was given the enclosed copy of a circular telegram from Dr Kissinger to all US Ambassadors by a State Department friend in Geneva (I have been there temporarily filling a gap at the CSCE). Although the telegram is now perhaps a little dated - as you will see, it issued on 24 October - you may find it of interest as a guide to Dr Kissinger's thinking about the reporting process. Paragraph 3(c), in particular, if taken literally and acted on energetically, would open up a Pandora's Box of massive dimensions. The views it contains are hardly likely to be welcome to many Heads of Mission.

LAST PAPER

Your ever,
Michael Pike

(M E Pike)

* Naturally, in strict confidence
Will each Mission divided against
become a house divided against
itself? - - -

Mr. Hanning
Mr. Hanning
Mr. Hanning

Mr. Hanning
Mr. Hanning

Certainly the State Dept. reporting heads
calling back. K. is
sympathetic about Kubrick, Maynard utilities etc.

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING U.S. MISSION GENEVA

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ON:

DATE: 24 Oct 73

TIME: 0955

ACTION:

CITE:

R 240048Z OCT 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO:

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

AMBDOM

RUESBE/USINT BAGHDAD 0307

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PC

UNCLAS STATE 209583

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E.O. 11652; N.A.

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TAGS: OGEN

GATT

SUBJ: REPORTING FROM THE FIELD

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

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CHRON.

SECRET-2

SECRET-5

1. OVER THE COMING MONTHS I PLAN TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON HOW WE CAN BEST WORK TOGETHER. IN RETURN, I WELCOME, AND IN FACT WILL RELY HEAVILY ON YOUR OPINIONS AS TO HOW WE CAN IMPROVE THE CONDUCT OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

2. MY PURPOSE IN THIS CABLE IS TO MAKE CLEAR MY VIEWS ON REPORTING FROM THE FIELD. THE EMPHASIS I PLACED ON THE SUBJECT IN MY REMARKS TO THE DEPARTMENT ON SEPTEMBER 28 UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO THIS PROCESS.

3. WE MUST HAVE TIMELY, ACCURATE AND USEFUL REPORTING FROM ABROAD. SUCH REPORTING SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED BY: (A) ANALYSIS, NOT JUST DESCRIPTION; (B) QUALITY OVER QUANTITY; (C) OPEN AND FREE EXPRESSION OF DIFFERING VIEWS.

(A) ANALYSIS. I HAVE THE HIGHEST RESPECT FOR THE KNOWLEDGE AND CAPABILITIES OF THE CAREER PROFESSIONALS IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE. OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS I HAVE BEEN STRUCK HOWEVER BY THE SHEER VOLUME OF INFORMATION WHICH FLOWS INTO THE DEPARTMENT, CONTRASTED WITH THE PAUCITY OF GOOD ANALYTICAL MATERIAL WHETHER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OR THE FIELD. HERE REPORTAGE OF EVENTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE AND ABOUT WHICH IN MANY CASES WE CAN DO LITTLE IS NOT SUFFICIENT. FOR THAT REPORTING TO BE USEFUL TO ME, I REQUIRE NOT ONLY INFORMATION ON WHAT IS HAPPENING, BUT YOUR MOST THOUGHTFUL AND CAREFUL ANALYSES OF WHY IT IS HAPPENING, WHAT IT MEANS FOR U.S. POLICY, AND THE DIRECTIONS IN WHICH YOU SEE EVENTS GOING.

(B) QUALITY. I WANT TO ASK THE CHIEFS OF MISSION IN EACH POST TO REVIEW MOST CAREFULLY FIELD REPORTING. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION WE CAN ELIMINATE MANY ITEMS OF MINIMAL

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AND MARGINAL INTEREST. THIS WILL HELP TO CUT DOWN THE VOLUME AND WILL ALLOW REPORTING OFFICERS MORE TIME TO THINK ABOUT EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS AND TO ANALYZE THEM FOR US HERE IN WASHINGTON. I ASK ALSO CLOSE ATTENTION TO MAKING YOUR REPORTS COGENT AND CONCISE. VERBOSITY TOO OFTEN SEEMS TO SUBSTITUTE FOR CAREFUL THOUGHT. I AM ASKING THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS TO STUDY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO ELIMINATE AS MANY MARGINAL REQUIREMENTS AS POSSIBLE AS WELL AS TO ENSURE THAT IMPORTANT AREAS NOT NOW BEING FULLY REPORTED ON AND ANALYZED ARE COVERED IN THE FUTURE.

(C) FREE EXPRESSION. I URGE EMBASSIES, AND OFFICERS WITHIN EMBASSIES WHO HAVE DIFFERING VIEWS ON MAJOR ISSUES FROM THOSE REPORTED BY THEIR COLLEAGUES, TO MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO ME IN THE SPECIAL AND CONTROLLED CHANNELS PROVIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT FOR THAT PURPOSE. I EXPECT THAT ALL OFFICERS IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE DEPARTMENT WILL KEEP DISSENTING VIEWS IN THE CHANNELS PROVIDED FOR; WE CANNOT OPERATE THE GOVERNMENT OR THE DEPARTMENT IF DISSENT IS TAKEN TO THE PRESS. I OF COURSE WILL LOOK DIRECTLY TO THE AMBASSADOR FOR ADVICE; BUT ON FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS I BELIEVE THAT DISSENTING VIEWS AND OPINIONS SHOULD BE HEARD. THIS SHOULD HELP TO PRODUCE A MORE OPEN SPIRIT OF THE KIND I AM TRYING TO ENCOURAGE BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT AND THE CONGRESS AND THE DEPARTMENT AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. IF WE CANNOT HAVE IT WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT WE HAVE LITTLE REASON TO EXPECT IT IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THOSE OUTSIDE. EXPRESSION OF DIFFERING VIEWS WILL OF COURSE BE SUBJECT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S CONTROL; HOWEVER, I WILL EXPECT THAT WHEN HIS VIEWS ARE SUBMITTED, OPPOSING VIEWS AND COMPROMISES WILL BE NOTED AS WELL.

4. I HAVE ASKED MY COLLEAGUES IN THE DEPARTMENT TO PAY ATTENTION TO YOUR REPORTING AND ANALYSES. YOU CAN EXPECT TO HEAR FROM ME WHEN ITS QUALITY MERITS PRAISE OR CENSURE.

5. PLEASE BRING THESE THOUGHTS TO THE ATTENTION OF YOUR COLLEAGUES AT YOUR MISSIONS AND CONSTITUENT POSTS.


6. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU DURING THIS CRUCIAL PERIOD FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. KISSINGER
BT

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under ref. a.
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Mr. Ashton
2/1
2/1

Mr Goulding

c.c. Mr Overton ✓
Mr Elliott

CONCEPTUALISM IN FOREIGN POLICY

In support of Mr Overton's minute of 20 December, replying to yours of 18 December, you may be interested in the attached draft paper prepared by Mr Cable early in 1972 on Dr Kissinger's ideas in foreign policy. This gives a brief account of the "concepts" underlying Dr Kissinger's thought, in particular his concern for legitimacy, and the way in which he applies them.

N.P. Bayne

N P Bayne
Planning Staff

21 December 1973

P. a
22/1

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DR KISSINGER'S IDEAS

In conceding to Dr Henry A Kissinger unique influence and authority as his adviser on international affairs, President Nixon has invested a philosopher with powers greater than those wielded by most of the Princes of this world. Seldom has a theorist been given such opportunities to practise what he preached. To anyone concerned with relations with the United States, or with the American impact on the world, Dr Kissinger's works are required reading. Nor is this a particularly difficult task, for Dr Kissinger writes with clarity and occasional elegance. He is no addict of mathematical obscurity, no slave of behaviourism, no peddler of academic jargon. He writes to be understood and his works are soundly based on a wide reading of history and of classical political theory. Though conceptual in structure, they are firmly rooted in the real world and directed towards its practical problems. They reveal a coherent philosophy of statesmanship

2. There are three reasons for reading Dr Kissinger's books. The first is that these are a necessary part of the intellectual background of a member of the Service, the works of a man of outstanding intelligence, of considerable scholarship as well as intimate acquaintance with great affairs, and a real contribution to professional understanding. The second is that, in common with other writers, he has given hostages to fortune: they contain arguments that can be exploited by those who may be called on to negotiate with Dr Kissinger. The

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third - and this is the one primarily considered here - is that they reveal his underlying philosophy and thus offer clues to the nature of American foreign policy as long as this remains partly under his influence.

3. This idea of an underlying philosophy is explicitly stated in the first page of President Nixon's Report to Congress of February 1972: "US Foreign Policy in the 1970s". There we are told that:

"..without an understanding of the philosophical conceptions upon which specific actions were based, the actions themselves can neither be adequately understood, nor fairly judged. This account of a year of intense action, therefore, properly begins with a brief review of the intellectual foundation on which these actions rest." Although this audacious proposition, so inconceivable in a British Blue Book, clearly stems from Dr Kissinger, it would be unfair to expect it to be fully sustained in the two hundred odd pages that follow. These are necessarily subject to all the euphemisms, the reticences, the ambiguities imposed by their primary function as an apologia for, rather than an exposition of, the official policy of President Nixon. To understand their underlying premises, their veiled objectives, we have to turn to the rather more candid pages composed in the period of Dr Kissinger's relative irresponsibility.

4. Of these, the most revealing are to be found in one of the earliest and, superficially, the least relevant of his published works: "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-21." Published in 1957, this was a work of traditional diplomatic history, but one quite as /concerned

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concerned with drawing conclusions of general applicability as with the analysis of particular events. It also reveals a profoundly romantic outlook, a fascination with great men and great events, an intense admiration for the intelligent and imaginative use of power. His hero is "not a man of strong passions and of bold measures; not a genius but a great talent; cool, calm, imperturbable and calculator par excellence". His diplomacy was "a game whose daring resided in the loneliness in which it had to be played, in the face of non-comprehension and abuse by both friend and foe". How often, one wonders, has Dr Kissinger since recalled, with defiant pride, such phrases? One of his concluding aphorisms is no less relevant: "The statesman is therefore like one of the heroes in classical drama who had a vision of the future but who cannot communicate it directly to his fellow men the statesman must bridge the gap between a people's experience and his vision".

5. The theme of the book - which recurs throughout Dr Kissinger's works - is the conflict between the concept of international legitimacy (defined as "international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy") and the incompatible aspirations of "revolutionary powers". Two recurrent chords are that "Stability.....has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy" and that "war is the impossibility of peace". "Statesmanship, he argues, and in this he has been consistent, "must deal with the future".

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6. The analogy with the second half of the twentieth century is never emphasised, but always implicit. A revolutionary power (France) had created an unstable world by challenging the principle of legitimacy. "Because they were legitimised by the goals of the social effort and not an administrative routine, Castlereagh and Mettermich were able to plan policy as a long range national strategy". Thanks to these two lonely heroes, each imperfectly supported or understood by timorous governments, and to their readiness to contemplate war and strange, new coalitions, the principle of legitimacy was established and ushered in an era of unprecedented peace, stability and progress.

7. The concept of the legitimate international order, of its challenge by revolutionary powers and of the need for daring and vision to achieve "a world restored" recur in all his later works. But these also introduce (as early as "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" in 1957) the importance of doctrine to the conduct of foreign policy, the contrast between statesmanship and the bureaucratic process, "the need for inspiration". "The capacity to think conceptually was never more important in foreign policy certainty is conferred at least as much by philosophy as by fact. It derives from the imposition of purpose on events".

8. In "The Necessity of Choice" (1960) Dr Kissinger
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sharpened his criticisms of the bureaucratic conduct of American foreign policy. In the final, and now the most interesting, chapter on The Policymaker and the Intellectual, he lamented the deficiencies of politicians and officials. "The qualities rewarded in the rise to eminence are less and less the qualities required once eminence is reached". He concluded - and even the State Department could scarcely deny that he has since practised what then he preached:

"If a bureaucracy is to support and not paralyse policy, it must have a leadership group conscious of two responsibilities: (1) to be vigilant that what is defined as routine applies in fact to the most frequent occurrences; (2) to take the responsibility for innovation".

9. "The Troubled Partnership" (1965) emphasised that:

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 .."if there is no doctrine at all and a society operates pragmatically, solving problems "on their merits", as the saying goes, every event becomes a special case. More energy is spent on deciding where one is than where one is going".

10. The last book he published before entering the White House - "American Foreign Policy" (1969) echoes and re-emphasises the ideas he had advocated from the outset and which President Nixon's reports to Congress would again reflect:

"In the years ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy will be philosophical: to develop some concept of order ... in the field of foreign policy, we will never be able to contribute to building a stable and creative world order

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unless we first form some conception of it".


11. These underlying and persistent themes - the idea of a legitimate world order challenged by revolutionary powers, the bold and imaginative statesman imposing his philosophy on events, the necessity of doctrine, the road to stability through risks and shifting coalitions - are perhaps more important than any of the detailed argument and analysis, the occasional errors, of these books. It is curious, for instance, to find Dr Kissinger, as late as 1960, admitting the possibility of a rift between China and the Soviet Union, but dismissing it as a will o' the wisp. It might embarrass him to recall today certain arguments for sharing American nuclear know-how with European allies. The advocacy of limited nuclear wars - "our most effective strategy against nuclear powers or against a major power which is capable of substituting manpower for technology" - might not be repeated now. But the general thrust of his philosophy, its forward-looking character, its readiness for innovation and flexibility, its idealisation of the lonely statesman whose concepts are too bold for the constraints of public opinion: these have remained consistent. Dr Kissinger may be a romantic, but he is a romantic whose notions we must reckon with.

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TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 3958 OF 28 DECEMBER 1973
INFO CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA PARIS MOSCOW
UKMIS NEW YORK UKMIS GENEVA OECD PARIS KUWAIT KHARTOUM.

MY TELEGRAM NO 3956 (NOT TO ALL)

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE UNITED STATES' SECRETARY OF STATE:
MIDDLE EAST.

1. MUCH OF DR KISSINGER'S OPENING STATEMENT WAS DEVOTED TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

" IDEOLOGY, LONG ESTABLISHED RELATIONS, AS WELL AS THE INTERNAL LOGIC OF CERTAIN AREAS, SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST CAN PRODUCE TENSIONS, AND INDEED, CAN PRODUCE EXPLOSIONS, THAT WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE FOSTERED BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, MAY BRING THEM INTO CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER.

NOR IS IT FOREORDAINED THAT THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE TWO PROTAGONISTS NECESSARILY LIVES UP TO THE PRINCIPLES THAT THEY DECLARE. IN THOSE CASES, AS HAPPENED AT ONE PHASE DURING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES WILL MAINTAIN ITS COMMITMENTS AND WILL DEFEND ITS INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND THE POSITION OF ITS FRIENDS

THE MOST DRAMATIC EVENT OF THE YEAR, OF COURSE, WAS THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS -- IT CAME UPON US UNEXPECTEDLY. WE WERE NOT WARNED BY ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT THAT THERE WERE ANY SPECIFIC PLANS FOR AN ATTACK. THE ONLY WARNINGS WE RECEIVED WERE GENERAL DESCRIPTIONS THAT THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT -- OR THAT THE TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MIGHT NOT BE CONTAINED. AND I HAVE ALREADY DESCRIBED THE KIND OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT WAS AVAILABLE AND WHICH ILLUSTRATED THAT FACTS ARE NOT SELF-EXPLANATORY, THAT ONE'S PRECONCEPTIONS DETERMINE VERY IMPORTANTLY

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WHAT INTERPRETATION IS GIVEN TO THESE FACTS.

THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST FACED THE UNITED STATES WITH A NUMBER OF PROFOUND ISSUES.

THERE WAS THE COMMITMENT THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD THROUGH ALL POST WAR ADMINISTRATIONS TO THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. IT WAS OUR CONCERN THAT ANOTHER SUPERPOWER NOT EXPLOIT THE TENSIONS IN THE AREA FOR ITS OWN ADVANTAGE. THERE WAS OUR INTEREST IN MAINTAINING A BALANCED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. AND THERE CAME TO BE, INCREASINGLY, THE PROBLEM OF THE ENERGY CRISIS.

OUR POLICY HAD TO GO THROUGH SEVERAL PHASES.

THE FIRST, DURING THE MILITARY PHASE, WAS TO BRING -- TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SITUATION IN WHICH THE POST WAR EVOLUTION WOULD NOT BE DETERMINED BY MILITARY SUCCESS PRIMARILY, ESPECIALLY BY MILITARY SUCCESS GROWING OUT OF A SURPRISE ATTACK AND ACHIEVED WITH SOVIET ARMS.

AND SECONDLY, TO CONDUCT OURSELVES IN SUCH A MANNER THAT IN THE THE DIPLOMACY THAT WOULD FOLLOW THE WAR, WE WOULD BE ABLE TO TALK TO ALL OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED -- ARAB AS WELL AS ISRAELI,

AND THIRDLY, WE HAD TO CONDUCT OURSELVES IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD NOT PLAY THE ROLE OF THE BALKANS IN 1914, IN WHICH LOCAL RIVALRIES PRODUCED A CATASTROPHE FROM WHICH EUROPE NEVER RECOVERED, AND IN WHICH UNDER CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS, IF A GENERAL WAR OCCURRED THE WORLD WOULD NEVER RECOVER.

THE RESULT OF THESE EFFORTS WAS FIRST, THE CEASEFIRE OF OCTOBER 22ND:

THEN, THE SIX POINT AGREEMENT THAT WAS SIGNED IN EARLY NOVEMBER.

AND THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE WHICH STARTED LAST WEEK.

WE ARE AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF WHAT WILL BE A SLOW AND AGONIZING EFFORT TO RECONCILE OBJECTIVES THAT IN MANY RESPECTS SEEM CONTRADICTORY. BUT AS I HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY, AND AS THE PRESIDENT HAS EMPHASIZED -- THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THAT RECOGNIZES THE SECURITY OF ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- AS WELL AS THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF ALL OF THE PEOPLES IN THE AREA.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE CONFERENCE IS WELL LAUNCHED AND WE HOPE THAT SOME PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN THE DISENGAGEMENT TALKS THAT ARE NOW GOING ON BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL -- AND THAT COULD GO ON BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. "

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2. THE MAIN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELATING TO ARAB/ISRAEL,
THE OIL EMBARGO AND TERRORISM WERE AS FOLLOWS:-

Q. I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU WHETHER YOU CAN TELL US AT ALL WHAT
STAKE THE SOVIET UNION HAS IN MAINTAINING THE AGREEMENTS THAT
YOU HAVE MADE SO FAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IF SO, WHERE THEIR
POSITION IS NOW. I AM THINKING OF THE VARIOUS MEETINGS THAT
YOU HAVE HAD WITH MR. DOBRYNIN AND OTHERS.

A. THERE ARE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ABOUT SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN
THE MIDDLE EAST. ONE SCHOOL OF THOUGHT IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION
HAS AN INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE TENSION BECAUSE THAT WILL
GUARANTEE PERMANENT ARAB HOSTILITY TO THE UNITED STATES, AND
ENHANCES THE POSSIBILITIES OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. THE OTHER SCHOOL
OF THOUGHT IS THAT WHILE THIS MAY HAVE STARTED OUT TO BE THE
SOVIET POLICY IN THE 1950'S. THERE HAVE BEEN SINCE THEN
THREE WARS WHICH HAVE CONSUMED A GREAT DEAL OF SOVIET RESOURCES
AND WHOSE OUTCOME HAS BEEN INCONCLUSIVE. IT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED
THAT THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAN BRING THE SUPERPOWERS
INTO POSITIONS OF POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION. AND IT IS THEREFORE
AT LEAST POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAS AN INTEREST
IN CONTRIBUTING TO THE STABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION
IN AN AREA WHICH NEITHER SUPERPOWER CAN REALLY CONTROL BY ITSELF.

AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, WE WILL DEAL WITH
THE SOVIET UNION AS LONG AS ITS ACTIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE
SECOND INTERPRETATION. THAT IS TO SAY, IF THE SOVIET UNION MAKES
A RESPONSIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE WILL
BE PREPARED TO COOPERATE -- NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR TRADITIONAL
FRIENDS NOR BY IMPOSING A SETTLEMENT MADE TOGETHER WITH THE
SOVIET UNION. WE ARE IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH ALL OF THE PARTIES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET
UNION ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS AS LONG AS ITS MOTIVES, OR AS LONG
AS ITS ACTIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH A RESPONSIBLE COURSE.

AT GENEVA, THE SOVIET UNION CONTRIBUTED TO A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE.
AS YOU KNOW, FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
EB/N.

THE SOVIET UNION COOPERATED ALSO IN FOCUSING THE DISCUSSIONS
ON THE FIRST ISSUE OF DISENGAGEMENT WHICH SEEMED MORE MANAGABLE
THAN SOME OF THE MORE DIFFICULT ONES THAT WILL COME ALONG
FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD.

/So AS

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SO AS OF NOW, JUDGING THE SOVIET UNION BY ITS ACTIONS, WE ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE. SHOULD SOVIET BEHAVIOUR CHANGE, WE CAN ALWAYS RE-EXAMINE OUR POLICY.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, NOW THAT THE ARAB STATES HAVE LIFTED THEIR OIL EMBARGO AGAINST EUROPE AND JAPAN AND HAVE RESTORED SOME OF THE PRODUCTION CUTBACKS, WHEN DO YOU EXPECT THEM TO START SUPPLYING THE UNITED STATES WITH OIL AGAIN?

A. I DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE ON WHEN THE ARAB COUNTRIES WILL RESTORE -- WILL LIFT THE BOYCOTT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. AS I HAVE POINTED OUT AT SEVERAL PREVIOUS PRESS CONFERENCES, THE UNITED STATES COULD UNDERSTAND CERTAIN ACTIONS BY ARAB COUNTRIES AT A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES SEEMED TO BE -- WAS SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ONE OF THE SIDES IN A WAR. NOW THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS PUBLICLY DECLARED ITS COMMITMENT TO BRING ABOUT A JUST SETTLEMENT, NOW THAT MUCH OF THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT CAN BE TRACED TO AMERICAN ACTIONS, DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND.

NOW, IN ANALYZING THE SUPPLY OF OIL, ONE HAS TO CONSIDER THAT THERE ARE TWO PROBLEMS INVOLVED. ONE IS THE PROBLEM OF THE EMBARGO; THE SECOND IS THE PROBLEM OF PRODUCTION. LIFTING THE EMBARGO WITHOUT INCREASING THE PRODUCTION DOES NOT HELP A GREAT DEAL, BECAUSE IT MEANS THAT MORE NATIONS WOULD COMPETE FOR AN INADEQUATE SUPPLY. SO BOTH OF THESE MEASURES HAVE TO GO HAND IN HAND. AND ON THE WHOLE WE CONSIDER IT A POSITIVE STEP THAT PRODUCTION HAS BEEN INCREASED.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU SEEM TO BE EXPRESSING AN INCREASING SENSE OF IRRITATION WITH THE FACT THAT SAUDI ARABIA, PRINCIPALLY, HAS NOT LIFTED THE OIL EMBARGO AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, THOUGH IT HAS TAKEN THESE OTHER ACTIONS TOWARDS EUROPE AND JAPAN. WAS THERE SOME ACTION THAT YOU EXPECTED TO HAPPEN BY NOW FROM THE SAUDI ARABIANS THAT DID NOT? DO YOU LINK A POSSIBLE ACTION TO THE DISENGAGEMENT TALKS IN GENEVA?

A. I DO NOT EXPRESS AN INCREASING SENSE OF IRRITATION. I AM EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN, AND WHICH I HAVE EXPRESSED AT EVERY PREVIOUS PRESS CONFERENCE -- NAMELY, THAT DISCRIMINATORY ACTION AGAINST THE UNITED

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STATES BECOMES INCREASINGLY INAPPROPRIATE WHEN THE UNITED STATES IS THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRY ENGAGING ITSELF IN THE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS IS A POSITION THAT HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THIS ADMINISTRATION FROM THE BEGINNING. IT IS NOT SAID IN ANY SPIRIT OF IRRITATION, BUT IT IS A STATEMENT OF REALITY.

I DO NOT WANT TO SAY WHAT I EXPECTED. BUT THE VIEW THAT I HAVE EXPRESSED HERE IS NOT CAUSED BY ANY DISAPPOINTMENT ABOUT WHAT I HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE.

Q. IS THERE A LINK AS WELL WITH THE DISENGAGEMENT TALKS?

A. THE UNITED STATES' POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE OIL EMBARGO HAS BEEN THAT WE CANNOT DISCUSS SPECIFIC PEACE TERMS IN RELATION TO THE LIFTING OF THE OIL EMBARGO; THAT WE CAN EXPRESS OUR COMMITMENT TO BRING ABOUT A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE, OR TO HELP BRING IT ABOUT, BASED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. BUT AS I HAVE EXPLAINED MANY TIMES BEFORE, WE CANNOT BARGAIN INDIVIDUALLY WITH OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES AND THEN ENTER INTO A PEACE CONFERENCE IN WHICH THE PARTIES HAVE TO NEGOTIATE THIS PROCESS ALL OVER AGAIN.

Q. MR SECRETARY, ARE YOU SATISFIED BY THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION THAT YOU ARE GETTING FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT AND JORDAN TO GET A PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

A. I THINK THAT ONE OF THE RESULTS OF THE TWO TRIPS THAT I HAVE MADE INTO THE MIDDLE EAST IS THAT THE GOVERNMENTS THAT YOU HAVE MENTIONED NOW HAVE A MUCH CLEARER COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE. THEY ARE NOW TALKING FROM A COMMON BASE. AND I HAVE NO COMPLAINT ABOUT THE COOPERATION THAT I HAVE RECEIVED FROM ANY OF THESE GOVERNMENTS, AND I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A GOOD POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS.

Q. CAN YOU TELL US IN ANY MORE GENERALIZED WAY WHAT THE PRESENT INTER-RELATIONSHIP IS OF A SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS TO THE PATTERN OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- SALT, MBFR, THESE OTHER ISSUES?

/A. WELL, IT

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A. WELL, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR A COUNTRY TO EXACERBATE TENSIONS IN ONE AREA AND TO SEEK RELAXATION IN ANOTHER. THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED THE NOTION OF SELECTIVE DETENTE, IN WHICH ONE AREA WOULD BE PACIFIED WHILE THERE WOULD BE VERY ACTIVE CONFLICT IN ANOTHER. THEREFORE, OBVIOUSLY - WE WOULD HAVE TO JUDGE THE SOVIET SINCERITY IN SEEKING ACROSS-THE-BOARD RELAXATION OF TENSIONS BY ITS BEHAVIOR IN ALL THE NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH WE ARE ENGAGED WITH IT, INCLUDING THAT OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

NOW, I WANT TO REPEAT: I'M NOT SAYING THIS IN ANY PARTICULARLY CHALLENGING MANNER, BECUASE THE SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THE PRELUDE TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE BY ALL OF THE PARTIES THERE.

Q. MR SECRETARY, IF YOU GET THE KIND OF PROGRESS THAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT IN DISENGAGEMENT, WOULD IT ENTAIL A QUICK OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL? AND DO YOU CONSIDER THAT TO BE ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL SOVIET OBJECTIVES AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATION?

A. I BELIEVE THAT -- FIRST, I DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE ABOUT WHAT THE SPECIFIC TERMS OF A DISENGAGEMENT SCHEME WOULD BE; BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL, HOWEVER ADVANTAGEOUS IT MIGHT BE TO ANY OF THE PARTIES, IS THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION.

I WANT TO STRESS ALSO THAT MUCH OF THE DIPLOMACY THAT HAS PRECEDED THE OPENING OF THE GENEVA TALKS WAS NOT ONE THAT WAS ORGANIZED BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIET UNION BUT WAS DEVELOPED ON SEVERAL TRIPS THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST BY MYSELF, ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION, AND IN DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIET UNION HAS SUPPORTED THESE EFFORTS. BUT IT WAS NOT A SOLUTION THAT WAS ACHIEVED BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON AND THEN HANDED TO THE PARTIES IN THE CONFLICT. MUCH OF IT HAS EMERGED OUT OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE AT KILOMETER 101 BETWEEN THE EGYPTIANS AND THE ISRAELIS WITHOUT EITHER U.S. OR SOVIET PARTICIPATION. SO I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRINCIPAL SOVIET INTEREST WOULD BE THE OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL, EVEN IF THAT SHOULD TURN OUT TO BE ONE OF THE RESULTS.

/Q. MR SECRETARY,

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Q. MR SECRETARY, A TWO-PART QUESTION, IF I MAY. IN VIEW OF KUWAIT'S REFUSAL TO EXTRADITE TO ITALY THE PALESTINIANS WHO WERE THE SELF-ADMITTED MURDERERS OF 16 AMERICAN CITIZENS -- IN VIEW OF KUWAIT'S CONTINUATION OF THE OIL EMBARGO -- HOW IS IT THAT WE HAVE REPORTS THAT WE HAVE PLANNED, AS A NATION, TO SUPPLY THIS NATION WITH CONTINUED MILITARY AID AS WELL AS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS?

THAT'S THE FIRST PART OF THE QUESTION, SIR.

A. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THERE IS A PLAN TO EXTRADITE THESE TERRORISTS TO THE SO-CALLED PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, WHICH HAS PROMISED TO PUNISH THEM SEVERELY.

NOW, OUR INTEREST IS THAT THIS TERRORISM BE ENDED: AND THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO THAT EFFECT.

WITH RESPECT TO OTHER MEASURES, THEY WILL HAVE TO AWAIT THE ACTIONS OF THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT ON OTHER FRONTS; BUT WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN ANY REASON TO TERMINATE THEM.

Q. WELL, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS PROMISE TO PUNISH THEM SEVERELY, I SEEM TO RECALL YOUR PREDECESSOR -- SECRETARY ROGERS -- ASKED FOR THE DEATH PENALTY OF THOSE PALESTINIANS THAT MURDERED AMBASSADOR NOEL LAST MARCH. I CHECKED WITH YOUR SUDAN DESK THIS WEEK AND FIND THAT THESE TERRORISTS HAVE NOT EVEN BEEN BROUGHT TO TRIAL.

NOW, IN CONSIDERATION OF THAT, AND REPORTS THAT A GROUP SIMILAR TO THIS -- OR POSSIBLY THE SAME GROUP -- PLANNED TO ASSASSINATE YOU, WHAT IS THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION PREPARED TO DO ABOUT THIS, OTHER THAN REGRET IT OR PLEAD FOR AVIATION SECURITY -- USUALLY IN VAIN?

A. WELL, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN A VERY STRONG STAND AGAINST ANY ATTACKS ON ME --

(LAUGHTER.)

-- BUT OUR POSITION ON TERRORISM IS CLEAR. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS A WORLDWIDE PROBLEM THAT MUST BE STAMPED OUT. WE WILL RENEW OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT WHICH PUTS TEETH INTO THE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITY. BUT I DO NOT WANT TO COMMENT ON EVERY INDIVIDUAL ACTION OF EVERY GOVERNMENT CONCERNED.

Q. FIRST OF ALL, WHAT CAN YOU TELL US OF THE FATE OF THE ISRAELI POW'S IN SYRIA? AND, SECONDLY, WHAT CONCESSIONS DO YOU EXPECT ISRAEL TO MAKE IN THE GENEVA TALKS?

/A. WITH RESPECT

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A. WITH RESPECT TO THE ISRAELI PRISONERS IN SYRIA, THE UNITED STATES HAS OF COURSE STRONGLY SUPPORTED THEIR RELEASE AND THE PROVISION AT LEAST OF LISTS TO THE ISRAELIS.

IT IS NOT CORRECT -- AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT -- THAT WE PROMISED THIS AS A CONDITION OF THE CEASE-FIRE, THOUGH WE DID INDICATE THAT WE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT A MAJOR EFFORT WOULD BE MADE AFTER ISRAEL HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED THE CEASE-FIRE.

NEVERTHELESS, THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE FACT THAT THE LISTS SHOULD BE PRODUCED AND THAT THE PRISONERS SHOULD BE RELEASED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

Q. ARE THEY STILL ALIVE?

A. WE HAVE NO INDEPENDENT INFORMATION. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT THEY ARE NOT ALIVE, BUT WE HAVE REALLY NO INFORMATION OF ANY KIND -- THAT IS, OF AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE.

Q. WHAT DO YOU EXPECT THE ISRAELIS TO DO?

A. WE ARE NOT APPROACHING THE PROBLEM OF NEGOTIATIONS BY DRAWING UP A LIST OF CONCESSIONS THAT EITHER SIDE SHOULD MAKE. WHAT WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DO IS DISCOVER, AS HONESTLY AS WE COULD ON THESE TRIPS THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST, WHAT THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF EACH SIDE WERE AND THEN TO ATTEMPT TO BRING THESE INTO SOME RELATION TO EACH OTHER.

TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PARTIES HAVE TALKED TO EACH OTHER, AS THE EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS HAVE ON KILOMETER 101, SOME RAPPROCHEMENT HAS DEVELOPED OUT OF THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION; BUT WE ARE NOT STARTING WITH AN ABSTRACT LIST OF CONCESSIONS WHICH WE ARE THEN ASKING ANY COUNTRY TO MAKE. UNQUOTE.

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PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE.


DR KISSINGER GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY IN WHICH HE
SURVEYED THE WHOLE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY, CONCENTRATING HOWEVER
ON THE MIDDLE EAST, ENERGY, SALT, DETENTE, INCLUDING RELATIONS
WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, AND RELATIONS WITH WEST EUROPE.
I SHALL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY THE MAIN PASSAGES DEALING WITH
THE MIDDLE EAST AND WILL SEND THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT BY BAG TO
THE RECIPIENTS OF THIS TELEGRAM. THE REST OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE,
WHICH HAS BEEN COVERED FAIRLY FULLY IN THE TAPES, WILL BE REPORTED
BY BAG AS NECESSARY.

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UNITED STATES EMBASSY, 55/56 UPPER BROOK STREET, LONDON W1A 2LH

Friday WOD have
December 28th, 1973

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TRANSCRIPT KISSINGER'S DECEMBER 27 NEWS CONFERENCE

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, IN WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 27:

(Begin text)

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I thought the way to give this conference some focus is for me to make a brief summary of the highlights of this year's foreign policy as we see it and some attempt of projecting it into the future.

First, let me begin with the event that started the year which was, of course, the peace in Vietnam, and then let me go from there to the general design of the foreign policy and how the various pieces -- how we attempted to fit the various pieces together.

The year began with ending the most divisive, the most difficult, the most agonising war in American history, certainly the most divisive and agonising foreign war in American history.

Throughout the four years of President Nixon's first term, the basic debate had been on the terms by which the war should be ended. And the fundamental condition that the United States had set was that we would not end the war by overthrowing the Government with which we had been allied, but that we were prepared to withdraw our forces and to leave the evolution of events in Indo-China to the Indochinese.

At the beginning of January, last year, we achieved a settlement which permitted the disengagement of American forces, which left the political resolution of the political future of Vietnam to be decided by negotiation among the Vietnamese parties, and which returned the American prisoners. It did not settle all the issues that had produced the conflict in the first place, a war that was partly a foreign invasion from the outside and partly civil war; an area that had been rent by conflict for thirty years could not possibly go from war to peace immediately or painlessly or perhaps at all.

We had defined the American role as permitting an evolution that left the destiny of the area in the hands of the people concerned. We had hoped -- if you remember the speech of the President and my Press Conference -- we had hoped that the end of the war in Vietnam would permit also the beginning of an era of national reconciliation in this country. And much of the agony of the previous years had been assumed to be overcome by the fact that both those who had opposed the manner of conducting the war and those who had wanted to bring it to a

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conclusion along the lines that was achieved, could agree now that there was a need to turn to more positive tasks.

For a variety of reasons, other issues arose that did not make this entirely possible. But the war in Vietnam is no longer -- and the war in Indochina -- is no longer a divisive national issue, and as far as the Administration is concerned, it will, as I have pointed out in my last Press Conference, heed the expressions of the Congress and stay true to the principles that it has consistently pursued.

In any event, with the war in Vietnam ended, the major focus of our foreign policy attention could turn to the design of the structure of peace that has been the President's principal goal since he came into office.

In its first phase, this meant that the United States had to reduce many of its over-extended commitments, and that the United States had to disengage gradually from any foreign involvement, and above all that the United States should evoke a sense of responsibility for their own sake in many areas of the world. This was the so-called "Nixon doctrine" which characterised the first two or three years of the President's first term.

It was the prelude to the initiatives towards China and the detente with the Soviet Union that was to lay the basis for a fundamental re-alignment of the post-war period which had been based on a rigid division between opposing hostile blocs.

So, by the time the second term of the President started, we faced an international situation in which the basic assumptions of the immediate post-war period had been substantially altered. The rigid hostility between the Communist world and the non-communist world had been altered first by the divisions within the Communist world itself and by the amelioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as the People's Republic of China and the United States.

Europe and Japan had gained strength and political self confidence. The economic system that had been created in the immediate post-war period had become fluid and was in need of redesigning. So the great task before this Administration, as it will be before its successors, has been to construct an international system based on a sense of justice so that its participants would have a stake in maintaining it; with a sufficient balance of power so that no nation or group of nations would be dependent entirely on the good will of its neighbours, and based on a sense of participation so that all nations could share in the positive aspirations.

This has been the basic architectural design that cannot possibly be completed in any one Administration, and the work which must continue in future Administrations. And when we speak of institutionalising foreign policy, we do not mean that designated committees would carry out specific tasks, but that the basic goals of the long term are accepted by a sufficient consensus in America so that the future security of this country does not depend entirely on the vagaries of the political process.

Now, let me be more specific, and let me talk in various categories. Let me begin first with East-West relations. Our policy towards both the Soviet Union and the

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People's Republic of China has been characterised as a policy of detente. And it is the characteristic of policies that become more or less accepted, that its benefits are taken for granted, and that some of the difficulties that were overlooked in the beginning become more and more apparent.

Let me explain what we understand by detente. We do not say that detente is based on the compatibility of domestic systems. We recognise that the values and ideology of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are opposed and sometimes hostile to ours. We do not say that there are no conflicting national interests. We do say that there is a fundamental change in the international environment compared to any other previous period, a change which was expressed by President Eisenhower more than 20 years ago when he said "There is no longer any alternative to peace." Under conditions of nuclear plenty, the decision to engage in general war involves consequences of such magnitude that no responsible statesman can base his policy on the constant threat of such a holocaust, and every leader with a responsibility for these weapons must set himself the task of bringing about conditions which reduce the possibility of such a war to a minimum and, indeed, over any extended period of time reduces this possibility to zero.

So, we do not say that we approve of the domestic evolution of the Soviet Union, or of other Communist countries, with which we are attempting to co-exist. Nor do we accept that detente can be used for military expansion or for threatening weaker countries, or for undermining our traditional friendships. But we do make a conscious effort to set up rules of conduct and to establish a certain inter-connection of interests, and above all to establish communications between the top leaders and between officials at every level, that makes it possible in times of crisis to reduce the danger of accident or miscalculation.

This has been our policy with the Soviet Union and it is the policy we have pursued as well with the People's Republic of China.

With respect to the Soviet Union, it has led us into a series of negotiations on the limitations of strategic arms, on mutual and balanced force reductions on European security, on such measures as the agreement for the prevention of nuclear war -- into extended exchanges between the President and General Secretary Brezhnev designed to lay the basis for a more civil discourse.

This does not preclude that this relationship can break down.

Ideology, long established relations, as well as the internal logic of certain areas, such as the Middle East can produce tensions, and indeed, can produce explosions, that whether or not they are fostered by the two superpowers, may bring them into conflict with each other.

Nor is it foreordained that the behaviour of the two protagonists necessarily lives up to the principles that they declare. In those cases, as happened at one phase during the Middle East crisis, the United States will maintain its commitments and will defend its international position and the position of its friends.

But we will not be easily deflected from the course of seeking a relaxation of tension -- a course which proved itself even in tension periods, and a course which modern technology will impose on any Administration even if we should be prevented

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from carrying out all the measures by different opinions about what should be the purposes of detente -- such as the degree to which we should attempt to use our Foreign Policy to affect the domestic structure of other countries.

With respect to the Peoples Republic of China, we have established Liaison Offices in each other's capitals that are performing many of the functions that are normally carried out by embassies. We have had two visits by myself to Peking, and also a substantial expansion of economic and other exchanges.

So we believe that with respect to the two great Communist countries, we are on a course which is in the interests of all of mankind and which is essential for the long term prospects of peace.

In our relations with our friends in Europe, the year has been disappointing. It had been our intention, in what we called perhaps too rashly "the year of Europe" to affirm that the important measures in Foreign Policy were not confined to relations with adversaries, but that traditional friends could also seize the opportunities of the future. We intended in our various initiatives, to lay to rest concerns about the possibilities of a condominium between the United States and, particularly, the Soviet Union. We attempted to emphasize that the very successes of the Atlantic Alliance had created a new situation which required a new act of vision, and we invited Europe and Japan to participate with us in this task of construction.

Now there have been many debates about whether the tactics by which this objective was pursued were always ideal and there were many comments about this or that initiative. And obviously, any senior official pursuing the policies of his Government, will always be convinced that the measures his Administration took are correct, because otherwise he would not have taken them. But I do not believe that this is the key problem. There is one principle problem in our relations with, especially, Europe at this moment, that only the Europeans can answer. All the other criticisms can be relatively easily taken care of -- and that question is: what is to be the shape of the emerging unified Europe? Is this Europe to be organized on a basis which seeks its identity in exclusivity to our position -- or at least in distance from the United States? Or is it prepared, while affirming its identity, to recognise that the opportunities of the future require Atlantic cooperation?

As far as the United States is concerned, we have given our answer. All of our proposals, however they were advanced, from the proposal of the Atlantic Charter to the proposal of the common approach to energy -- had one fundamental goal: to create a dialogue between ourselves and the Europeans in terms of the challenges that lay ahead of us and in terms of the common problems that needed to be solved.

That offer is still open. We believe that some progress was made in our recent talks in Europe and we will continue both the work on the declarations with the European Community and with our NATO partners, as well as the work on the energy action group.

But the United States is not concerned with developing some legal formula or with a document that responds to a single initiative. The problem before us is whether the nations of the Atlantic area, as well as Japan, faced with self-evident problems that affect them all can develop a common approach or whether they will consume themselves

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in the sort of rivalry that has destroyed other civilisations. I will have a word to say about that when I discuss the energy problem.

As far as Japan is concerned, we believed that we were well under way to developing a new and mature partnership when the energy crisis diverted energies, diverted concerns, and when it created many temporary obstacles. But we believe that Japan should be an integral part of the relationship we are also attempting to develop with Europe, and that Japan's importance and its growing strength and its political maturity entitle it to full consideration as an equal partner of the United States.

The most dramatic event of the year, of course, was the crisis in the Middle East. It is -- it came upon us unexpectedly. We were not warned by any foreign Government that there were any specific plans for an attack. The only warnings we received were general descriptions that the Middle East conflict -- or that the tensions in the Middle East might not be contained. And I have already described the kind of intelligence information that was available and which illustrated that facts are not self explanatory, that one's preconceptions determine very importantly what interpretation is given to these facts.

The war in the Middle East faced the United States with a number of profound issues.

There was the commitment the United States has had through all post war Administrations to the security of Israel. It was our concern that another superpower not exploit the tensions in the area for its own advantage. There was our interest in maintaining a balanced relationship with the Arab countries. And there came to be, increasingly, the problem of the energy crisis.

Our policy had to go through several phases.

The first, during the military phase, was to bring -- to contribute to a situation in which the post war evolution would not be determined by military success primarily, especially by military success growing out of a surprise attack and achieved with Soviet arms.

And secondly, to conduct ourselves in such a manner that in the diplomacy that would follow the war, we would be able to talk to all of the parties involved -- Arab as well as Israeli.

And thirdly, we had to conduct ourselves in such a way that the Middle East would not play the role of the Balkans in 1914, in which local rivalries produced a catastrophe from which Europe never recovered, and in which under contemporary conditions, if a general war occurred the world would never recover.

The result of these efforts, was first, the ceasefire of October 22nd;

Then, the six point agreement that was signed in early November;

And the Geneva peace conference which started last week.

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We are at the very beginning of what will be a slow and agonising effort to reconcile objectives that in many respects seem contradictory. But as I have said repeatedly, and as the President has emphasized -- the United States is committed to making a major effort to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, that recognises the security of all the countries in the Middle East -- as well as the legitimate aspirations of all of the peoples in the area.

We believe that the conference is well launched and we hope that some progress can be made in the disengagement talks that are now going on between Egypt and Israel -- and that could go on between Israel and the other Arab countries.

The Middle East -- the war in the Middle East also brought to a head the energy crisis on a global basis. It brought it to a head, but it did not cause it.

The basic cause of the energy crisis is that demand for energy has been growing exponentially while the incentives for supply have not kept pace -- and in these conditions, sooner or later, the energy-consuming countries would have come up against the situation where their demand far outstripped the possibilities of supply.

And therefore, it is the United States' view that the long term problem in the field of energy makes it essential that a world-wide cooperative effort between consumers and between consumers and producers, be started so that we can deal with the challenges on a long term basis and not have to improvise responses with every year.

In this respect, the energy crisis may be only a forerunner of similar difficulties in other areas -- and this is why the United States supported the world food conference that has now been called for 1974.

These are some of the highlights of last year, and if one is to look ahead, one can see that the major task of building this international system remains to be done.

In East-West relations, in negotiations with the Soviet Union, we have before us the problem of S.A.L.T. and as I have pointed out repeatedly, no task is more urgent than to master the rapid technological change in which weapons may outstrip the capacity of political control.

And therefore, the United States will make a determined effort to fulfill the promise that President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev made to each other, to try to have an agreement on S.A.L.T. in 1974. It is a difficult assignment, because the first S.A.L.T. agreement dealt with quantitative change; the present negotiations deal with the problem of qualitative change, which is both technically and conceptually much more difficult.

And we will continue to pursue the negotiations on mutual force reductions and European security.

In relations with the People's Republic of China, we will continue the policy of normalisation that was started and seek to accelerate it.

Our relations with Europe -- the offer that we made in April and December, still remain on the table, and we are prepared to discuss with our European allies those aspects of our consultative processes that they find difficult. We believe that the problem of fears of condominium cannot be settled by abstract declarations, but only

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by a confident cooperation in trying to devise a future that we can all believe in.

In the Middle East, we will strive for peace -- based on justice and accepted by all of the parties. And we hope that the peace that has been so painfully achieved in Indochina, can be preserved.

These are the major tasks that we have set ourselves together with an initiative toward Latin America which will culminate in a Foreign Ministers' meeting at the end of February in Mexico City, in which the Latin American Foreign Ministers have responded to an initiative by the United States last October, that we should define, together, a new Western hemisphere relationship.

But I would like to stress again, that the basic conviction of the Administration is that the task that we have set ourselves cannot be completed in one Administration, or in one decade, because the international system that has grown up over many decades is fundamentally altered, and the new international system will take many years to construct -- but its ultimate objective must be to contribute to the peace and to the well being of all mankind.

Now I'll be glad to answer your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, early on in your lecture you said that the great task before this Administration is to create an international situation based on a structure so that its participants will have a stake in maintaining it, which is, I suppose, about the same as the late Secretary Dulles used to say when he said the Russians will keep any agreements that is to their benefit to keep.

With that background of continuity in mind, I would like to ask you whether you can tell us at all what stake the Soviet Union has in maintaining the agreements that you have made so far in the Middle East, and if so, where their position is now. I am thinking of the various meetings that you have had with Mr. Dobrynin and others.

A. There are two schools of thought about Soviet objectives in the Middle East. One school of thought is that the Soviet Union has an interest in maintaining the tension because that will guarantee permanent Arab hostility to the United States, and enhances the possibilities of Soviet influence. The other school of thought is that while this may have started out to be the Soviet policy in the 1950's, there have been since then three wars which have consumed a great deal of Soviet resources and whose outcome has been inconclusive. It has been demonstrated that the conflict in the Middle East can bring the superpowers into positions of potential confrontation. And it is therefore at least possible that the Soviet Union now has an interest in contributing to the stabilisation of the situation in an area which neither superpower can really control by itself.

As far as the United States is concerned, we will deal with the Soviet Union as long as its actions are consistent with the second interpretation. That is to say, if the Soviet Union makes a responsible contribution to peace in the Middle East, we will be prepared to cooperate -- not at the expense of our traditional friends nor by imposing a settlement made together with the Soviet Union. We are in direct contact with all of the parties in the Middle East. But we are prepared to deal with the Soviet Union on an equitable basis as long as its motives, or as long as its actions, are consistent with a responsible course.

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At Geneva, the Soviet Union contributed to a positive atmosphere. As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko met with Foreign Minister Eban.

The Soviet Union cooperated also in focusing the discussions on the first issue of disengagement which seemed more manageable than some of the more difficult ones that will come along further down the road.

So as of now, judging the Soviet Union by its actions, we are willing to cooperate. Should Soviet behaviour change, we can always re-examine our policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the institutionalising of foreign policy again today. Perhaps you can comment on that in light of increasing published stories that you have displayed an increasing penchant for secrecy and instead of institutionalising it, you have been personalising it and making it entirely dependent on your own role.

A. Of course the final judgment on foreign policy is the substance and not the procedure. The institutionalisation of foreign policy is in my view the development of a set of principles of foreign policy, and of a sufficient support among those who have to carry it out, so that continuity within the limits of the changes of the political process is assured.

Now, I have read many of these stories. And of course I do not propose to engage in a public debate with the various sources of these stories.

I believe that I am working closely with the appropriate Assistant Secretaries who are responsible for the areas with which we are dealing, and I believe that anyone who has a real knowledge of how policy is being made in the State department today knows that there is a close sense of participation by all of those who have responsibility for regional areas or for those functional areas that can most contribute to policy. How this filters down below the Assistant Secretary level is primarily the responsibility of the Assistant Secretaries. But I believe that after a period of six to nine months, it will be quite obvious what has been done.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that the Arab states have lifted their oil embargo against Europe and Japan and have restored some of the production cutbacks, when do you expect them to start supplying the United States with oil again?

A. I don't want to speculate on when the Arab countries will restore -- will lift the boycott against the United States. As I have pointed out at several previous Press Conferences, the United States could understand certain actions by Arab countries at a time when the United States seemed to be -- was supplying military equipment to one of the sides in a war. Now that the United States has publicly declared its commitment to bring about a just settlement, now that much of the progress that has been made towards a settlement can be traced to American actions, discriminatory measures against the United States become increasingly difficult to understand.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much knowledge did you have, either before you left Washington or after you left Saudi Arabia, that the Arab nations were about to make a change in their oil export policy to take Europe and Japan off the hook?

A. Well, I had no knowledge of this before I left Washington. And I had no precise knowledge of specific measures when I left Saudi Arabia, except that I knew that certain measures were under consideration.

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Now, in analysing the supply of oil, one has to consider that there are two problems involved. One is the problem of the embargo; the second is the problem of production. Lifting the embargo without increasing the production does not help a great deal, because it means that more nations would compete for an inadequate supply. So both of these measures have to go hand in hand. And on the whole we consider it a positive step that production has been increased.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you seem to be expressing an increasing sense of irritation with the fact that Saudi Arabia, principally, has not lifted the oil embargo against the United States, though it has taken these other actions towards Europe and Japan. Was there some action that you expected to happen by now from the Saudi Arabians that did not? Do you link a possible action to the disengagement talks in Geneva?

A. I do not express an increasing sense of irritation. I am expressing the view that the United States has consistently taken, and which I have expressed at every previous Press Conference -- namely, that discriminatory action against the United States becomes increasingly inappropriate when the United States is the principal country engaging itself in the search for a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This is a position that has been taken by this Administration from the beginning. It is not said in any spirit of irritation, but it is a statement of reality.

I do not want to say what I expected. But the view that I have expressed here is not caused by any disappointment about what I had been led to believe.

Q. Is there a link as well with the disengagement talks?

A. The United States' position with respect to the oil embargo has been that we cannot discuss specific peace terms in relation to the lifting of the oil embargo; that we can express our commitment to bring about a just and durable peace, or to help bring it about, based on Security Council Resolution 242. But as I have explained many times before, we cannot bargain individually with oil-producing countries and then enter into a peace conference in which the parties have to negotiate this process all over again.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have the impression that one of the problems with the SALT talks is that this Government hasn't gotten its own ducks in a row. For example, do you go along with the apparent doctrine that was enunciated the other day by Dr. Schlesinger which he called, for lack of a better name, "total equality"?

A. Well, how can you in an egalitarian society not accept total equality? I will agree with you that our Government has not thought through all the implications of the problem of qualitative change. I agree with the phrase "total equality". But like all slogans, it does not supply its own answer. And I am certain that my friend Dr. Schlesinger would agree that once you have enunciated that doctrine you still have to give it content in terms of what it is that you want to have equal. Is it numbers, is it throw-weight, is it warheads, is it everything? How do you compare superiority in bombers to superiority in missiles? How do you compare the superiority or the carrying power of bombers with the throw-weight of missiles? These are the tough questions that have to be answered. And I am frank to say that while we have developed positions, and while I believe our positions are better than those of the Soviet Union, we have not -- there is not the conceptual basis for the SALT II that existed over a decade of previous work with respect of SALT I. However, I am confident that as far as the United States Government is concerned this problem will

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be substantially overcome in the very near future, and that if the Soviet Union is prepared to proceed, that we have a chance of meeting our deadline of 1974.

Q. Along those lines, Dr. Kissinger, about five or six weeks ago a senior U.S. official expressed the hope, I guess is the best word, that these problems you are talking about as far as both the Soviets and we are concerned would be settled by Christmas. Would it be fair to say, then, that these negotiations or your private discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin are behind schedule, and if so could you tell us why?

A. Well, there are some senior officials who get caught by giving too early deadlines. Whether a particular negotiation is on or behind schedule you can really only determine in retrospect, after it is completed.

We expect to make progress in clarifying the various points of view within our Government in the very near future. And I believe, based in part also on conversations I have recently had, that the Soviet Union is working very seriously on the problem. How the various issues can then be reconciled remains to be seen. But I think everybody recognizes that the pace of technology is such that there is a certain urgency in pushing these negotiations, and they will be pushed.

Q. Is this what you have been discussing with Mr. Dobrynin in the last two days?

A. I never go into the discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin.

Q. On the same question, do you think it is still conceivable that President Nixon could go to the Soviet Union this summer, or would the SALT negotiations make it more feasible to go later in the year?

A. No date has been set, but the summer is certainly not ruled out.

Q. What do you think, though? Do you think you could have a SALT agreement by this summer?

A. Not with O'Leary sitting next to you. I am not going to give you another date on anything.

(laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied by the degree of cooperation that you are getting from the Governments of Israel and Egypt and Jordan to get a peace in the Middle East?

A. I think that one of the results of the two trips that I have made into the Middle East is that the Governments that you have mentioned now have a much clearer common understanding of what needs to be done. They are now talking from a common base. And I have no complaint about the cooperation that I have received from any of these Governments, and I believe that there is a good possibility of progress.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, if you have found a way to co-exist with the Soviet Union and China, what is there to prevent a detente or co-existence with Cuba? Do you have any plans for attempting to achieve a rapprochement with Cuba or on your trip will you go to Havana?

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A. I certainly have no plan to go to Havana on any trip that I am now planning. And the major obstacle to rapprochement with Cuba has been the hostility of the Cuban Government and its commitment to a revolutionary policy throughout the Western hemisphere.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you have talked and given us a more specific definition of "detente" and some of the limitations on detente. And you also referred to the inter-connection between issues. I know you will not go into the discussions you've had with the Soviet Ambassador, but can you tell us in any more generalised way what the present inter-relationship is of a solution of the Middle East crisis to the pattern of relationships with the Soviet Union -- SALT, MBFR, these other issues?

A. Well, it is obvious that it is not possible for a country to exacerbate tensions in one area and to seek relaxation in another. This Administration has consistently opposed the notion of selective detente, in which one area would be pacified while there would be very active conflict in another. Therefore, obviously we would have to judge the Soviet sincerity in seeking across the board relaxation of tensions by its behaviour in all the negotiations in which we are engaged with it, including that of the Middle East.

Now, I want to repeat: I'm not saying this in any particularly challenging manner, because the Soviet behaviour in the prelude to the Geneva conference and during the first phase of the Geneva conference has been constructive and has been recognised to be constructive by all of the parties there.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, one gets the impression that lately, since you took over, there has been a vast improvement in India-America relations. Is it possible for you to put your relations with India in perspective against the background of the global peace that you seek?

A. We have always considered, even during periods of difficult relationship -- we've always considered India as one of the major countries in the world. It is a great democracy, and a great democracy in an under-developed country, that can be a symbol for many other countries. There is a long history of friendship between India and the United States. And we have no conflicting national interests. And, therefore, as far as the Administration is concerned, we have made -- you are quite correct -- a serious effort to improve our relationship with India.

I believe this effort has been reciprocated.

One of its tangible expressions has been the recent Rupee settlement, which we consider the beginning of a continually improving relationship.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you get the kind of progress that you're talking about in disengagement, would it entail a quick opening of the Suez Canal? And do you consider that to be one of the principal Soviet objectives at this stage of the negotiation?

A. I believe that -- first, I don't want to speculate about what the specific terms of a disengagement scheme would be; but I do not believe that opening of the Suez Canal, however advantageous it might be to any of the parties, is the principal objective of the Soviet Union.

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I want to stress also that much of the diplomacy that has preceded the opening of the Geneva talks was not one that was organized between us and the Soviet Union but was developed on several trips through the Middle East by myself, on behalf of the Administration, and in direct relationship with the parties in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union has supported these efforts. But it was not a solution that was achieved between Moscow and Washington and then handed to the parties in the conflict. Much of it has emerged out of the discussions that took place at Kilometer 101 between the Egyptians and the Israelis without either U.S. or Soviet participation. So I do not believe that the principal Soviet interest would be the opening of the Suez Canal, even if that should turn out to be one of the results.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a two part question, if I may. In view of Kuwait's refusal to extradite to Italy the Palestinians who were the self-admitted murderers of 16 American citizens -- in view of Kuwait's continuation of the oil embargo -- how is it that we have reports that we have planned, as a nation, to supply this nation with continued military aid as well as agricultural products?

That's the first part of the question, sir.

A. My understanding is that there is a plan to extradite these terrorists to the so-called Palestinian liberation organization, which has promised to punish them severely.

Now, our interest is that this terrorism be ended; and the United States has made strong representations to that effect.

With respect to other measures, they will have to await the actions of the Kuwaiti Government on other fronts; but we have not yet seen any reason to terminate them.

Q. Well, in connection with his promise to punish them severely, I seem to recall your predecessor -- Secretary Rogers -- asked for the death penalty of those Palestinians that murdered Ambassador Noel last March. I checked with your Sudan desk this week and find that these terrorists have not even been brought to trial.

Now, in consideration of that, and reports that a group similar to this -- or possibly the same group -- planned to assassinate you, what is the next Administration prepared to do about this, other than regret it or plead for aviation security -- usually in vain?

A. Well, the Administration has taken a very strong stand against any attacks on me -- (laughter) -- but our position on terrorism is clear. We believe that it is a worldwide problem that must be stamped out. We will renew our efforts to achieve a multilateral agreement which puts teeth into the enforcement of anti-terrorist activity. But I do not want to comment on every individual action of every Government concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the answer may be in your responses here; but the thing that I am still uncertain about is that you will recall, in that saloon in the basement of the National Hotel in Moscow, when you briefed us on the SALT agreement, there was a certain amount of optimism about the future with respect to offensive nuclear weapons. I acknowledge it was qualified optimism.

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Now, who is responsible for the fact that things have not gone quite as well as you thought at the time?

Now, if the premise of my question is wrong, why, the answer is inoperative -- I don't know. (laughter)

A. Well, I think one would have to look again at the transcript of that Press Conference in order to be able to determine what is meant by the phrase "it has not gone as well as one hoped."

The agreement that was made in Moscow in 1972 was supposed to last for only five years. And it was to permit the negotiation of a more permanent agreement.

It was recognised at the time that the problem of the multiple warheads would soon come to the fore. If the strategic problem had remained what it was in 1972 -- that is to say, individual weapons with individual warheads -- the situation would have been essentially stabilised by that agreement.

The new element in the equation is the rapid evolution of technology, coupled with improvements in accuracy that have -- even within the limits of that agreement -- produced vulnerabilities, perhaps a year or two more rapidly than one expected at the time.

When I was a professor, I used to study the issue of arms control. All of the theoretical thinking was concentrated on the problem of quantity -- how to get control of quantitative change. How to master technology really has no good theoretical base. When we started the first SALT negotiations, there was a vast literature on which one could draw for an understanding of the problem of numbers.

So if things have not gone as well -- which I wouldn't quite concede -- if we are now facing new problems, it is not because anyone has done anything wrong. It is simply because technology has been accelerating at a rate that threatens to outstrip the capacity to control it.

Q. Technology has been accelerating from the Russian side, not from our side?

A. Well, it's been accelerating on both sides, but especially on the Russian side.

Q. To follow up, Mr. Secretary --

A. This young lady here has been very patient, and then we'll get the next question.

Q. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. Also a two part question. I hope I can get a two part answer.

A. You'll probably get a five part. (laughter)

Q. First of all, what can you tell us of the fate of the Israeli POW'S in Syria? And, secondly, what concessions do you expect Israel to make in the Geneva talks?

A. With respect to the Israeli prisoners in Syria, the United States has of course strongly supported their release and the provision at least of lists to the Israelis.

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It is not correct -- as has been pointed out -- that we promised this a condition of the ceasefire, though we did indicate that we had been given to understand that a major effort would be made after Israel had already accepted the cease-fire.

Nevertheless, the United States supports the fact that the lists should be produced and that the prisoners should be released as rapidly as possible.

Q. Are they still alive?

A. We have no independent information. We have no information that would indicate that they are not alive, but we have really no information of any kind -- that is, of an independent source.

What was the second one?

Q. What do you expect the Israelis to do?

A. We are not approaching the problem of negotiations by drawing up a list of concessions that either side should make. What we have attempted to do is discover, as honestly as we could on these trips through the Middle East, what the minimum requirements of each side were and then to attempt to bring these into some relation to each other.

To the extent that the parties have talked to each other, as the Egyptians and Israelis have on Kilometer 101, some rapprochement has developed out of the process of negotiation; but we are not starting with an abstract list of concessions which we are then asking any country to make.

There was a follow up question

Q. Yes. Mr. Secretary, you spoke just earlier of the lack of a conceptual basis for SALT II to be one of the problems and then expressed confidence that this problem would be overcome in the very near future. Do you mean within our own Government only, or do you expect that perhaps in the near future there will be some agreement on a conceptual basis for SALT II between the Soviet Union and the United States -- as there was, on a conceptual basis, for SALT II in, I think, the spring of 1971?

A. I hope for both. But, of course, there have to be two stages. First, we have to clear up our own thinking. But don't let me leave you with a misconception. The United States made a proposal last year -- which was perfectly adequate, from our point of view -- and which reconciled many different points of view within our Government.

As you progress in a negotiation, you always face the problem then of getting down to the essentials. And, as we are getting down to the essentials, the need for a new conceptual base, or a more refined conceptual base, has become apparent.

Q. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.

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Minister of State

Mr Goulding

Huff 21-12 Mr. Oration
Mr. Hanley 15 Dec 1973

Phelan

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1. Thank you for your minute on "Conceptualism in Foreign Policy".

I quite agree that Mr Annenberg's definitions do not help much!

I will leave the philosophy to the Planning Staff. As

I understand it, and in plain terms, conceptualism as applied to

Dr Kissinger's foreign policy means the following:

- a. He has an overall view of the nature of international relations and of the balance of power, developed from historical research and analysis of past situations. This overall view, as explained (and developed) in his books, governs his approach to the management of international affairs on behalf of the United States.
- b. He has applied this overall view, and continues to apply it to the contemporary situation and the broad groups of international problems, in such a way as to develop, in the various areas, a set of principles and priorities which should determine US policy. This, of course, against the background of United States interests in the broadest sense.
- c. These principles and priorities are then translated into US policy on the ground, both in the form of present policy, and trying to shape developments in the way required by future policy. In the process contradictions must be ironed out, and questions of method and presentation resolved.

2. In short

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2. In short, Kissinger's conceptualism is to work from the general to the particular, always holding the general in mind. It is the reverse of pragmatism.

H T A Overton


H T A Overton
North America Department

20 December 1973

copy to
Mr Elliott
Mr Cable

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Mr Overton

Now see

(61) (59)

CONCEPTUALISM IN FOREIGN POLICY

1. During the Dr Kissinger visit Mr Amery asked the US Ambassador what was really meant when Dr Kissinger was described as having a "conceptual" approach to international affairs. Mr Annenberg said that he was not really sure but would think about it. The result is the attached letter. Mr Amery wonders whether we could improve on Mr Annenberg's definitions. It may be that the Washington Embassy's reporting has already covered this point.

M I Goulding

M I Goulding

18 December 1973

c.c. Mr Elliott
Mr Cable

P.A. gl 221

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00040

FROM THE OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

(59)

To..... The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.,
Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs,
Downing Street, SW1A 2AL.

December 13, 1973

Rec'd 14/12

My dear Julian:

I am still struggling with
"conceptual". Don't you think it
might be a good thing if we were to
table this for the holidays?

Warmly,

P.A.
22/1

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 72 20 DEC 1973 Amv2/5

W. Annenberg
Walter Annenberg

Mr. Bowley

*Prin' even for a question
I put to Mr. A. as to
what 'conceptual' really
means - Can we improve
his def'n? Re 1975 or
earlier. Cable input to allow to
help. 2A*

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00041

FROM THE OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR 59

To..... The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.,
Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs,
Downing Street, SW1A 2AL.

December 13, 1973

Rec'd 14/12

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Warmly,

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 72 20 DEC 1973 Amv2/5

W. Annenberg
Walter Annenberg

Mr. Bowley

*Print name for a question
I put to Mr. A. as to
what 'conceptual' really
means - Can we improve
his def'n's? The 1965 or
earlier cable might be able to
help. JA*

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from Britannica:

Concept is an abstract notion or idea.
Any notion combining elements into the
idea of one object.

A thought or opinion.

Conceptual - of or pertaining to
conception or a concept.

Conceptualism: the doctrine that
general ideas, or universals, exist in
the mind only and that the mind is
capable of forming abstract ideas
independently of concrete existences:
a theory devised as intermediate between
the extremes of nominalism and realism.

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A concept is a general notion or an object of thought.

Conceptual is an adjective that is in effect, pertaining to the forming of a concept.

Conceptualism is the noun form which might be best described as a philosophical doctrine which might be midway between that which is nominal and that which is real.

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(58)



CON 2/1

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REGISTRY No. 18
12 DEC 1973

BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL

845 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

AMVZ/5

J A N Graham Esq, CMG
British Embassy
Washington DC

For action to

6 December 1973

U.S. Desk

For information to

Canada Desk

Mr. Salmon

P/A

Dea Johnny,

Please refer to my letter of 19 November about
Admiral Zumwalt's talk to the Calvin Bullock Forum and his
criticism of the USA's NATO allies.

2. As I mentioned to you orally last Friday, I was
heavily attacked on the subject of our lack of support of
the US over the Middle East crisis when I was in St Louis
last week. James McDonnell, the Chairman of the McDonnell
Douglas Aircraft Corporation attacked me vigorously on the
subject over lunch, and I only wish that I had had avail-
able to use at the time the Ambassador's brilliant riposte
("I presume you are talking about the Russians") to
Kissinger's remark about the United States being let down
most by those who were most consulted in Europe.

3. I should also, I think, record that Michael Witunsky -
who plays a leading role in the St Louis Council on Foreign
Relations and chairs a discussion group on the St Louis TV -
said that he thought that one of the consequences of the
Middle East crisis might well, once the fuel restrictions
started to bite, be a serious danger of a rise in anti-
Semitism in the country. Remembering how out West Jews have
until comparatively recently been blackballed from men's
clubs, I think that there is a good deal of substance to
this warning. Indeed, the virulently anti-Semitic remarks
of the President of St George's Society when I sat next door
to him at the St Andrew's Society's Dinner on Friday
suggested that the danger was already with us.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Hugh Overton in
the FCO.

Yours ever,

John.

J A Ford

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I heard that
the US
seemed
favourable.
H. J.

Swedish
- N. K. P. too

P.A. gl
12/12

00045



RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 72
10 DEC 1973

Amw 2/5

OFFICIAL TEXT

CC W N R N A D

FED
SEADUND RPT MKS 11/12
WOD
B N A R Y

AM

UNITED STATES EMBASSY, 55/56 UPPER BROOK STREET, LONDON W1A 2LH

Friday
December 7th, 1973

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE

Following is the transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger's news conference, in Washington, December 6:

(Begin transcript)

Secretary Kissinger: With your agreement, ladies and gentlemen, I thought we could do the press conference in two parts. As you know, some appointments were announced at the White House -- (interrupted by sound of tape recorder rewind) -- I have known about the Washington Post all along (laughter), but this is the first time they carry it into a press conference. (laughter)

Mr. Marder: We are doing a tape on you, sir.

A. I thought this was a tape of one of your editorial conferences. (laughter)

Mr. Marder: No -- that would come through much more clearly. No need to stop.

A. Not on your editorial page.

Some appointments were announced at the White House this morning. I thought I'd go over those briefly for the benefit of this group, take some questions about those appointments, and then go on to the substantive part, if that is agreeable to you.

Now, with respect to the announcements that were made at the White House today, a total of nine nominations were announced -- three Ambassadorial and six departmental.

The President has nominated the following as Ambassadors:

David Popper as Ambassador to Chile,

David Newsom as Ambassador to Indonesia, and

Walter Stoessel as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Popper is currently Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. In this position, he did a distinguished job in handling the Middle East at the United Nations from this end. He is a Foreign Service Officer with the rank of Career Minister, and served previously as Ambassador to Cyprus.

David Newsom, who is currently Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, is being nominated to succeed Francis Galbraith as Ambassador to Indonesia. As you know, Ambassador Newsom has served admirably in his current position in bringing the importance of Africa to the attention of the country, and in conducting his office

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in a manner which won him the award, the 1973 Rockefeller Public Service award yesterday, of which the Department of State is extremely proud.

As Ambassador to the Soviet Union, the President is nominating Walter Stoessel, old friend -- if I may say so, student -- from Harvard. He has had extensive experience in European and Soviet affairs since entering the Foreign Service in 1942. His nomination underlines the importance we attach to the Ambassadorship in the Soviet Union.

Now, turning to Departmental appointments. As Counselor of the Department of State, the President intends to nominate Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Mr. Sonnenfeldt is a class one Foreign Service Officer, has been a close associate of mine on the National Security Council staff. Prior to that, he has held a number of positions in the Department of State. He was recently confirmed by the Senate Finance Committee for the position of Under Secretary of Treasury. He will work as Counselor, obviously, on matters, such matters as may be assigned to him, but he will particularly concentrate on European relations, SALT, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, the sort of problems he worked on also previously.

As Ambassador-at-large, the President is nominating Robert McCloskey, presently Ambassador to Cyprus. I do not have to introduce Ambassador McCloskey to this group. He will be given various negotiating responsibilities and other assignments on an ad hoc basis. In addition, he will have overall supervision of the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Bureau of Congressional Relations, and the Office of Press Relations.

As Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the President is nominating Donald B. Easum, presently Ambassador to Upper Volta, with considerable experience in both African and Latin American affairs, and one of the ablest young foreign service officers.

As Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, the President is nominating Arthur Hartman to succeed Walter Stoessel. Mr. Hartman is presently Deputy Chief of Mission to the European Community, worked in the State Department Secretariat, and has wide experience in European affairs and a good background in economic matters.

As Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, the President is nominating William B. Buffum, presently Ambassador to Lebanon. He has had exceptional experience in the U.N. and international organization affairs.

As Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, the President is nominating Thomas Enders to succeed Willis C. Armstrong. Mr. Armstrong has served as the head of this Bureau with distinction since he returned from retirement in 1972.

Mr. Enders is presently our Charge in Phnom Penh, one of the ablest young Foreign Service Officers, who has, under extremely difficult conditions, performed in a remarkable fashion in Phnom Penh. He has also an exceptional record in the economics field.

I would like to say a word about two fine officers who have elected to resign from their posts.

William Casey, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, has informed me of his intention to assume the position of President of the Export-Import bank. As you know, this is a most prestigious and important post, one well suited for a man of such exceptional talents as William Casey. I regret that he is departing, but wish him every success in his new assignment.

Joseph Sisco's resignation as Assistant Secretary of State and retirement from the Foreign Service was announced yesterday. I need hardly emphasize how deeply I regret his departure. His career has been characterized by tireless work and splendid performance. In the last two months, Mr. Sisco has been an invaluable source of

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strength for this country, for the President, for the Department, and for me personally. He has agreed to remain in his present assignment for another several months before going on to assume the Presidency of Hamilton college.

I intend to recommend to the President individuals to succeed Messrs. Casey and Sisco in the near future.

Now, I will be glad to take some questions on personnel, and then I will go on to substantive questions. Do you want to wait for that?

Q. A question on personnel. You had expected to name an Ambassador to Tokyo shortly. What's the outlook for that now?

A. I nearly said within a week. (laughter) We consider the embassy in Tokyo one of the most important assignments in the Government, and we are looking for the best man. We are not yet ready to make an announcement.

Q. Has the President withdrawn Mr. Sonnenfeldt's nomination as Under Secretary so there won't need to be a vote in the Senate? And will he have to be confirmed by the Senate for the new job?

A. He will have to be confirmed by the Senate for the new job. He will be put before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and after that the entire Senate will have an opportunity to vote on Mr. Sonnenfeldt, and we are confident that a man of his distinction will be confirmed rapidly.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there is now no Ambassador to Sweden, or even a DCM. Is it your intention to fill that post?

A. I promised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that we would review the question of relations with Sweden at the time that we are reviewing all other Ambassadorial appointments. And I will keep that promise.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in the light of Mr. Sisco's distinguished service, can you tell us what efforts were made to hold him, to retain him?

A. Mr. Sisco felt that he was -- of course, Mr. Sisco should speak for himself. My understanding is that Mr. Sisco felt that he was at a time in his life where if he ever was going to make a change to a senior administrative position in academic life this was the appropriate moment to do it, and maybe the last moment to do it.

I attempted to dissuade him from this. He has assured me that it was only the importance of the assignment on which he was working that made him hesitate.

I can only emphasize again that I'm losing a trusted colleague and a valued friend. But I'm also certain that he will be consulted frequently.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you explain how Secretary Shultz was persuaded to defer taking Mr. Sonnenfeldt as his Under Secretary of the Treasury and what criteria were behind the Administration's decision to take him into the Department of State instead?

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A. Well, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, as those of you who know him can confirm, is not exactly a chattel that gets passed from hand to hand, and he has been known to express strong views about what he would intend. So finally the decision was left up to Mr. Sonnenfeldt.

It was thought that, given the extraordinary importance that we attach to the SALT talks, to the MBFR discussions, and to our relationship with Europe, and given the policy of having some individuals on the seventh floor responsible for the range of issues of interdepartmental significance, that Mr. Sonnenfeldt had unique qualifications for that position.

I'm delighted that I managed to persuade him to accept this position. Secretary Shultz would have been delighted, as he should have been, to have Mr. Sonnenfeldt associated with him at the Treasury, but he recognized also that Mr. Sonnenfeldt can make a very major contribution here.

Now, let me turn to substance. Let me make a few comments on the Middle East and on my forthcoming trip, and then let me answer your question.

On the Middle East, the last time I met with this group I indicated that we might be able to make a formal announcement as to the time and place of the conference in a relatively brief period of time. I seem to have an obsession with weeks, and I think I indicated that it would be done in a week.

The fact is that we consider it extremely probable that the conference will begin on December 18 in Geneva. There are some technical details to be worked out as to the form of invitation, as to the nature of the invitations, and matters of this kind. We believe them to be relatively easily soluble, and we're in touch with the parties now as well as with the Soviet Union and the Secretary General to work out the appropriate procedure. But we have no reason at this point to doubt that the conference will take place in the manner in which I have indicated.

We believe that once the conference starts a negotiating process will be under way which, dealing first with issues of a military nature and then turning to the overall settlement, will bring about a settlement in accordance with resolution 242. And the United States, as I have stated repeatedly, will use its influence to bring about such a settlement.

With respect to my trip to the NATO meeting, obviously there has been some disagreement. Equally clearly, the Atlantic Alliance remains the cornerstone of our Foreign Policy, and I'm going there with the attitude that the need for starting and for giving a new impetus of Atlantic relationship remains and that the United States will spare no effort to inject new vitality, creativity and hope into the Atlantic relationship. I'm not going in an attitude of confrontation and acrimony.

I'll be glad to answer questions.

Q. In light of the breakoff of kilometer 101 talks, the Israeli forces being in a high state of alert, the continued oil squeeze, what reasons, as specifically as you can be, do you have for expecting a constructive peace conference in Geneva?

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A. The kilometer 101 talks concerned the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. While we regret that they have been broken off, we believe that the issues that were raised at this conference are soluble and can be dealt with particularly when other countries can play a more active role in relation to them.

The high state of alert of both sides is, to a considerable extent, produced by the military dispositions that now exist. Both sides have their forces in the rear of the other. And both sides are in danger of imminent encirclement if military operations resume. Therefore, the penalty for being surprised is extremely serious. This calls attention to the fact that there is a need of a separation of forces that reduces this danger. And I believe that the experience of the last two months will have brought this home to both of the parties.

With respect to the oil embargo, I have stated our position at the last press conference, which is that we understand the Arab point of view. The United States prior to October 6 perhaps did not see the situation with the same degree of urgency as some of the Arab countries. And we can understand also the decisions that were made during military operations.

Now that the United States is taking an active part in the negotiations and has affirmed that it will work for an implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, we continue to believe that discriminatory measures against the United States and pressures are no longer appropriate, and we are talking in that sense to those Arab nations with which we are in contact.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you've spoken with regard to your NATO visit, the obvious disagreements which exist there. Of course, you've got the biggest piece of real estate pulled out of there sometime ago as far as the military went to France. Now, you've had the damage -- if such is the right word -- damage done by the different view some of the NATO countries took of the Middle East situation than we did.

My question is: how easy -- and this is difficult to say, I know -- but how easy do you think that this can be repaired? And how much will it depend not on what you do at NATO now but what you do at Geneva later?

A. First, it is clear -- as I pointed out last time -- that there are a number of significant disagreements in the Alliance -- some of them produced by style, some of them produced by the fact that some of our allies have been absorbed with bringing about European unity while we have naturally put more emphasis on Atlantic unity and some of them produced by a different view with respect to Middle East policy.

I believe that we will be able in the discussions -- taking the last point first on the Middle East -- to make clear that this was not a difference in tactics but perhaps a different assessment as to what was at stake -- the relationship between what was at stake to the energy crisis, and the possibilities that existed for individual action.

I believe that the discussions that may take place at NATO can contribute to clarifying the points of view. In any event, whatever happens at the NATO meeting can only be the beginning of a process; it cannot bring about a final resolution.

Now, obviously, what happens in the Middle East -- even more importantly, the

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perceptions of the two sides about the relationship of what happens in the Middle East to their energy problem -- will greatly affect the vitality of the relationship in the long term. We believe that the energy problem is accentuated by the Arab-Israeli conflict but that it has much deeper sources, the most important of which is that demand has outrun the incentives for supply and that it is an aspect of the rapid industrialization of the developed nations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you were told earlier this week that the 101 talks might be resumed by week's end. Now, probably something has happened to change your estimate of that; and we hear that the Israeli Defence Minister may be delayed in getting to Washington to talk to you. And we hear about reports today of Israeli and Egyptian planes being shot down.

What has happened, and do you think it now likely that the cease-fire could come apart and jeopardize the holding of that conference?

A. In a situation in which the forces are as closely mixed as they are and in which we, of course, do not control the decisions of either side, any prediction is somewhat hazardous. We do not believe that the ceasefire will come apart and that the conference will be jeopardized. But, I must repeat: I must add the caveat that we do not, of course, control the decisions.

As for the delay of the arrival of the Israeli Defence Minister, all I have is the news ticker. I don't know what caused it. We have not been officially informed that he is, in fact, delaying his arrival; and I expect to get some official notification, if there is a delay in his meeting with me -- which was scheduled for tomorrow -- later in the day.

The resumption of the 101 talks really depends on the assessment both sides make of what should be done in the 101 talks and what should be done later at the conference. This is no conclusive indication of the difficulty of making progress; it may simply be a decision as to the venue at which some of these issues will be discussed.

Q. Sir, do you expect the 101 talks to resume before December 18th, or do you think that whole operation will be transferred to Geneva?

A. I am not sure whether they will be resumed. It is one of the issues we want to discuss. At any rate, the subject matter of those talks -- if the talks are not resumed before Geneva -- will, of course, require the most urgent consideration at Geneva.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since you have two job descriptions, but basically this single function of being the architect of U.S. Foreign Policy, I'm wondering if Henry Kissinger, as Secretary of State, now finds himself at odds with Henry Kissinger of the NSC on the question of what is properly held secret.

And this is by way of asking if the Secretary of State is now prepared to tell the nation in precise detail the reasons for the October alert when perhaps the Chief of the Security Council is not.

A. You're trying to institutionalize schizophrenia. (laughter)

The hesitation about going into all the details was produced by the fact that we did

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not think that it would be helpful in the present situation, when we're trying to bring about a settlement cooperatively with the Soviet Union, to re-create a spirit of confrontation of a rather intense 36-hour period.

As many news reports have pointed out, we formed the view, on the basis of evidence that seemed to us conclusive, that there was a possibility of a unilateral Soviet move in the Middle East. And this was reinforced by certain communications that we received.

A military alert, moreover, should be clearly understood. We went from defence condition 5 to defence condition 3 -- which is that defence condition 1 is imminence of hostilities. So this was not a very high state of alert; it is the state of alert in which the Pacific command is at all times. So there was no additional alert taken in the Pacific. The Strategic Air Command is always in defence condition 4, so that was only a slight increase in its readiness. And all an alert does is to prepare our forces in case they would be needed; it has no other practical consequence.

It was produced by what we thought would have been a very significant move, the first time that Soviet combat forces were introduced in an area not contiguous to the Soviet Union, and for reasons not connected with the preservation of a socialist regime. And, therefore, it was a matter taken extremely seriously.

We have never published the details of correspondence between the President and the General Secretary because, if we once start this process, every exchange will be written from the point of view of its impact later. And we have given as much of our reasoning as we could, and we have given a more detailed chronology to certain Congressional Committees.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to get back, if I could, for a moment to the oil situation, which is such a vital concern of the American people. There have been a number of reports in the last day or so that there may be consideration of a phased return of oil supplies to the United States in return for a phased Israeli withdrawal. Now, you yourself are reported to have indicated to Egyptian President Sadat on your last trip that any Middle East settlement is likely to take a fairly long period of time, perhaps as long as a year or two. In view of that, is the phased withdrawal idea the best hope that the American people have of getting a return of these vital oil supplies?

A. First of all, when I saw President Sadat, we were alone. And what you are referring to is a conversation at a dinner party with an Egyptian editor of a somewhat enthusiastic frame of mind. You cannot conclude from that that this is necessarily the discussion I had with President Sadat.

We have not engaged in a public discussion as to the methods by which the oil embargo might be mitigated, because we recognize that this is also a difficult problem for the Arab countries that have to make the decision.

Our basic philosophy was stated in the last press conference here, which is that we do not think it is helpful for us to negotiate -- prior to a conference which will address these questions -- a separate agreement relating oil to particular issues at the conference table. And I have stated our general philosophy earlier.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, have you detected any change in the Arab policy on oil?

A. I think we will have to let events speak for themselves. You all heard Minister Yamani when he appeared yesterday. And while we are in the process of engaging in these discussions, before my trip I don't think I want to speculate on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on another subject -- we have seen a resurgence of military activity in Vietnam. Do you foresee any possible introduction of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam, either through use of the War Powers Legislation or through any other form of current or future legislation?

A. With respect to the War Powers Legislation, there has been speculation that the War Powers Legislation supersedes existing legislation. It is a question that was asked of me in executive session in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I promised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that we would make a legal study. Our legal adviser has concluded that the War Powers Legislation does not supersede any existing legislation, and we will notify the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to that effect in a formal letter.

Therefore, any military action that would be contemplated would be taken only in accordance with the provisions of both the joint resolution and existing legislation -- in other words, would be fully discussed by the Congress.

Q. Does that mean, sir, that if there was a decision by the Administration to reintroduce forces, that it would seek new legislation, or simply consult over the existing status. I don't quite follow you -- because the existing legislation, I believe, does foreclose the reintroduction of any U.S. combat forces into Indochina.

A. Without Congressional approval -- that is correct. And that is what we would seek.

Q. Would that require new legislation in your judgment?

A. I think it would require whatever form the Congress expresses its approval. But we do not foresee this as an imminent possibility.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with the confirmation of a new Vice President, there is increased Congressional discussion about the possibility of impeachment of the President or of the President possibly resigning. How does this discussion of impeachment and resignation affect the conduct of Foreign Policy?

A. Well, I have pointed out at two previous press conferences that the constant -- to the degree that the authority of those who have the constitutional responsibility for conducting Foreign Policy is being drawn into question by whatever process, it complicates the task of Foreign Policy and it creates long-term dangers.

I might say one other thing -- one thing to Mr. O'Leary, which is that as Secretary of State, as I said in my confirmation hearing, and as I have attempted to practice, I do recognize the importance of openness and of maximum disclosure.

Q. May I follow this up. You mentioned Sheikh Yamani. When he came out I think he said that once Israel had agreed to a timetable and begins to pull back, the restrictions on the oil shipments would be gradually eased. It seems it may be an ambiguous statement.

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How do you understand that? Does Israel have to agree to the total pullback although only taking initial steps before the shipments are partially resumed?

A. Well, I think also that the Minister pointed out that we both expressed our views frankly and I believe he said constructively, which usually means that we did not necessarily agree to each other's formulas precisely.

Q. Mr. Secretary --

Q. Mr. Secretary --

A. I don't know why I keep calling on former students. Go ahead, Les.

Q. Two brief questions. One -- the Soviet Union has more or less slipped into the background of the Middle East diplomacy.

A. Has done what?

Q. Has more or less slipped into the background of the Middle East diplomacy. What sort of helpful role are they playing in this conference between the Israelis and the Arabs. The second question is -- I noticed in your explanation of departmental appointments that you frequently used the word "young", and that indeed many of the people you are appointing are relatively junior Foreign Service Officers. Are you signaling something to the senior Foreign Service Officers?

A. With respect to the first question -- as I pointed out at previous press conferences, the Soviet Union, as I suppose all participants in the diplomacy in the Middle East, have various incentives produced by their existing associations. We did not consider some of the actions that the Soviet Union has taken constructive. We believe that in setting up the conference, and in helping to define possible agendas, participation, framework, the Soviet Union has played a constructive role. A settlement in the Middle East cannot be carried out without the Soviet Union -- the principal supplier of arms to several of the participants -- and given its close association with and friendship with several of the countries. And if the Soviet Union attempted to push extremist solutions, it would make a settlement extremely difficult.

Now, up to now most of the discussions have been procedural. And I cannot form a final judgment as to what the Soviet Union will do once the conference has actually opened. As far as we are concerned, we will try to give a maximum encouragement to a moderate course, and we will cooperate if a moderate position is adopted. And if the behaviour in the procedural phase is carried out over into the substantive phase, then I think it will be extremely helpful.

As far as the departmental appointments are concerned, I stated from the beginning that it is one of my principal objectives in coming to the Department of State not simply to conduct Foreign Policy effectively from my office, but to create a tradition in the Foreign Service and a discipline so that future Administrations can rely on this organization, and so that the debate that has gone on where the focus of Foreign Policy responsibility should be will be settled by the professionalism, the discipline and the dedication of the existing institution. And therefore I am trying to see to it -- and my associates, the new Deputy Under Secretary for Management, the Director General of the Foreign Service are fully supporting it -- to see to it

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that younger officers are promoted rapidly and get into key positions. There is no disrespect to other officers who will be judged on their performance and not on their age.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you and other officials have pointed out that the United States is the one country in touch with all sides in the Middle East. You also pointed out in your last press conference, which you quoted here, that if the oil embargo continues for any length of time, the United States would have to consider counter-measures. Would the United States consider withdrawing from Middle East diplomacy if this oil embargo continues?

A. The particular answer to which you refer occurred about two-thirds through the press conference as a response to questions. It was not volunteered by me.

What the United States might do if other countries treat it unreasonably, or what we consider unreasonably, we will leave until that situation arises.

We believe very strongly that a constructive settlement in the Middle East will not result from an attitude of confrontation between the Arabs and the United States, but from an attitude of cooperation between the United States and Arab countries. And this is the attitude with which we are approaching the negotiation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you perceive is going to be the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the conference? Do you expect them to participate from the start of the conference, or do you leave this to the parties to decide?

A. The question of the Palestinians has at least three aspects. One is who speaks for the Palestinians in general. Secondly, what is their relationship at the conference to Jordan, to Israel and the other parties. And thirdly, what are the concrete terms that are going to be advanced for the solution of the Palestinian question.

Our view is, with respect to the participation of the Palestinians, and the role they might play at the conference, that this would best be settled by the parties at the conference. With respect to the specific terms, this of course also will have to be discussed at the conference. Some relationship will have to be found between the rights of Palestinians, to which the United States has made reference in several international documents, and the limitations of absorption in the mandated territory of Palestine.

Mr. Gwertzman.

Q. Mr. Secretary -- I am just trying to get one question in here.

A. Go ahead.

Q. A year ago at this time you were deeply engaged in Vietnam negotiations. It was rather secret, with a sort of semi-public aspect to it. How do you find yourself at this time in the Middle East diplomacy -- what differences do you find in the two situations -- and do you expect once the negotiations start, that there will be both a highly secret aspect as well as a sort of public forum?

A. Anyone who has to negotiate with three Vietnamese and five Middle East parties in one year qualifies for some sort of medical help after some period.

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But there are a number of differences.

In Vietnam we were one of the principal parties and our actions could directly control major decisions. In the Middle East, this is not the case. In Vietnam, the issues, while extremely complex, were nevertheless rather finite. In the Middle East, they affect many other nations, and they have even greater complexities than they do in Vietnam.

Procedurally, I would assume that once the conference organizes itself, that there will be formal sessions and less public negotiations. And if my experience is any indication, the real progress is apt to be made in the less public forums.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, yesterday we were told in response to a question at the daily briefing, that you might in the end, find mutually acceptable, the notion that the ultimate guarantee of a peace agreement might be a joint Soviet-American peacekeeping force in the Middle East, and making the distinction that --

A. He was running some sort of shop there that I didn't know about --

Q. But making the distinction that we are talking about a new arrangement after a peace agreement -- not the UNEF or UNTSO -- is it possible that in the end, a joint U.S.-Soviet peace force might occur to you to be a mutually -- or acceptable from your side?

A. I don't want to undermine the self-confidence of Mr. Vest, but I haven't actually read the text of that particular remark.

We are prepared to consider the question of guarantees in its broadest sense, and we are willing to examine any idea that any of the parties might put forward as to what would constitute adequate guarantees.

We believe, however, that the issue of guarantees can be faced in detail, only after a settlement has been reached, and on security arrangements between the parties that is to say that such issues as demilitarized zones, joint inspection teams, and so forth that might constitute the body of the security arrangements between the parties. Then we will know what it is that outside countries should guarantee.

Now the question of U.S. and Soviet guarantees, or anybody else's guarantee, has two aspects:

One, the formal guarantee.

Second, the force that might be used to implement it.

We are prepared to consider -- I said to "consider" not necessarily to agree -- either individual or joint guarantees.

As to the permanent stationing of U.S. and Soviet forces in the Middle East, we are somewhat dubious. We do not rule it out totally, but we are reluctant to get into this, and our position there was expressed at the Security Council discussions that formed the UNEF. But I think we can make a more reasonable decision on the nature of guarantees after the other elements of the settlement are in place.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on your earlier peacekeeping effort, or peacemaking effort in Vietnam and Indochina, there appears to be some question whether it will be able to

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hold together under "nibbling" operations, and one thing and another. Would you give us your assessment, please, of what might be expected there?

A. In Indochina?

Q. In Indochina.

A. There is always when one discusses Indochina or any other settlement -- one has to understand that no settlement is self-enforcing. It is not possible to write an agreement whose terms, in themselves, guarantee its permanence. Any agreement will last if the hostility of the parties is thereby lessened; if the parties have an incentive to observe it and/or if the parties pay a penalty for breaking it.

If those three conditions are not met, no matter what the terms of the agreement, there is a tendency towards erosion.

In Vietnam, in civil war conditions, the hostility of the parties does not significantly lessen.

The incentives and penalties have been affected by many events of the past year, with which you are familiar.

So at this moment, a great deal depends on the perception of the two sides of the existing military balance. And we have succeeded with a settlement -- not in guaranteeing necessarily a permanent peace but in moving the decision to a Vietnamese decision, which is what we always said our objective was. And we believe that there is a possibility of maintaining the peace within that framework.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, following up the remark that you just made, you spoke of "civil war" conditions in Vietnam. Does this mean that the United States now regards the hostilities between North and South Vietnam as a civil war?

A. No. The conditions in Vietnam -- the psychological conditions are those of a civil war in the sense that they are people of the same general nationality fighting for the control of political power.

And the conflict between the Saigon Government and the NLF is the civil war part of it.

We, of course, consider the infiltration of North Vietnamese forces in total violation of article 7 of the agreement an international event and not a civil war action.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to turn to the question concerning Korea:

Quite accidentally, in the wake of your recent trip to Asia, a trip through Peking, Tokyo and Seoul, the United Nations General Assembly adopted what is called a "concensus" statement last month -- actually delaying the discussion of Korea for another year.

But at the same time, assigning the task of resolving the Korean question, to the Koreans themselves, alone.

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Now I would like to have your assessment about the U.N. decision. How do you think the North and South Koreans, themselves, could resolve their own questions without taking what the United Nations -- while the United Nations, is it still deeply involved in the Korean question?

For example, by keeping the United Nations Command there.

And my second question is:

Quite recently, Senior State Department Officials often report to, referred to as "cease-fire agreement" including William -- Under Secretary William Porter and Ambassador John Scali, who almost successively said that they could become willing to explore such an intelligence on a ceasefire agreement -- what does the State Department have in mind, in referring to that or to encourage it?

A. We have encouraged, and we continue to encourage the talks between North and South Korea that started, leading at first, we hope, to mitigating the conditions of confrontation that exist on the Korean Peninsula -- and perhaps, ultimately, to a political solution.

The consensus resolution did not take the United Nations out of concern with the question of Korea. It deferred a debate this year, and no doubt in subsequent years the issue can be re-raised by either of the parties that feels that inadequate consideration has been given to their views.

We consider the consensus resolution a constructive step taken by both sides, in which a partial progress was made on some issues such as the Uncurk issue -- and in which some other issues were left for further discussion, and later elaboration -- and particularly those that concerned the two Korean parties, themselves.

As my two associates pointed out, we do not have a closed mind on arrangements that were made twenty years ago, and we are prepared to discuss them -- first, of course, with our ally in Korea and then with other interested parties -- to see how they can be adapted to current conditions.

Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you attach special importance to your trip through Syria, in view of the question of the Israeli prisoners of war?

A. Well, the United States, of course, believes that a release of prisoners of war is an essential part of the cease-fire agreement, and we have made our view known to the parties.

As to the specific topics that will be raised on particular stops, I don't think it would be appropriate for me to discuss them.

Q. Thank you very much, sir. (End transcript)

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
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Date 26 November 1973

My dear Hugh.

(54)

... I enclose a fair text of the transcript of Mr Secretary Kissinger's press conference of 21 November, from which we telegraphed the principal extracts relating to the Middle East. The full text has also been sent to James Craig, but you might like to have it.

2. Apart from the Middle East, the passages that struck me are those on pages 25-27 about the opening of the Suez Canal and the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. John Wilberforce tells me that there is nothing in this inherently new, since at last year's talks on the Indian Ocean the doctrine was set out in much the same form as Kissinger's summary.

3. Another passage of interest on pages 29-32 deals with relations within the North Atlantic Alliance. We telegraphed the key passages of this but the whole section is worth reading.

Yours ever
[Signature]

See (54)

J A N Graham

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PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 21, 1973

No. 423



#4

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
NOVEMBER 21, 1973

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am missing that group
that was in front of me. I'm slipping.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I will just make a very
few brief observations about where we stand in the Middle
East, where we expect to go, then say a word about our
attitude towards the various oil pressures.

First, with respect to the situation in the
Middle East. As I have pointed out before, our objective
was to solidify the cease-fire so that we could move
forward, together with the other interested parties,
towards peace negotiations.

Now, in the complex situation that exists on

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the Egyptian-Israeli front, sufficient progress has been made on the cease-fire, in the cease-fire negotiations, so that we can look forward with some confidence to the beginning of peace negotiations.

Our effort will be to create the appropriate auspices called for in Security Council Resolution 338 and under the auspices of the United Nations, to begin a negotiating process--hopefully during the month of December-- that we believe and that we expect and hope will lead towards the just and lasting peace that all parties have pledged themselves to attempt to negotiate.

The United States has committed itself, in Security Council Resolution 338, to support the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts.

We will make a major effort to narrow the differences between the parties, to help the parties move towards the peace that all the peoples in the area need, and that the peace of the world requires.

Now, this will be our policy in the Middle East.

We stated this policy to the Arab Foreign Ministers at the United Nations prior to the outbreak of

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the Arab-Israeli War. And I lay stress on this because the United States policy is determined, not by the pressures that this or that nation may attempt to generate, but by the American conception of the national interest and of the interest of general peace.

Now, the United States has full understanding for actions that may have been taken when the war was going on, by which the parties and their friends attempted to demonstrate how seriously they took the situation.

But as the United States has committed itself to a peaceful process, as the United States has pledged that it would make major efforts to bring about the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, those countries who are engaging in economic pressures against the United States should consider whether it is appropriate to engage in such steps while peace negotiations are being prepared, and even more while negotiations are being conducted.

I would like to state for the United States Government that our course will not be influenced by such pressures, that we have stated our policy, that we have expressed our commitments, and that we will adhere to those and will not be pushed beyond this point

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by any pressures.

Now, this is all I will say on the Middle East.

But of course I will be delighted to answer your questions.

There is one matter that I wanted to raise with you ladies and gentlemen, growing out of my last press conference, in which I promised, within a week, to supply the material or the evidence on which our decision to go on alert was based. It was a statement that, quite frankly, I regretted having made in terms of the short deadline immediately afterwards. The reason is that as we are now moving towards peace negotiations, which we expect to conduct with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, I do not believe any useful purpose would be served if the United States recited confidential communications that had taken place, and tried to recreate an episode of confrontation that hopefully has been transcended.

As time goes on, and as the spirit of cooperation which we are attempting to foster in the Middle East takes hold, as things can be seen in fuller perspective, we still expect to fulfill what I have stated.

I am also glad to note that whatever the

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formal cooperation of the government, reportorial enterprise and the reluctance of associates to admit anything less than full knowledge of participation in events have both combined to produce journalistic efforts that have given a fuller picture of events than those that were available on the morning of my last press conference.

So with these two observations, I will turn to your questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, in your exposition on the situation in the Middle East, you said the United States will not be influenced by the pressures -- I assume you are talking economic or otherwise. And I wanted to ask you whether the opposite side of that coin has any validity. In other words, Mr. Vest, your spokesman, early this week ruled out any retaliatory economic measures against what he called the Arab blackmail. I don't know whether he used the term "blackmail". I shouldn't say that. But anyway, he ruled out retaliatory economic measures. Then last night Under Secretary Porter in a speech indicated what some people thought was a possibility of economic retaliation by the United States when he said that this sort of thing was a two-edged sword. And then a number of

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eminent economists from your former neighborhood called upon the government to resist Arab blackmail and to consider taking counter-measures.

Now, that is a long question, but what I want to know is are you going to slap back at them in some way?

A The principle objective in the Middle East now is to try to move the contestants towards a spirit of greater conciliation, and towards a greater understanding that the requirements of world peace simply do not permit the constant warfare that has been characteristic of the past twenty years. We still hope that some of the steps that were taken, when certain assumptions were made about the principal American objective in that area, will be changed when it becomes apparent that we are attempting to bring about a just peace.

However, it is clear that if pressures continue unreasonably and indefinitely, that then the United States will have to consider what counter-measures it may have to take. We would do this with enormous reluctance and we are still hopeful that matters will not reach this point.

Q Mr. Secretary, during your talks in China

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there appears to have been a speed-up in the normalization process. Would you say, please, what effect this may have on our relations in Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia, and our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan?

A First let me make a negative point. I have seen several stories to the effect that the United States on my trip to China attempted to bring about a full normalization of relations and failed. This is totally incorrect.

With respect to our relations to the People's Republic of China, we have always placed primary emphasis on the substance of the communications and on the substance of the consultations rather than on the form in which it took place.

On this trip, we brought about an expansion of the functions of the liaison officers, a continuation of the exchange programs, an expansion of trade, and a substantial expansion of the consultative processes. This was the maximum that we had set ourselves as a goal.

With respect to future normalization, I think that there are certain indications in the communique which now remain to be explored as to the form that that might take.

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With respect to the impact of normalization of relations or increased contacts between the People's Republic and the United States on Southeast Asia, it has always been understood that progress towards normalization would be aided by a general condition of stability and tranquility in Asia and that both sides had an obligation to do their utmost to bring this about.

So we are hopeful that the situation in Southeast Asia will not be exacerbated by the actions of any outside country.

With respect to our relations -- with respect to the situation on Taiwan, there have been no changes in the basic relationship.

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that the Soviet Union has introduced tactical nuclear weapons into Egypt. Is that true, and if so how do you view it?

A We have no confirmed evidence that the Soviet Union has introduced nuclear weapons into Egypt. And there are public Soviet statements rejecting this allegation.

If the Soviet Union were to introduce nuclear

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weapons into local conflict, this would be a very grave matter and would be a fundamental shift in traditional practices, and one hard to reconcile with an effort to bring about a responsible solution.

But I repeat -- we have no evidence, or at least we have no confirmed evidence that this has been the case.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have talked about the Arab boycott lasting perhaps unreasonably and indefinitely. Based on your conversations with Arab leaders, what in your estimation will it take to get a lifting, even partial, of the boycott, and how soon might that happen?

A I don't want to speculate as to the timing that Arab leaders foresee as to easing the boycott. I think the Arab leaders can take two positions. They can either give us a reasonable opportunity, once the negotiating process is under way, to see what we can do to make our contribution to bringing about the just and lasting peace to which we have committed ourselves, and which they affirm is their goal as well. Or they can attempt to deal with us by making a series of specific demands, backed up by economic pressures.

We would not be in a position to be able to accede to that second procedure. And we believe that for

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the sake of our future relationships, for the sake of making clear that we conduct our policy for the interests of the general peace, that the first course is by far the more advisable for the Arab leaders. And the decision, of course, is up to them.

Q Mr. Secretary, what measures could the United States take to counter these economic pressures?

A Well, I don't want to speculate on what we might do under circumstances that we hope will not arise. But you should remember that 85 percent of our energy is produced in the United States, so that we are not a total prey to outside pressures.

Q Mr. Secretary, do your remarks about external pressure apply equally to internal pressure -- and I have in mind those traditional supporters of Israel versus those who believe that we ought to change our policy in order to get the Arab oil flowing again?

A Our policy will be conducted on the basis of our assessment, our best judgment, of the national interest, and our best judgment of the general interest of world peace, and they would apply to all special pressures.

Q Mr. Secretary, you seem to concentrate your answer about the alert on the contents of a confidential

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communication from the Soviet Union. And I have great difficulty with that answer, when you said that you saw no useful purpose that would be served by it. This is a democratic country of two-hundred-million people who have been put on alert before, and this is the first time they have never been told why. The Russians certainly know what was in their note. And I would like to hear some more about why the American people cannot.

A Mr. O'Leary, I have given an account of these events to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. And there are in international politics situations in which, as I pointed out in my last press conference, there has to be a modicum of confidence between the public and the responsible officials. At this point to go through the whole sequence of events would only bring about a recitation of a situation of confrontation, a score-card of who won or lost, which we do not believe would contribute to the atmosphere of confidence that is necessary.

We have given an account to elected representatives of the American people. We have given some account to the press. And I recognize the seriousness of your question.

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It is not any lack of confidence in our judgment as to the alert, but a plea for some understanding that there are greater imperatives at this moment--when we are trying to calm the situation, when we in a very delicate situation are trying to bring about a cooperative attitude on the part of all parties--not to recite, in this time-frame, the elements of a situation of confrontation.

Q Are you committed not to give -- by a promise to the Russians -- not to release that note?

A We have not in the past released any of the private exchanges between the Soviet leaders and the President, and it would therefore be a very serious matter if we suddenly began to do it on a selective basis.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the same point, sir, you have explained why you cannot or will not go any further on this issue. Can you not, perhaps, clarify some of the existing apparent discrepancies on the record. You said at your press conference that there were certain ambiguities as to what the Soviet intent was. The President said that this was the gravest crisis since the Cuban missile crisis. Could you possibly clarify that fundamental issue for us?

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A When I gave my press conference, I was motivated by the same considerations that I have expressed here. I saw no purpose at that time to stress the aspect of confrontation. In any set of actions, unless the event which you are trying to prevent has in fact happened, there is always a certain element of uncertainty. We believed, on the basis of evidence, of an intelligence nature, coupled with specific communications, that there was a serious danger that we attempted to avoid. The President described his judgment of the seriousness of the event -- had it occurred. The difference perhaps in characterization is due to the fact that I spoke before I was aware of the UN decision, and I attempted to influence a conciliatory attitude in the decisions that were to be taken.

Q Mr. Secretary, in the stories to which you referred, or one of them, to which I assume you referred in your opening comment, it stated and attributed to a Cabinet official that in the course of the decisions on the alert, the President empowered you and Mr. Schlesinger to manage the crisis on your own, to conceive and carry out various moves, and the President himself only ratified those moves. Is that a correct characterization of his role?

A I don't want to go into the details, but I

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thought also I made clear in my statement that not every official who comments to journalists is in equal possession of the facts.

Q Dr. Kissinger --

A Bob.

Q Mr. Secretary, in one of your answers before you left open the possibility that the first option available to Arab leaders, which is the preferable one from your point of view, wouldn't occur until after peace negotiations had begun. If we are talking about next month, talking about some movement in those peace negotiations, implicitly you are not holding out any hope for an end to the embargo before the beginning of the year. Is that fair?

A No. I don't want to set a deadline to decisions that are not of our own making. I would have thought that the most constructive course would be to give the negotiating process a chance now that the point has been made, and to permit the countries concerned to make their efforts. What the appropriate timing for their decision is I think should be left in the first instance to the leaders who have to make that decision. I didn't want to give a deadline.

Marvin.

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Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how you envisage this peace conference? On the Israeli side there is one state -- on the Arab side several. Is a veto to be implied? How do you see this developing?

A Well, of course the conference, to be effective, would have to be left to a considerable extent to the decision of the participants. For example, there are many ways it could be conducted. It could operate through plenary sessions that then break up into a series of bilateral negotiations. It could address some issues of common concern in plenary sessions, and then some issues of bilateral concern in separate meetings. I think the procedural possibilities are fairly wide and should be explored in the first instance by the parties concerned. Obviously no agreement can be made, and certainly no agreement can last, unless it has the willing participation and agreement of all of the parties at the conference.

Les.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding of the modified Cooper-Church legislation on Indochina that it prohibits all direct U.S. military activity -- land, sea and air -- with respect to North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia?

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A That has been my understanding of it, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, Prime Minister Meir, addressing some Israeli troops today in the Sinai, said that the U.S. will put pressure on Israel to make some concessions. Could you now elaborate on what concessions you would expect Israel to make?

A What the United States will do will depend on the process of negotiations. It is obvious that the conditions that produced the war that started on October 6 will have to be changed. And it is obvious, and it has always been understood, that a peace settlement will not ratify the cease-fire lines as they existed on October 6. Therefore, a peace settlement will have to have a number of elements. It will have to have an element of withdrawals. It will have to have an element of security arrangements between the parties concerned. And it may have to have an element of outside guarantees. In addition, there are such issues as the Palestinians and the future of Jerusalem. It will undoubtedly have to be discussed in some form or another at a peace conference.

We hope that Israel, as well as the Arab countries, will recognize that one of the clear consequences of recent events is that a purely military solution to the

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problems of the Middle East is impossible, and that all countries therefore have the problem of the right balance between their security needs and the needs of legitimacy, acceptance or whatever you want to call it.

We do not consider it axiomatic that this can only be achieved by pressure on Israel by the United States to make concessions. We expect to have full consultations with Israel, as we expect to have discussions with the Arab participants, and the positions we will take as the negotiations develop depend on the positions the various parties take during the course of the negotiations, and cannot be assumed ahead of time.

Q Mr. Secretary, what role do you foresee for the Palestinians at the peace conference?

A This is a very difficult question that affects Israel, the other Arab states, and among the other Arab states Jordan in particular. And it is a question which sometime in the course of the negotiation will require explicit discussion. Whether it is necessary to address it in the very first phases of the negotiations, when probably the military issues will loom largest, remains to be seen, and I would doubt it. But the Palestinian issue is of course one of the key questions that will come up.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, in your discussions yesterday with the representatives of American oil companies, were you at all encouraged that these oil companies would take the effort, the American effort to produce a peace settlement in the Middle East, into consideration, particularly with emphasis on Japan, on the supply of oil to American troops stationed on Okinawa and Japan, and will they provide some of the scarce reserves that they have to help the Japanese particularly.

A The problem of the world-wide energy crisis has been a very profound challenge to all of the oil-consuming countries. At a minimum, we have an obligation to study seriously what we can do to alleviate difficulties that have been caused either by policies which we consider responsible during the war, which would be the case with The Netherlands, or which are produced by the stationing of American troops, which would be the case in Japan.

We are now looking at this problem very seriously and hope to formulate some position by the early part or by the middle part of next week.

The meeting with the oil executives was not primarily concerned with these more or less technical issues.

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was rather concerned with the fact that here are representatives of American companies that are operating in many of these countries, and that need to understand what the basic direction of our policy is so that in their own economic activities they are at least aware of how we conceive the national interest.

Q Dr. Kissinger, President Nixon has been saying that the personal relationship between himself and the leaders of the Soviet Union played some kind of role in connection with this alert. But the facts, as far as we know them, which by your new policy is virtually zero, suggest that the communication was so bad that you had to call a military alert to get your message across.

A I didn't understand the question.

Q What I am trying to ask is whether or not, or exactly what role President Nixon's personal relationship with Mr. Brezhnev played in the recent alert.

A The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States is an inherently ambiguous one. We have never said that detente indicates that we have parallel objectives, or that it indicates that we have compatible domestic structures. Our view has been that the detente is made necessary because as the two great

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nuclear superpowers, we have a special responsibility to spare mankind the dangers of a nuclear holocaust. And if one looks at history and sees how often it has happened that wars have been produced by the rivalries of client states without a full consideration of the world-wide issues, how easily misunderstandings could produce confrontations that could have catastrophic consequences, the overriding need of finding a solution to the problem of world-wide general nuclear war becomes overwhelming.

As I pointed out in my last press conference, this is the central problem of our period, and it is a problem that will have to be solved either by this group of officials or by their successors. But it cannot be avoided.

Now, in this situation, in this relationship, one will always have an element, both of confidence and of competition, coexisting in a somewhat ambivalent manner. The relationship that has developed between the Soviet Union and the United States since 1971 has been one of considerable restraint, and there have been very frequent, very confidential exchanges between General Secretary Brezhnev and the President. At the same time it is perfectly conceivable, and indeed it has

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happened during the Middle East crisis, that longstanding commitments or ideological pressures produce actions that bring these two sides into confrontation. At that point it is important that enough confidence exists so that the confrontation is mitigated. And therefore, one has to judge not only the fact that a confrontation occurred, really in the aftermath of a settlement, and as a result of actions which could not be fully controlled by either of the two sides because it happened the immediate cause was the violation of the cease-fire.

But one also has to consider how rapidly the confrontation was ended and how quickly the two sides have attempted to move back and are now moving back to a policy of cooperation in settling the Middle East conflict.

I would therefore say that the relationship that had developed between the two governments and between the two leaders played a role in settling the crisis, even though it had not yet been firm enough to prevent the crisis.

Q That it played the role is one thing.

But what kind of a role was that in this particular instance?

A I have tried to give my best --

Q It had to be some kind of a role.

A It played in my judgment a significant role,

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the degree of which one will have to assess over a period of time.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have referred several times to peace negotiations within the next several weeks. Yet Prime Minister Meir has said this is impossible until after the Israeli election December 31. Do you have assurances from the parties concerned of a place and a date, and which parties will participate, and may we know them?

A We have no absolutely firm assurances, but we have some rather substantial understandings with all of the parties of the time frame which I indicated. The participants remain fully to be determined, but we are close to an agreement on that as well. And we will also agree, then, on the site.

We hope that this process should be completed during the next week, and we will then announce it as soon as all the parties have agreed to it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said that the United States had --

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you --

A I am trying to understand this process where I look at one person and another speaks. But ladies first. Go ahead, Marilyn.

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Q You said the United States produces 85 percent of its energy, and it has been noted that other countries are not that fortunate. Is the United States, among the things it is considering, thinking of sharing some of its energy sources with Japan, and the Netherlands, and other countries less fortunate in a time of embargo?

A Well, our first problem is to understand exactly what needs to be done to get our own energy crisis under control, and I am told that energetic steps in that direction are being taken.

The degree to which we can share our energy sources with other countries is a very complex matter, and, of course, the more broadly the sharing is conceived, the more difficult it becomes. But with respect to specific needs, such as in the case of The Netherlands, and the particular issue that Mr. Wallach mentioned in the case of Japan, require our careful study, and we are trying very hard to look into it.

The second issue that is raised by your question is the attitude that the more vulnerable countries should take in this crisis with all understanding for their vulnerability, and they have to consider whether, by taking

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isolated actions, they will contribute more to the peace settlement on which, after all, the ultimate solution of this problem depends, or whether their better course would not be to try to work as closely with us in the responsible efforts that we are trying to undertake.

Q Mr. Secretary, during your confirmation hearings, you said that the United Nations could not, or would not, be able to play a useful political role because of the veto that the super-powers or the major powers have in the Security Council. In the event, during this Middle East crisis, it looks as if the United Nations was able to play a useful role. First, have you changed your opinion, and, second, what does this forecast for the United States use of the U.N. in the future.

A I must say that the United Nations played a more effective role in this crisis than could have been deduced from my theoretical statements as a professor, or from my statements during my confirmation hearings.

It proved to be an extremely effective sounding board, the most rapid means of communication among the parties, and when the chief participants had decided on a settlement, the most effective way by which the

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settlement could be achieved.

Finally, it performed the absolutely essential role of providing the buffer that prevented the confrontation that could have occurred without it.

So, we believe that the United Nations played a very useful role, and we will take very serious account of that in the solution of other problems.

Q Mr. Secretary, in view of the evident and considerable advantage to Russia inherent in the reopening of the Suez Canal, granting their large Mediterranean Fleet access to the Indian Ocean, to the Persian Gulf, and so on, can you tell us why, as I think is the case, the United States so strongly favors the reopening of the Suez?

A The United States has not favored the reopening of the Suez Canal in the abstract. The United States has favored the evolution of the Middle East policy of such a nature that some reasonable prospect towards a final settlement was opened up to the chief participants.

If anything has become clear in recent years, it is that the situation as it existed prior to October 6th, was simply unacceptable to enough of the Arab countries and to the Middle East, so that it would constantly produce

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the danger of renewed warfare, and of a kind of warfare that as the war has made clear is not in the long-term interest of Israel, either.

Therefore, the opening of the Suez Canal ought to be seen, not in the context of the strategic movements of the Soviet Fleet, but in the context of world peace in general.

Now, with respect to the greater ease of movement of the Soviet Fleet from the Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean, there is a great danger of looking at the developments in this area in terms of a strategy that is more appropriate to the previous century than now.

Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean will not depend primarily on the number of ships it can deploy into the Indian Ocean. And I am confident that to the degree that power becomes the principal factor in the Indian Ocean, that we will be able to generate a fleet of sufficient size in that area so that we could counter-balance anything that the Soviet Union might put into the Indian Ocean, as the recent visit of the Hancock in that area has demonstrated.

Q Are you favoring a permanent U.S.- Indian Ocean Fleet, or inferring that?

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A I am saying that the future of the Middle East should not be deduced from the steaming time of the Soviet Fleet from the Black Sea into the Indian Ocean, and whether adding ten days to it, or cutting ten days off it, will not be the determining factor.

Therefore, the United States attitude towards the opening of the Suez Canal, and to the military disengagement of forces in that area, will be determined primarily, first by the contribution this would make towards the general peace in the area, and, secondly, by the possibilities it gives to reduce the influence of outside powers in general, by focusing matters on Middle East concerns. That is the principal issue, and this is the best way to reduce Soviet influence, and, for that matter, any outside influence in that area.

Q Mr. Secretary, a three-part question. In your opening statement, you referred to the peace talks under U.N. auspices. I think at your last press conference, you talked about Soviet-American auspices. Is this a slight change? And, secondly, after your appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, you said you had no plan but certain principles that you would like to see in an agreement.

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Chairman Fulbright, in his talk with newsmen yesterday, went through certain principles, including which he said he favored the Rogers plan of Israeli pull-backs to the old boundaries with insubstantial changes.

I wondered how you felt on that question.

A With respect to the procedural issue, we still believe that the appropriate auspices foreseen in Security Council Resolution 338 could best be provided by the United States and the Soviet Union. We believe, however, also, that these auspices should be generally blessed by the United Nations, and we would have no objection -- in fact, we would welcome -- some participation by the Secretary General of the United Nations to symbolize this United Nations aegis.

With respect to the specifics of an American position, our attitude -- I have stated the general principles with respect to Security Council Resolution 242, and some of the elements that we believe are likely to be contained in such a negotiation.

We do not believe it is effective for the United States to put forward a proposal in all its details which then will enable both parties, or will tempt both

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parties, to start shooting at the American proposal, rather than to concentrate on what it is that they should accomplish.

We believe that the process that was followed in bringing about the six point agreement solidifying the cease-fire may be more effective, in which the parties assume responsibility for their own positions. And once they put their positions on the table, then the United States can attempt to bring about a closing of the gap and perhaps inject its own ideas where those appear to be useful.

Q NATO proved to be a rather fragile vessel at the height of our airlift, Mr. Secretary, and some hard words were exchanged openly and privately. Would you give us your estimate of the damage that has been done to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and what can be done to shore it up, if anything?

A Well, let me say, first of all, that the relationships in the Atlantic area remain the absolutely core element of American foreign policy. We remain convinced, as we have been convinced--on a bipartisan basis in the entire post-war period--that if the free nations of the North Atlantic cannot regulate their relationships with each other, it is hard to see how they can cope with

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the problems on a global basis that they confront.

On the other hand, it is necessary to realize that serious difficulties arose in recent weeks. These difficulties were not accidental, but have reflected strains that have been apparent for a good part of this year.

Now, I have read a great deal of speculation which ascribes this to inadequate consultation by the United States. And, of course, senior officials have a tendency towards a conviction in their infallibility, and they rarely admit that mistakes might have been made. But I don't even want to argue that point. Any process of consultation can be improved. The key question one has to ask one's self however is -- and that one has to answer-- is this: It is a root fact of the situation that the countries that were most consulted proved among the most difficult in their cooperation; and those countries that were most cooperative were least consulted. So that there is at least no automatic relationship between consultation and agreement.

Secondly, if we deal with the question in its deepest aspect, are the objections that were raised due to inadequate information or to a different perception

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of their role. And one cannot avoid the perhaps melancholy conclusions that some of our European allies saw their interests so different from those of the United States that they were prepared to break ranks with the United States on a matter of very grave international consequence, and that we happen to believe was of very profound consequence to them as well.

Now, I don't want to debate the merits of this issue. And, in answering your question about what damage has been done to the Atlantic Alliance, I would say the recent weeks made evident the need which the United States tried to underline by its initiative for these declarations of defining just what it is that the nations of the North Atlantic can do together, and what they should do separately; of defining what forms of consultation are appropriate; how the nations of the North Atlantic can cooperate. This is what we put before the Europeans in April. This is what we hope to achieve. And this is why the need for it should have been made evident to both sides of the Atlantic in recent weeks. And if that is the conclusion that is drawn on both sides of the Atlantic, as it is on this side of the Atlantic, then I think it will have been a good thing, and it can lead to a new period of progress.

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Q Mr. Secretary, what do you expect to accomplish on that issue?

A Well, we are having a NATO Ministerial Meeting on December 10th and 11th, and this gives an opportunity for the Foreign Ministers of all NATO nations to discuss the state of the Alliance. We expect to do this candidly, and in a constructive attitude, and with the determination to put new vitality into Atlantic relationships.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you tell us what led you to pledge the documents on the U.S.-Soviet situation? Particularly, was it the American domestic turbulence at that time that encouraged you, particularly with that short deadline which you gave?

A It is a mistake to assume that everything that is said in a press conference is fully considered.
[Laughter.]

Q Mr. Secretary, does it remain the intention of the United States Government to ask the Congress for the full \$2.2 billion in aid to Israel, and has the United States committed itself to delivering that full total in armament to Israel?

A We maintain our request, and we will judge

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what will be done with it on the basis of the needs as they will be jointly assessed between Israel and the United States.

Q Thank you, very much, Mr. Secretary.

[The briefing terminated at 3:25 p.m.]

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UNITED STATES EMBASSY, 55/56 UPPER BROOK STREET, LONDON W1A 2LH

Now Ser (56)

Monday,
November 12, 1973

SENATE RESOLUTION ON UPHOLDING VITAL U.S. INTERESTS

Following is the text of a resolution passed by the U.S. Senate November 9 affirming the Senate's determination that U.S. domestic events will not be allowed to affect the upholding of the nation's vital interests, including the achievement of "a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

The resolution, adopted by voice vote, was sponsored by Senator Hubert Humphrey and a group of 30 other Senate members from both parties.

(Begin text)

Whereas the law of our nation requires the concurrence of the Congress in all decisions relating to the nation's vital national security interests; and

Whereas the recent uncertainties and divisions in the nation may cause adversaries and friends to doubt the bipartisan unity behind the pursuit of our national security objectives; and

Whereas the ability of the U.S. Government to effectively pursue its international objectives must not be impaired, particularly in time of crisis; and

Whereas recent international events have posed a grave threat to peace and stability; and

Whereas the U.S. is currently involved in serious negotiations affecting our vital national interest and the peace of the world; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, that it is the sense of the Senate that other nations should not construe domestic events as adversely affecting our resolve to uphold these vital interests, nor be tempted to seize upon them as an opportunity to undermine the security of the United States;

Be it further resolved that it is the sense of the Senate that other nations should not construe domestic events as impairing the full commitment of our Government to achieve a just and durable peace in the Middle East;

Be it further resolved that the Senate calls upon all friendly nations to join with the United States in pursuance of these vital common objectives which have as their goal respect for law and a stable and secure peace throughout the world.
(End text)

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SIR JOHN HUNT

cc Coordinator
Mr Howard Smith

Sir Geoffrey Arthur
Mr Parsons
Mr Overton ✓

DGI

For action to Assistant

U.S. D. 5/18/11

For information to

Canada Desk

Mr. Salmon

P/A. *eli*

1 to 22 k.
May 11/2 (R. Det.)

MEETING WITH MR SONNENFELDT

1 On 16 November, Malcolm Mackintosh and I had a short talk with Sonnenfeldt, who was on a brief visit to London as a member of the Executive Panel of the American Chief of Naval Operations. (This Panel, composed of senior United States naval officers and civilians, was here to discuss Soviet attitudes to detente and the Middle East crisis with British officials and academics).

✓ 2 Sonnenfeldt spoke mainly about the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East crisis. He did not believe that the Russians planned or were instrumental in launching the Arab attack. He drew attention to the pattern of Soviet behaviour in the last three Arab-Israeli wars. In 1956, the Soviet Union had suggested intervention in the Middle East by a joint Soviet-American force, which was rejected by the Americans; in 1967, the Russians had, over the hot-line, called for joint United States-Soviet action to halt the Israelis, with a hint of unilateral Soviet intervention to save Egypt; and in October 1973, similar proposals, with a similar suggestion of unilateral action, were made. This suggested a pattern of Soviet attempts to seize opportunities for the introduction of Soviet troops into the Middle East, primarily with the blessing of the United States and the United Nations; faced with a firm US response, however, the Russians were prepared to draw back.

3 Sonnenfeldt described Dr Kissinger's and his visit to Moscow during the war. The invitation reached Washington when it was clear that the Israelis were regaining the military initiative on the Egyptian front. When the Americans arrived in Moscow they found Brezhnev in anxious mood. He insisted that the two sides should hold a meeting at once. The Soviet Union had a draft resolution already prepared which called for an immediate halt to military operations, initiation of Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 frontiers, and joint United States - Soviet supervision of the cease-fire. The Americans stalled, and produced their draft on the following day. Brezhnev became increasingly agitated, and, in the interests of obtaining the joint United States-Soviet resolution 338, agreed to delete references to United States-Soviet supervision of the cease-fire and the immediate withdrawal of the Israelis to their 1967 frontiers and to include a mention of negotiation between the parties concerned.

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4 Sonnenfeldt said that the exchanges between Brezhnev and the Americans over the introduction of a joint force into the Middle East on 25 October, and in particular the Note which led to the American alert, were also evidence of Brezhnev's agitation. The Note, according to Sonnenfeldt, was not so much threatening as urgent and anxious in tone; its wording showed signs of hasty preparation; but it had left a clear impression that the Russians were prepared, at least for a short time, to "go it alone"; and the military and technical evidence in support of this interpretation was, he said, "ominous".


5 Sonnenfeldt considered that, despite these alarms, detente and the US/Soviet relationship had stood up well. Without the framework and the habit of communication Kissinger had created, it would have been a more dangerous crisis. Looking ahead, he said that as far as Soviet policy was concerned, there were some grounds for hope. The Soviet Union had seen how its attempts to persuade the United States to participate in the introduction of Soviet troops into the Middle East or to allow the Russians to move in unilaterally, had failed three times in a row and the Russians did not like reinforcing failure. He also thought that the Russians would be reluctant to perpetuate a situation in which an Arab-Israeli war broke out every few years in circumstances in which American diplomacy and American strength took the initiative and left the Soviet Union behind. He believed that the Russians might come to have qualms about letting the Arabs' oil weapon loose on the world and would see it as dangerously destabilising. The Russians might even urge restraint on the Arabs in this context, though when asked he admitted he had no evidence that they were doing so.

6 On his own future, Sonnenfeldt said that his appointment in the Treasury was "on the floor of the House" in Congress; the investigatory work was complete and he awaited formal confirmation, which might come this week. He now had mixed feelings about the job in the Treasury, and might prefer to continue with Kissinger in the State Department. Kissinger had, however, declined to take him to China, because he thought that the presence of a Soviet expert on his team might be inappropriate: however, Mr Schultz at the Treasury also intended to go to Peking soon, and he might have fewer qualms about taking Sonnenfeldt with him.

P CRADOCK
21. November 1973

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TEXT: KISSINGER NOVEMBER 21 NEWS CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT

Following is the transcript of the news conference by Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger in Washington, November 21:

(Begin transcript)

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and Gentlemen, I will just make a very few brief observations about where we stand in the Middle East, where we expect to go, then say a word about our attitude towards the various oil pressures.

First, with respect to the situation in the Middle East. As I have pointed out before, our objective was to solidify the cease-fire so that we could move forward, together with the other interested parties, towards peace negotiations.

Now, in the complex situation that exists on the Egyptian-Israeli front, sufficient progress has been made on the cease-fire, in the cease-fire negotiations, so that we can look forward with some confidence to the beginning of peace negotiations.

Our effort will be to create the appropriate auspices called for in Security Council resolution 338 and under the auspices of the United Nations, to begin a negotiating process -- hopefully during the month of December -- that we believe and that we expect and hope will lead towards the just and lasting peace that all parties have pledged themselves to attempt to negotiate.

The United States has committed itself, in Security Council resolution 338, to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 in all of its parts.

We will make a major effort to narrow the differences between the parties, to help the parties move towards the peace that all the peoples in the area need, and that the peace of the world requires.

Now, this will be our policy in the Middle East.

We stated this policy to the Arab Foreign Ministers at the United Nations prior to the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war. And I lay stress on this because the United States policy is determined, not by the pressures that this or that nation may attempt to generate, but by the American conception of the national interest and of the interest of general peace.

Now, the United States has full understanding for actions that may have been taken when the war was going on, by which the parties and their friends attempted to demonstrate how seriously they took the situation.

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But as the United States has committed itself to a peaceful process, as the United States has pledged that it would make major efforts to bring about the implementation of Security Council resolution 242, those countries who are engaging in economic pressures against the United States should consider whether it is appropriate to engage in such steps while peace negotiations are being prepared, and even more while negotiations are being conducted.

I would like to state for the United States Government that our course will not be influenced by such pressures, that we have stated our policy, that we have expressed our commitments, and that we will adhere to those and will not be pushed beyond this point by any pressures.

Now, this is all I will say on the Middle East.

But of course I will be delighted to answer your questions.

There is one matter that I want to raise with you ladies and gentlemen, growing out of my last press conference, in which I promised, within a week, to supply the material or the evidence on which our decision to go on alert was based. It was a statement that, quite frankly, I regretted having made in terms of the short deadline immediately afterwards. The reason is that as we are now moving towards peace negotiations, which we expect to conduct with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, I do not believe any useful purpose would be served if the United States recited confidential communications that had taken place, and tried to recreate an episode of confrontation that hopefully has been transcended.

As times goes on, and as the spirit of cooperation which we are attempting to foster in the Middle East takes hold, as things can be seen in fuller perspective, we still expect to fulfill what I have stated.

I am also glad to note that whatever the formal cooperation of the Government, reportorial enterprise and the reluctance of associates to admit anything less than full knowledge of participation in events have both combined to produce journalistic efforts that have given a fuller picture of events than those that were available on the morning of my last press conference.

So with these two observations, I will turn to your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your exposition on the situation in the Middle East, you said the United States will not be influenced by the pressures -- I assume you are talking economic or otherwise. And I wanted to ask you whether the opposite side of that coin has any validity. In other words, Mr. Vest, your spokesman, early this week ruled out any retaliatory economic measures against what he called the Arab blackmail. I don't know whether he used the term "blackmail". I shouldn't say that. But anyway, he ruled out retaliatory economic measures. Then last night under Secretary Porter in a speech indicated what some people thought was a possibility of economic retaliation by the United States when he said that this sort of thing was a two-edged sword. And then a number of eminent economists from your former neighbourhood called upon the Government to resist Arab blackmail and to consider taking counter-measures.

Now, that is a long question, but what I want to know is are you going to slap back at them in some way?

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A. The principle objective in the Middle East now is to try to move the contestants towards a spirit of greater conciliation, and towards a greater understanding that the requirements of world peace simply do not permit the constant warfare that has been characteristic of the past twenty years. We still hope that some of the steps that were taken, when certain assumptions were made about the principal American objective in that area, will be changed when it becomes apparent that we are attempting to bring about a just peace.

However, it is clear that if pressures continue unreasonably and indefinitely, that then the United States will have to consider what counter-measures it may have to take. We would do this with enormous reluctance and we are still hopeful that matters will not reach this point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, during your talks in China there appears to have been a speed up in the normalisation process. Would you say, please, what effect this may have on our relations in Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia, and our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan?

A. First let me make a negative point. I have seen several stories to the effect that the United States on my trip to China attempted to bring about a full normalisation of relations and failed. This is totally incorrect.

With respect to our relations to the People's Republic of China, we have always placed primary emphasis on the substance of the communications and on the substance of the consultations rather than on the form in which it took place.

On this trip, we brought about an expansion of the functions of the liaison officers, a continuation of the exchange programmes, an expansion of trade, and substantial expansion of the consultative processes. This was the maximum that we had set ourselves as a goal.

With respect to future normalisation, I think that there are certain indications in the communique which now remain to be explored as to the form that that might take.

With respect to the impact of normalisation of relations or increased contacts between the People's Republic and the United States on Southeast Asia, it has always been understood that progress towards normalisation would be aided by a general condition of stability and tranquility in Asia and that both sides had an obligation to do their utmost to bring this about.

So we are hopeful that the situation in Southeast Asia will not be exacerbated by the actions of any outside country.

With respect to our relations -- with respect to the situation on Taiwan, there have been no changes in the basic relationship.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that the Soviet Union has introduced tactical nuclear weapons into Egypt. Is that true, and if so how do you view it?

A. We have no confirmed evidence that the Soviet Union has introduced nuclear weapons into Egypt. And there are public Soviet statements rejecting this allegation.

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If the Soviet Union were to introduce nuclear weapons into local conflict, this would be a very grave matter and would be a fundamental shift in traditional practices, and one hard to reconcile with an effort to bring about a responsible solution.

But I repeat -- we have no evidence, or at least we have no confirmed evidence that this has been the case.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have talked about the Arab boycott lasting perhaps unreasonably and indefinitely. Based on your conversations with Arab leaders, what in your estimation will it take to get a lifting, even partial, of the boycott, and how soon might that happen?

A. I don't want to speculate as to the timing that Arab leaders foresee as to easing the boycott. I think the Arab leaders can take two positions. They can either give us a reasonable opportunity, once the negotiating process is under way, to see what we can do to make our contribution to bringing about the just and lasting peace to which we have committed ourselves, and which they affirm is their goal as well. Or they can attempt to deal with us by making a series of specific demands, backed up by economic pressures.

We would not be in a position to be able to accede to that second procedure. And we believe that for the sake of our future relationships, for the sake of making clear that we conduct our policy for the interests of the general peace, that the first course is by far the more advisable for the Arab leaders. And the decision, of course, is up to them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what measures could the United States take to counter these economic pressures?

A. Well, I don't want to speculate on what we might do under circumstances that we hope will not arise. But you should remember that 85 percent of our energy is produced in the United States, so that we are not a total prey to outside pressures.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do your remarks about external pressure apply equally to internal pressure -- and I have in mind those traditional supporters of Israel versus those who believe that we ought to change our policy in order to get the Arab oil flowing again?

A. Our policy will be conducted on the basis of our assessment, our best judgment, of the national interest, and our best judgment of the general interest of world peace, and they would apply to all special pressures.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you seem to concentrate your answer about the alert on the contents of a confidential communication from the Soviet Union. And I have great difficulty with that answer, when you said that you saw no useful purpose that would be served by it. This is a democratic country of two-hundred-million people who have been put on alert before, and this is the first time they have never been told why. The Russians certainly know what was in their note. And I would like to hear some more about why the American people cannot.

A. Mr. O'Leary, I have given an account of these events to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. And there are in international politics situations in which, as I pointed out

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in my last press conference, there has to be a modicum of confidence between the public and the responsible officials. At this point to go through the whole sequence of events would only bring about a recitation of a situation of confrontation, a score-card of who won or lost, which we do not believe would contribute to the atmosphere of confidence that is necessary.

We have given an account to elected representatives of the American people. We have given some account to the press. And I recognise the seriousness of your question. It is not any lack of confidence in our judgment as to the alert, but a plea for some understanding that there are greater imperatives at this moment -- when we are trying to calm the situation, when we in a very delicate situation are trying to bring about a cooperative attitude on the part of all parties -- not to recite, in this time-frame, the elements of a situation of confrontation.

Q. Are you committed not to give -- by a promise to the Russians -- not to release that note?

A. We have not in the past released any of the private exchanges between the Soviet leaders and the President, and it would therefore be a very serious matter if we suddenly began to do it on a selective basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the same point, sir, you have explained why you cannot or will not go any further on this issue. Can you not, perhaps, clarify some of the existing apparent discrepancies on the record. You said at your press conference that there were certain ambiguities as to what the Soviet intent was. The President said that this was the gravest crisis since the Cuban missile crisis. Could you possibly clarify that fundamental issue for us?

A. When I gave my press conference, I was motivated by the same considerations that I have expressed here. I saw no purpose at that time to stress the aspect of confrontation. In any set of actions, unless the event which you are trying to prevent has in fact happened, there is always a certain element of uncertainty. We believed, on the basis of evidence, of an intelligence nature, coupled with specific communications, that there was a serious danger that we attempted to avoid. The President described his judgment of the seriousness of the event -- had it occurred. The difference perhaps in characterisation is due to the fact that I spoke before I was aware of the U.N. decision, and I attempted to influence a conciliatory attitude in the decisions that were to be taken.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the stories to which you referred, or one of them, to which I assume you referred in your opening comment, it stated and attributed to a Cabinet official that in the course of the decisions on the alert the President empowered you and Mr. Schlesinger to manage the crisis on your own, to conceive and carry out various moves, and the President himself only ratified those moves. Is that a correct characterisation of his role?

A. I don't want to go into the details, but I thought I made clear in my statement that not every official who comments to journalists is in equal possession of the facts.

Q. Dr. Kissinger --

A. Bob.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in one of your speeches before you left open the possibility that the first option available to Arab leaders, which is the preferable one from your point of view, wouldn't occur until after peace negotiations had begun. If we are talking about next month, talking about some movement in those peace negotiations, implicitly

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Q. Mr. Secretary, in one of your answers before you left open the possibility that the first option available to Arab leaders, which is the preferable one from your point of view, wouldn't occur until after peace negotiations had begun. If we are talking about next month, talking about some movement in those peace negotiations, implicitly you are not holding out any hope for an end to the embargo before the beginning of the year. Is that fair?

A. No. I don't want to set a deadline to decisions that are not of our own making. I would have thought that the most constructive course would be to give the negotiating process a chance now that the point has been made, and to permit the countries concerned to make their efforts. What the appropriate timing for their decision is I think should be left in the first instance to the leaders who have to make that decision. I didn't want to give a deadline.

Marvin.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how you envisage this peace conference? On the Israeli side there is one state -- on the Arab side several. Is a veto to be implied? how do you see this developing?

A. Well, of course the conference, to be effective, would have to be left to a considerable extent to the decision of the participants. For example, there are any ways it could be conducted. It could operate through plenary sessions that then break up into a series of bilateral negotiations. It could address some issues of common concern in plenary sessions, and then some issues of bilateral concern in separate meetings. I think the procedural possibilities are fairly wide and should be explored in the first instance by the parties concerned. Obviously no agreement can be made, and certainly no agreement can last, unless it has the willing participation and agreement of all of the parties at the conference.

Les.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Prime Minister Meir, addressing some Israeli troops today in Sinai, said that the U.S. will put pressure on Israel to make some concessions. Could you now elaborate on what concessions you would expect Israel to make?

A. What the United States will do will depend on the process of negotiations. It is obvious that the conditions that produced the war that started on October 6 will have to be changed. And it is obvious, and it has always been understood, that a peace settlement will not ratify the cease-fire lines as they existed on October 6. Therefore, a peace settlement will have to have a number of elements. It will have to have an element of withdrawals. It will have to have an element of security arrangements between the parties concerned. And it may have to have an element of outside guarantees. In addition, there are such issues as the Palestinians and the future of Jerusalem. It will undoubtedly have to be discussed in some form or another at a peace conference.

We hope that Israel, as well as the Arab countries, will recognise that one of the clear consequences of recent events is that a purely military solution to the problems of the Middle East is impossible, and that all countries therefore have the problem of the right balance between their security needs and the needs of legitimacy, acceptance or whatever you want to call it.

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We do not consider it axiomatic that this can only be achieved by pressure on Israel by the United States to make concessions. We expect to have full consultations with Israel, as we expect to have discussions with the Arab participants, and the positions we will take as the negotiations develop depend on the positions the various parties take during the course of the negotiations, and cannot be assumed ahead of time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what role do you foresee for the Palestinians at the peace conference?

A. This is a very difficult question that affects Israel, the other Arab states, and among the other Arab states Jordan in particular. And it is a question which sometime in the course of the negotiation will require explicit discussion. Whether it is necessary to address it in the very first phases of the negotiations, when probably the military issues will loom largest, remains to be seen, and I would doubt it. But the Palestinian issue is of course one of the key questions that will come up.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your discussions yesterday with the representatives of American oil companies, were you at all encouraged that these oil companies would take the effort, the American effort to produce a peace settlement in the Middle East, into consideration, particularly with emphasis on Japan, on the supply of oil to American troops stationed on Okinawa and Japan, and will they provide some of the scarce reserves that they have to help the Japanese particularly?

A. The problem of the world-wide energy crisis has been a very profound challenge to all of the oil-consuming countries. At a minimum, we have an obligation to study seriously what we can do to alleviate difficulties that have been caused either by policies which we consider responsible during the war, which would be the case with the Netherlands, or which are produced by the stationing of American troops, which would be the case in Japan.

We are now looking at this problem very seriously and hope to formulate some position by the early part or by the middle part of next week.

The meeting with the oil executives was not primarily concerned with these more or less technical issues. It was rather concerned with the fact that here are representatives of American companies that are operating in many of these countries, and that need to understand what the basic direction of our policy is so that in their own economic activities they are at least aware of how we conceive the national interest.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, President Nixon has been saying that the personal relationships between himself and the leaders of the Soviet Union played some kind of role in connection with this alert. But the facts, as far as we know them, which by your new policy is virtually zero, suggest that the communication was so bad that you had to call a military alert to get your message across.

A. I didn't understand the question.

Q. What I am trying to ask is whether or not, or exactly what role President Nixon's personal relationship with Mr. Brezhnev played in the recent alert.

A. The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States is an inherently ambiguous one. We have never said that detente indicates that we have parallel objectives,

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or that it indicates that we have compatible domestic structures. Our view has been that the detente is made necessary because as the two great nuclear superpowers, we have a special responsibility to spare mankind the dangers of a nuclear holocaust. And if one looks at history and sees how often it has happened that wars have been produced by the rivalries of client states without a full consideration of the world-wide issues, how easily misunderstandings could produce confrontations that could have catastrophic consequences, the overriding need of finding a solution to the problem of world-wide general nuclear war becomes overwhelming.

As I pointed out in my last press conference, this is the central problem of our period, and it is a problem that will have to be solved either by this group of officials or by their successors. But it cannot be avoided.

Now, in this situation, in this relationship, one will always have an element, both of confidence and of competition, coexisting in a somewhat ambivalent manner. The relationship that has developed between the Soviet Union and the United States since 1971 has been one of considerable restraint, and there have been very frequent, very confidential exchanges between General Secretary Brezhnev and the President. At the same time it is perfectly conceivable, and indeed it has happened during the Middle East crisis, that longstanding commitments or ideological pressures produce actions that bring these two sides into confrontation. At that point it is important that enough confidence exists so that the confrontation is mitigated. And therefore, one has to judge not only the fact that a confrontation occurred, really in the aftermath of a settlement, and as a result of actions which could not be fully controlled by either of the two sides because it happened the immediate cause was the violation of the cease-fire.

But one also has to consider how rapidly the confrontation was ended and how quickly the two sides have attempted to move back and are now moving back to a policy of cooperation in settling the Middle East conflict.

I would therefore say that the relationship that had developed between the two Governments and between the two leaders played a role in settling the crisis, even though it had not yet been firm enough to prevent the crisis.

Q. That it played the role is one thing. But what kind of a role was that in this particular instance?

A. I have tried to give my best --

Q. It had to be some kind of a role.

A. It played in my judgment a significant role, the degree of which one will have to assess over a period of time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have referred several times to peace negotiations within the next several weeks. Yet Prime Minister Meir has said this is impossible until after the Israeli election December 31. Do you have assurances from the parties concerned of a place and a date, and which parties will participate, and may we know them?

A. We have no absolutely firm assurances, but we have some rather substantial understandings with all of the parties of the time frame which I indicated. The participants remain fully to be determined, but we are close to an agreement on that

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as well. And we will also agree, then, on the site.

We hope that this process should be completed during the next week, and we will then announce it as soon as all the parties have agreed to it.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said that the United States had --

Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you --

A. I am trying to understand this process where I look at one person and another speaks. But ladies first. Go ahead, Marilyn.

Q. You said the United States produces 85 percent of its energy, and it has been noted that other countries are not that fortunate. Is the United States, among the things it is considering, thinking of sharing some of its energy sources with Japan, and the Netherlands, and other countries less fortunate in a time of embargo?

A. Well, our first problem is to understand exactly what needs to be done to get our own energy crisis under control, and I am told that energetic steps in that direction are being taken.

The degree to which we can share our energy sources with other countries is a very complex matter, and, of course, the more broadly the sharing is conceived, the more difficult it becomes. But with respect to specific needs, such as in the case of the Netherlands, and the particular issue that Mr. Wallach mentioned in the case of Japan, require our careful study, and we are trying very hard to look into it.

The second issue that is raised by your question is the attitude that the more vulnerable countries should take in this crisis with all understanding for their vulnerability, and they have to consider whether, by taking isolated actions, they will contribute more to the peace settlement on which, after all, the ultimate solution of this problem depends, or whether their better course would not be to try to work as closely with us in the responsible efforts that we are trying to undertake.

Q. Mr. Secretary, during your confirmations hearings, you said that the United Nations could not, or would not, be able to play a useful political role because of the veto that the super-powers or the major powers have in the Security Council. In the event, during this Middle East crisis, it looks as if the United Nations was able to play a useful role. First, have you changed your opinion, and, second, what does this forecast for the United States use of the U.N. in the future.

A. I must say that the United Nations played a more effective role in this crisis than could have been deduced from my theoretical statements as a professor, or from my statements during my confirmation hearings.

It proved to be an extremely effective sounding board, the most rapid means of communication among the parties, and when the chief participants had decided on a settlement, the most effective way by which the settlement could be achieved.

Finally, it performed the absolutely essential role of providing the buffer that prevented the confrontation that could have occurred without it.

So, we believe that the United Nations played a very useful role, and we will take very serious account of that in the solution of other problems.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the evident and considerable advantage to Russia inherent in the reopening of the Suez canal, granting their large Mediterranean fleet access to the Indian Ocean, to the Persian Gulf, and so on, can you tell us why, as I think is the case, the United States so strongly favours the reopening of the Suez?

A. The United States has not favoured the reopening of the Suez canal in the abstract. The United States has favoured the evolution of the Middle East policy of such a nature that some reasonable prospect towards a final settlement was opened up to the chief participants.

If anything has become clear in recent years, it is that the situation as it existed prior to October 6th, was simply unacceptable to enough of the Arab countries and to the Middle East, so that it would constantly produce the danger of renewed warfare, and of a kind of warfare that as the war has made clear is not in the long-term interest of Israel, either.

Therefore, the opening of the Suez canal ought to be seen, not in the context of the strategic movements of the Soviet fleet, but in the context of world peace in general.

Now, with respect to the greater ease of movement of the Soviet fleet from the Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean, there is a great danger of looking at the developments in this area in terms of a strategy that is more appropriate to the previous century than now.

Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean will not depend primarily on the number of ships it can deploy into the Indian Ocean. And I am confident that to the degree that power becomes the principal factor in the Indian Ocean, that we will be able to generate a fleet of sufficient size in that area so that we could counter-balance anything that the Soviet Union might put into the Indian Ocean, as the recent visit of the Hancock in that area has demonstrated.

Q. Are you favouring a permanent U.S.-Indian Ocean fleet, or inferring that?

A. I am saying that the future of the Middle East should not be deduced from the steaming time of the Soviet fleet from the Black sea into the Indian ocean, and whether adding ten days to it, or cutting ten days off it, will not be the determining factor.

Therefore, the United States attitude towards the opening of the Suez canal, and to the military disengagement of forces in that area, will be determined primarily, first by the contribution this would make towards the general peace in the area, and, secondly, by the possibilities it gives to reduce the influence of outside powers in general, by focusing matters on Middle East concerns. That is the principal issue, and this is the best way to reduce Soviet influence, and, for that matter, any outside influence in that area.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a three part question. In your opening statement, your referred to the peace talks under U.N. auspices. I think at your last press conference, you talked about Soviet-American auspices. Is this a slight change? And, secondly, after your appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, you said you had no plan but certain principles that you would like to see in an agreement.

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Chairman Fulbright, in his talk with newsmen yesterday, went through certain principles, including which he said he favoured the Rogers plan of Israeli pullbacks to the old boundaries with insubstantial changes.

I wondered how you felt on that question.

A. With respect to the procedural issue, we still believe that the appropriate auspices foreseen in Security Council resolution 338 could best be provided by the United States and the Soviet Union. We believe, however, also, that these auspices should be generally blessed by the United Nations, and we would have no objection -- in fact, we would welcome -- some participation by the Secretary General of the United Nations to symbolise this United Nations Aegis.

With respect to the specifics of an American position, our attitude -- I have stated the general principles with respect to Security Council resolution 242, and some of the elements that we believe are likely to be contained in such a negotiation.

We do not believe it is effective for the United States to put forward a proposal in all its details which then will enable both parties, or will tempt both parties, to start shooting at the American proposal, rather than to concentrate on what it is that they should accomplish.

We believe that the process that was followed in bringing about the six point agreement solidifying the cease-fire may be more effective, in which the parties assume responsibility for their own positions. And once they put their positions on the table, then the United States can attempt to bring about a closing of the gap and perhaps inject its own ideas where those appear to be useful.

Q. NATO proved to be a rather fragile vessel at the height of our airlift, Mr. Secretary, and some hard words were exchanged openly and privately. Would you give us your estimate of the damage that has been done to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and what can be done to shore it up, if anything?

A. Well, let me say, first of all, that the relationships in the Atlantic area remain the absolutely core element of American Foreign Policy. We remain convinced, as we have been convinced -- on a bipartisan basis in the entire post-war period -- that if the free nations of the North Atlantic cannot regulate their relationships with each other, it is hard to see how they can cope with the problems on a global basis that they confront.

On the other hand, it is necessary to realise that serious difficulties arose in recent weeks. These difficulties were not accidental, but have reflected strains that have been apparent for a good part of this year.

Now, I have read a great deal of speculation which ascribes this to inadequate consultation by the United States. And, of course, senior officials have a tendency towards a conviction in their infallibility, and they rarely admit that mistakes might have been made. But I don't even want to argue that point. Any process of consultation can be improved. The key question one has to ask one's self however is -- and that one has to answer -- is this: it is a root fact of the situation that the countries that were most consulted proved among the most difficult in their cooperation; and those countries that were most cooperative were least consulted. So that there is at least no automatic relationship between consultation and agreement.

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Secondly, if we deal with the question in its deepest aspect, are the objections that were raised due to inadequate information or to a different perception of their role. And one cannot avoid the perhaps melancholy conclusions that some of our European allies saw their interests so different from those of the United States that they were prepared to break ranks with the United States on a matter of very grave international consequence, and that we happen to believe was of very profound consequence to them as well.

Now, I don't want to debate the merits of this issue. And, in answering your question about what damage has been done to the Atlantic alliance, I would say the recent weeks made evident the need which the United States tried to underline by its initiative for these declaration's defining just what it is that the nations of the North Atlantic can do together, and what they should do separately; of defining what forms of consultation are appropriate; how the nations of the North Atlantic can cooperate. This is what we put before the Europeans in April. This is what we hope to achieve. And this is why the need for it should have been made evident to both sides of the Atlantic in recent weeks. And if that is the conclusion that is drawn on both sides of the Atlantic, as it is on this side of the Atlantic, then I think it will have been a good thing, and it can lead to a new period of progress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you expect to accomplish on that issue?

A. Well, we are having a NATO Ministerial meeting on December 10th and 11th, and this gives an opportunity for the Foreign Ministers of all NATO nations to discuss the state of the alliance. We expect to do this candidly, and in a constructive attitude, and with the determination to put new vitality into Atlantic relationships.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you tell us what led you to pledge the documents on the U.S.-Soviet situation? Particularly, was it the American domestic turbulence at that time that encouraged you, particularly with that short deadline which you gave?

A. It is a mistake to assume that everything that is said in a press conference is fully considered. (laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, does it remain the intention of the United States Government to ask the Congress for the full \$2.2 billion in aid to Israel, and has the United States committed itself to delivering that full total in armament to Israel?

A. We maintain our request, and we will judge what will be done with it on the basis of the needs as they will be jointly assessed between Israel and the United States.

Q. Thank you, very much, Mr. Secretary.

(End transcript)

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AM MR DAVIES, MR ARCHER, MRS FLEMING (53)
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19 NOV 1973

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Tuesday
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DR. HENRY KISSINGER'S INTERVIEW IN PEKING

Secretary of State Kissinger told U.S. television interviewers November 12 the United States expects that when the Middle East ceasefire is stabilised, a peace conference can be set up in "not more than a matter of weeks."

Following is the transcript of the interview:

(Begin transcript)

Q. Mr. Secretary, what have you been talking to the Chinese about?

A. Ever since we established contact with the Chinese we have been meeting at this level twice a year. And there's generally an exchange of views about the whole range of international problems. And also discussion of where Sino - U.S. relations would go over the next period. And that has been the main subject of our conversations.

Q. Can you be more specific about what has been discussed?

A. In general, you can assume that we've discussed all the outstanding international issues, as well as Sino - U.S. relationships.

Q. On the Middle East, when and how was the peace conference perceived?

A. We have had from the beginning two objectives: one to stabilise the ceasefire and then once the ceasefire was stabilised, we move from there to a peace conference. As you know, Egypt and Israel yesterday signed the ceasefire stabilisation arrangement that was worked out last week. They have to negotiate some of the implementation of the modalities of this. When that is completed, which we hope will be soon, we will move into setting up the peace conference. Our expectation is that this should not be more than a matter of weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it inherently dangerous to the super powers -- the U.S. and Russia -- to become committed to guaranteeing peace arrangements in the Middle East?

A. So far there hasn't been any precise discussion of guarantees. What we have done up to now is not to guarantee a particular settlement, but to be helpful to the parties in narrowing the differences between them. The Arab nations and Israel have been fighting each other for nearly a generation. And many issues are fraught with tremendous emotion for them. Therefore, if we can strip away some of the emotions and present it in a way that it's more acceptable to both sides we can make some progress as was made last week. We have not yet given any particular guarantees. However I would assume that if the peace negotiations succeed it will be a very serious problem especially for Israel, of how security can be assured under conditions when the final borders will certainly be different from the ceasefire lines and when withdrawals are involved as Security Council

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Resolution Two Forty Two provides. At this point the question of guarantees will arise and we have to then ask the question what sort of guarantees -- unilateral, several countries and so forth. Second, moreover, the great powers are already involved to some extent in the Middle East. What we have to do is to try to prevent every crisis from turning into a clash of the super powers. And in that respect I agree with you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much pressure is the United States willing to apply to get Israel to make the kind of concessions that will be necessary for a fair settlement?

A. First, you are assuming something that will still remain to be revealed through the process of negotiations. Israel has already agreed that the final borders will not be the ceasefire lines, either of Nineteen Sixty Seven or Nineteen Seventy-Three. And we have every hope that through the process of negotiations a mutually acceptable settlement will be achieved. The United States stated during the conflict and has stated since that they would make a major effort to bring the parties together. That will be our intention. We don't expect that it will require major pressure on either of the sides.

Q. Are you satisfied that the major powers in sponsoring the peace conference will not try to use it in the future to gain a major edge in the Mideast.

A. The temptation is always there to explore the situation to the advantage of one or the other of the super powers. However, if the super powers understand their own interests, and the world interests, they ought to realise that the other side can always match them in terms of military equipment, and that the attempt to turn this into a super power confrontation must lead to a constantly increasing danger of war. The effort may be made. When it is made we will resist it as we have in the past. We hope, and that will certainly be an attitude that the Soviet Union will approach these negotiations in the same spirit we shall; namely that a settlement just to all parties is in the interest of everybody. If they do not, then we will have to see what else can be done.

Q. The Soviet Union has direct bilateral arrangements with Egypt, Syria, Iraq and a number of other Arab countries. Senator Fulbright in the past has called for the establishment of a bilateral treaty between the United States and Israel. Would the Administration support that?

A. It has been a constant American policy supported in every Administration and carrying wide bipartisan support that the existence of Israel will be supported by the United States. This has been our policy. In the absence of many formal arrangements. And it has never been challenged no matter which administration was in office. The question then is where are the borders and what are the security arrangements and this is what is going to be negotiated. In the next phase in accordance with Security Council Resolution Two-Forty-Two. Whether the security guarantees should be expressed in some formal document or in some other way, I think we should wait until the negotiations are completed; but it is one of the ideas that is under consideration.

Q. In that connection Mr. Secretary, given the oil situation, the number of people in territory involved, the new relationship with the Soviet Union, why is it in the American national interest to support Israel so strongly? I ask that in the context of guaranteeing the existence of Israel.

A. The United States in the entire post war period has supported the concept that international conflict should not be settled by force. It has moreover supported the

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concept that nations should not be eliminated simply by the superior numbers or in any manner by their neighbours. The United States has supported Israel because of the emotional ties that have existed, because of the democratic tradition of Israel, and because of the fact that it is a growing concern in this area and because as I have said about our opposition to the domination of one nation by force of others. The oil situation will continue for the indefinite future and while we are highly respectful of the views of the Arab world it is not possible for us to be swayed in the major orientation of our policies by the monopoly positions or the temporary monopoly positions enjoyed by a few nations.

Q. Do you get no indication from King Faisal or others in your Near Eastern journey that the oil restrictions might be changed?

A. We had very extensive talks with King Faisal and his advisors and it is a problem that has many complexities both for us as well as King Faisal. I think that both sides are studying its adaptation and in the light of the developing situation.

Q. As you get into the formal negotiations is it safe to assume that arms delivery by the U.S. to Israel, the Soviet Union to the Arabs, will continue, or do you have some kind of an arrangement already with the Soviet Union that when you reach a point in the negotiations both of the super powers will knock down the flow of arms.

A. No such arrangement exists as of now, but the United States has always held the view that it was prepared to discuss limitation of the flow of arms into the Middle East in order to avoid the present situation of the piling up of arms on both sides. If there is a limitation of the flow of armaments, it has, however, to include all of those countries which might transfer their arms to one or more of the combatants and not just the parties in the last war.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are some people who argue that detente was exposed as a myth during the Middle East crisis because the Russians threatened to use military force even though their own vital interests were not affected. How do you answer them.

A. There has been a misunderstanding in many respects about detente. There has been the idea that detente reflects the fact that the two sides agree with each other and that it reflects an era of good feeling or similar domestic structures. We have always believed that detente is necessary precisely because we have opposing interests in many parts of the world and totally different social systems. Detente is necessary because of the danger posed by the accumulation of nuclear weapons on both sides. We are in favour of detente because we want to limit the risk of major nuclear conflict. That gives us an opportunity to communicate and to move rapidly if we want to. It does not eliminate the conflicting interest. It does not prevent occasional clashes. What it does make possible is a more rapid settlement and a certain amount of restraint when crises develop when both of these things occur. But there are limitations beyond which it cannot go.

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Tuesday, 15/10
October 9, 1973

DR. KISSINGER'S ADDRESS AT 'PACEM IN TERRIS' CONFERENCE

Following is the text as prepared for delivery of the address by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at the "Pacem in Terris" conference in Washington, October 8:

THE NATURE OF THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE

This is an important anniversary. A year ago today -- on October 8 -- came the breakthrough in the Paris negotiations which led soon afterward to the end of American military involvement in Vietnam. It is strangely difficult now to recapture the emotion of that moment of hope and uncertainty when suddenly years of suffering and division were giving way to new possibilities for reconciliation.

We meet, too, at a time when renewed conflict in the Middle East reminds us that international stability is always precarious and never to be taken for granted. Pacem in Terris remains regrettably elusive. However well we contain this crisis, as we have contained others, we must still ask ourselves what we seek beyond the management of conflict.

The need for a dialogue about national purposes has never been more urgent and no assembly is better suited for such a discussion than those gathered here tonight.

Dramatic changes in recent years have transformed America's position and role in the world.

For most of the post-war period America enjoyed predominance in physical resources and political power. Now like most other nations in history, we find that our most difficult task is how to apply limited means to the accomplishment of carefully defined ends. We can no longer overwhelm our problems; we must master them with imagination, understanding and patience.

For a generation our preoccupation was to prevent the cold war from degenerating into a hot war. Today, when the danger of global conflict has diminished, we face the more profound problem of defining what we mean by peace and determining the ultimate purpose of improved international relations.

For two decades the solidarity of our alliances seemed as constant as the threats to our security. Now our allies have regained strength and self-confidence, and relations with adversaries have improved. All this has given rise to uncertainties over the sharing of burdens with friends and the impact of reduced tensions on the cohesion of alliances.

Thus, even as we have mastered the art of containing crises, our concern with the nature of a more permanent international order has grown. Questions once obscured by more insistent needs now demand our attention: what is true national interest? To what end stability? What is the relationship of peace to justice?

It is characteristic of periods of upheaval that to those who live through them, they appear as a series of haphazard events. Symptoms obscure basic issues and historical trends. The urgent tends to dominate the important. Too often, goals are presented as abstract utopias, safe havens from pressing events.

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But a debate to be fruitful must define what can reasonably be asked of Foreign Policy and at what pace progress can be achieved. Otherwise it turns into competing catalogues of the desirable rather than informed comparisons of the possible. Dialogue degenerates into tactical skirmishing.

The current public discussion reflects some interesting and significant shifts in perspective:

A Foreign Policy once considered excessively moralistic is now looked upon by some as excessively pragmatic.

The Government was criticised in 1969 for holding back East-West trade with certain countries until there was progress in their Foreign Policies. Now we are criticised for not holding back East-West trade until there are changes in those same countries' Domestic Policies.

The Administration's Foreign Policy once decried as too cold-war oriented is now attacked as too insensitive to the profound moral antagonism between communism and freedom. One consequence of this intellectual shift is a gap between conception and performance on some major issues of Policy:

The desirability of peace and detente is affirmed but both the inducements to progress and the penalties to confrontation are restricted by legislation.

Expressions of concern for human values in other countries are coupled with failure to support the very programmes designed to help developing areas improve their economic and social conditions.

The declared objective of maintaining a responsible American international role clashes with nationalistic pressures in trade and monetary negotiations and with calls for unilateral withdrawal from Alliance obligations.

It is clear that we face genuine moral dilemmas and important policy choices. But it is also clear that we need to define the framework of our dialogue more, perceptively and understandingly.

THE COMPETING ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign Policy must begin with the understanding that it involves relationships between sovereign countries. Sovereignty has been defined as a will uncontrolled by others; that is what gives Foreign Policy its contingent and ever incomplete character.

For disagreement among sovereign states can be settled only by negotiation or by power, by compromise or by imposition. Which of these methods prevails depends on the values, the strengths and the domestic systems of the countries involved. A nation's values define what is just; its strength determines what is possible; its domestic structure decides what policies can in fact be implemented and sustained.

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Thus Foreign Policy involves two partially conflicting endeavours: defining the interests, purposes and values of a society and relating them to the interests, purposes and values of others.

The Policy maker, therefore, must strike a balance between what is desirable and what is possible. Progress will always be measured in partial steps and in the relative satisfaction of alternative goals. Tension is unavoidable between values, which are invariably cast in maximum terms, and efforts to promote them, which of necessity involve compromise. Foreign Policy is explained domestically in terms of justice. But what is defined as justice at home becomes the subject of negotiation abroad. It is thus no accident that many nations, including our own, view the international arena as a forum in which virtue is thwarted by the clever practice of foreigners.

In a community of sovereign states, the quest for peace involves a paradox: the attempt to impose absolute justice by one state will be seen as absolute injustice by all others; the quest for total security for some turns into total insecurity for the remainder. Stability depends on the relative satisfaction and therefore also the relative dissatisfaction of the various states. The pursuit of peace must therefore begin with pragmatic concept of coexistence -- Especially in a period of ideological conflict.

We must, of course, avoid becoming obsessed with stability. An excessively pragmatic policy will be empty to vision and humanity. It will lack not only direction, but also roots and heart. General De Gaulle wrote in his memoirs that "France cannot be France without greatness." By the same token America cannot be true to itself without moral purpose. This country has always had a sense of mission. Americans have always held the view that America stood for something above and beyond its material achievements. A purely pragmatic policy provides no criteria for other nations to assess our performance and standards to which the American people can rally.

But when policy becomes excessively moralistic it may turn quixotic or dangerous. A presumed monopoly on truth obstructs negotiation and accommodation. Good results may be given up in the quest for ever elusive ideal solutions. Policy may fall prey to ineffectual posturing or adventuristic crusades.

The prerequisite for a fruitful national debate is that the policy makers and critics appreciate each other's perspectives and respect each other's purposes. The policy maker must understand that the critic is obliged to stress imperfections in order to challenge assumptions and to goad actions. But equally the critic should acknowledge the complexity and inherent ambiguity of the policy maker's choices. The policy maker must be concerned with the best that can be achieved, not just the best that can be imagined. He has to act in a fog of incomplete knowledge without the information that will be available later to the analyst. He knows -- or should know -- that he is responsible for the consequences of disaster as well as for the benefits of success. He may have to qualify some goals not because they would be undesirable if reached, but because the risks of failure outweigh potential gains. He must often settle for the gradual, much as he might prefer the immediate. He must compromise with others, and this means to some extent compromising with himself.

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The outsider demonstrates his morality by the precision of his perceptions and the loftiness of his ideals. The policy maker expresses his morality by implanting a sequence of imperfections and partial solutions in pursuit of his ideals.

There must be understanding, as well, of the crucial importance of timing. Opportunities cannot be hoarded; once past, they are usually irretrievable. New relationships in a fluid transitional period -- such as today -- are delicate and vulnerable; they must be nurtured if they are to thrive. We cannot pull up young shoots periodically to see whether the roots are still there or whether there is some marginally better location for them.

ORIGINAL We are now at such a time of tenuous beginnings. Western Europe and Japan have joined us in an effort to reinvigorate our relationships. The Soviet Union has begun to practice foreign policy -- at least partially -- as a relationship between states rather than as international civil war. The People's Republic of China has emerged from two decades of isolation. The developing countries are impatient for economic and social change. A new dimension of unprecedented challenges -- in food, Oceans, Energy, Environment -- demands global cooperation.

ORIGINAL We are at one of those rare moments where through a combination of fortuitous circumstances and design man seems in a position to shape his future. What we need is the confidence to discuss issues without bitter strife, the wisdom to define together the nature of our world as well as the vision to chart together a more just future.

DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Nothing demonstrates this need more urgently than our relationship with the Soviet Union.

This Administration has never had any illusions about the Soviet system. We have always insisted that progress in technical fields, such as trade, had to follow -- and reflect -- progress toward more stable international relations. We have maintained a strong military balance and a flexible defence posture as a buttress to stability. We have insisted that disarmament had to be mutual. We have judged movement in our relations with the Soviet Union, not by atmospherics, but by how well concrete problems are resolved and by whether there is responsible international conduct.

Coexistence to us continues to have a very precise meaning: -- We will oppose the attempt by any country to achieve a position of predominance either globally or regionally.

We will resist any attempt to exploit a policy of detente to weaken our Alliances.

We will react if relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots.

The Soviet Union cannot disregard these principles in any area of the world without imperilling its entire relationship with the United States.

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On this basis we have succeeded in transforming U.S.-Soviet relations in many important ways. Our two countries have concluded an historic accord to limit strategic arms. We have substantially reduced the risk of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation in crisis areas. The problem of Berlin has been resolved by negotiation. We and our Allies have engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations on major issues of European security including a reduction of military forces in central Europe. We have reached a series of bilateral agreements on cooperation -- health, environment, space, science and technology, as well as trade. These accords are designed to create a vested interest in cooperation and restraint.

Until recently the goals of detente were not an issue. The necessity of shifting from confrontation toward negotiation seemed so overwhelming that goals beyond the settlement of international disputes were never raised. But now progress has been made--and already taken for granted. We are engaged in an intense debate on whether we should make changes in Soviet society a precondition for further progress -- or indeed for following through on commitments already made. The cutting edge of this problem is the Congressional effort to condition Most-Favoured-Nation trade status for other countries on changes in their domestic systems.

This is a genuine moral dilemma. There are genuine moral concerns -- on both sides of the argument. So let us not address this as a debate between those who are morally sensitive and those who are not, between those who care for justice and those who are oblivious to humane values. The attitude of the American people and Government has been made emphatically clear on countless occasions, in ways that have produced effective results. The exit tax on emigration is not being collected and we have received assurances that it will not be reapplied; hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government are being given specific attention; the rate of Jewish emigration has been in the terms of thousands where it was once a trickle. We will continue our vigorous efforts on these matters.

But the real debate goes far beyond this: Should we now tie demands which were never raised during negotiations to agreements that have already been concluded?

Should we require as a formal condition internal changes that we heretofore sought to foster in an evolutionary manner?

Let us remember what the MFN question specifically involves. The very term "Most favoured nation" is misleading in its implication of preferential treatment. What we are talking about is whether to allow normal economic relations to develop -- of the kind we now have with over 100 other countries and which the Soviet Union enjoyed until 1951. The issue is whether to abolish discriminatory trade restrictions that were imposed at the height of the cold war. Indeed, at that time the Soviet Government discouraged commerce because it feared the domestic impact of normal trading relations with the West on its society.

The demand that Moscow modify its domestic policy as a precondition for MFN or detente was never made while we were negotiating; now it is inserted after both sides have carefully shaped an overall mosaic. Thus it raises questions about our entire bilateral relationship.

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Finally, the issue affects not only our relationship with the Soviet Union, but also with many other countries whose internal structures we find incompatible with our own. Conditions imposed on one country could inhibit expanding relations with others, such as the People's Republic of China.

We shall never condone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We shall urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice. But the issue comes down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can we press without provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions? Are we ready to face the crises and increased defence....that a return to cold war conditions would spawn? And will this encourage full emigration or enhance the well-being or nourish the hope for liberty of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Is it detente that has prompted repression -- or is it detente that has generated the ferment and the demand for openness which we are now witnessing?

For half a century we have objected to Communist efforts to alter the domestic structures of other countries. For a generation of cold war we sought to ease the risks produced by competing ideologies. Are we now to come full circle and insist on domestic compatibility as a condition of progress?

These questions have no easy answers. The government may underestimate the margin of concessions available to us. But a fair debate must admit that they are genuine questions, the answers to which could affect the fate of all of us.

Our policy with respect to detente is clear: we shall resist aggressive foreign policies. Detente cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East. As for the internal policies of closed systems the United States will never forget that the antagonism between freedom and its enemies is part of the reality of the modern age. We are not neutral in that struggle. As long as we remain powerful we will use our influence to promote freedom, as we always have. But in the nuclear age we are obliged to recognize that the issue of war and peace also involves human lives and that the attainment of peace is a profound moral concern.

THE WORLD AS IT IS AND THE WORLD WE SEEK

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly two weeks ago, I described our goal as a world where power blocs and balances are no longer relevant; where justice, not stability, can be our over-riding preoccupation; where countries consider co-operation in the world interest to be in their national interest.

But we cannot move toward the world of the future without first maintaining peace in the world as it is. These very days we are vividly reminded that this requires vigilance and a continuing commitment.

So our journey must start from where we are now. This is a time of lessened tension, of greater equilibrium, of diffused power. But if the world is better than our earlier fears, it still falls far short of our hopes. To deal with the present does not mean that we are content with it.

The most striking feature of the contemporary period -- the feature that gives complexity as well as hope -- is the radical transformation in the nature of power. Throughout history power has generally been homogenous. Military, economic and political potential were closely related. To be powerful a nation had to be strong in all categories. Today the vocabulary of strength is more complex.

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Military muscle does not guarantee political influence. Economic giants can be militarily weak, and military strength may not be able to obscure economic weakness. Countries can exert political influence even when they have neither military nor economic strength.

It is wrong to speak of only one balance of power, for there are several which have to be related to each other. In the military sphere, there are two super powers. In economic terms, there are at least five major groupings. Politically, many more centres of influence have emerged; some 80 new nations have come into being since the end of World War II and regional groups are assuming ever increasing importance.

Above all, whatever the measure of power, its political utility has changed. Throughout history increases in military power -- however slight -- could be turned into specific political advantage. With the overwhelming arsenals of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of marginal advantage is both pointless and potentially suicidal. Once sufficiency is reached, additional increments of power do not translate into usable political strength; and attempts to achieve tactical gains can lead to cataclysm.

This environment both puts a premium on stability and makes it difficult to maintain. Today's striving for equilibrium should not be compared to the balance of power of previous periods. The very notion of "operating" classical balance of power disintegrates when the change required to upset the balance is so large that it cannot be achieved by limited means.

More specifically, there is no parallel with the nineteenth century. Then, the principal countries shared essentially similar concepts of legitimacy and accepted the basic structure of the existing international order. Small adjustments in strength were significant. The "balance" operated in a relatively confined geographic area. None of these factors obtain today.

Nor when we talk of equilibrium do we mean a simplistic mechanical model devoid of purpose. The constantly shifting alliances that maintained equilibrium in previous centuries are neither appropriate nor possible in our time. In an age of ideological schism the distinction between friends and adversaries is an objective reality. We share ideals as well as interests with our friends, and we know that the strength of our friendships is crucial to the lowering of tensions with our opponents.

When we refer to five or six or seven major centres of power, the point being made is not that others are excluded but that a few short years ago everyone agreed that there were only two. The diminishing tensions and the emergence of new centres of power has meant greater freedom of action and greater importance for all other nations.

In this setting, our immediate aim has been to build a stable network of relationships that offers hope of sparing mankind the scourges of war. An inter-dependent world community cannot tolerate either big power confrontations or recurrent regional crises.

But peace must be more than the absence of conflict. We perceive stability as the bridge to the realization of human aspirations, not an end in itself. We have learned much about containing crises, but we have not removed their roots. We have begun to accommodate our differences, but we have not affirmed our commonality. We may have improved the mastery of equilibrium, but we have not yet attained justice.

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In the encyclical for which this conference is named, Pope John sketched a greater vision. He foresaw "that no political community is able to pursue its own interests and develop itself in isolation" for "there is a growing awareness of all human beings that they are members of a world community."

The opportunities of mankind now transcend nationalism, and can only be dealt with by nations acting in concert:

-- For the first time in generations mankind is in a position to shape a new and peaceful international order. But do we have the imagination and determination to carry forward this still fragile task of creation?

-- For the first time in history we may have the technical knowledge to satisfy man's basic needs. The imperatives of the modern world respect no national borders and must inevitably open all societies to the world around them. But do we have the political will to join together to accomplish this great end?

If this vision is to be realized, America's active involvement is inescapable. History will judge us by our deeds, not by our good intentions.

But it cannot be the work of any one country. And it cannot be the undertaking of any one Administration or one branch of government or one party. To build truly is to chart a course that will be carried on by future leaders because it has the enduring support of the American people.

So let us search for a fresh consensus. Let us restore a spirit of understanding between the legislative and the executive, between the Government and the Press, between the people and their public servants. Let us learn once again to debate our methods and not our motives, to focus on our destiny and not on our divisions. Let us all contribute our different views and perspectives but let us, once again, see ourselves as engaged in a common enterprise. If we are to shape a world community we must first restore community at home.

With Americans working together, America can work with others toward man's eternal goal of a *pax in terris* -- peace abroad, peace at home and peace within ourselves. (End text)

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Kissinger's speech at the United Nations

The Press comment on Kissinger's speech before the General Assembly has been mixed. After the build-up that Kissinger himself had given the occasion there was an element of anti-climax. In addition to the critical note struck by the New York Times (UKMIS TUR) there has been a syndicated article by Joe Kraft on 27 September which did not mention the speech but suggested that the era of striking initiatives and dramatic personal diplomacy was over; and that Kissinger's brilliance was no longer sufficient "to negate the limitations of domestic difficulties". Apart from these however the little comment that has appeared has on the whole been mildly favourable. Thus the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post both welcomed the Administration's renewed interest in the United Nations and the Post commended Kissinger's remarks on peace-keeping and on his proposal for a World Food Conference. But the Wall Street Journal devoted half its editorial to what it described as the irresponsibility of the United Nations and it will take more than one speech to cut through the widespread disenchantment in this country with the United Nations.

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Wednesday,
September 26, 1973

NOTE TO EDITORS

WAD
WOD
PLANNING STAFF

Please make the following correction in the prepared TEXT of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's address to the United Nations General Assembly distributed in this service yesterday.

In paragraph 4 on page 1 please delete the three sentences beginning "There have been substantial achievements..." and ending with the words "...distorted by slogans."

The text then picks up with the paragraph starting "But despite..."

Pi. copy also to: -
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Planning Staff

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Thursday September, 27th, 1973

OFFICIAL
TEXT
FROM USIS

UNITED STATES EMBASSY, LONDON

TRANSCRIPT OF KISSINGER'S SEPT. 26 NEWS CONFERENCE

Following is the transcript of the news conference in New York, September 26 by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger:

(Begin transcript)

The Secretary: Ladies and Gentlemen, I wanted to give you a brief account of what I have been doing here and then answer your questions, hopefully relating primarily to my activities in New York.

You know my schedule, so there is no point in repeating that. My activities consisted of the speech to the General Assembly, meetings with various Foreign Ministers and also meetings with my staff in preparation for my entering the State Department on Thursday -- where I still haven't been.

Now about my speech to the General Assembly, the intention was to convey the tone, philosophy, and the attitude of the Administration in its conduct of foreign policy for the remainder of this term.

We wanted to convey beyond the specific initiatives that might be proposed, that the task which is before us now is to consolidate what has been achieved, to construct something that can endure, something that can endure both within our country, because it has popular and governmental support -- and above all, something that can endure internationally -- because it is seen to be in the common interest.

This attitude and general philosophy, we thought was more important at this stage than a list of specific proposals although some were made, because you are familiar with the main outlines of many of our policies.

So for the President's second term, our agenda is to try to create an international consensus to international order that is seen to be just by all or if not by all, at least the greatest number of its members.

And sometimes that embodies humane and progressive ideas.

In my conversations with the Foreign Ministers I obviously had to deal primarily with the current agenda and on my trip this week, I saw a great many of our Allies. I saw many of the Foreign Ministers from Europe, I saw, of course, the Foreign Minister of Japan. I spent some time with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and today with the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China.

I had a long and fruitful talk with the Foreign Minister of Brazil, to underline the great importance we attach to reinvigorating our relationships in that area. And I saw the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Korea.

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Let me say a word about the conversations with our European friends, and also the relation of Japan to that process.

There has been a great deal of speculation tied to a possible trip of the President to Europe. We still, of course, plan this trip, but its exact date will have to be determined by the pace of our preparation.

Much of the speculation has been in terms of an adversary relationship between us and the Europeans and great difficulty in coming to an agreement.

I would like to correct this impression.

What we are confronting in the dialogue with the Europeans is the merging of several processes. There is the process of European integration. There is the process of the debate on security within NATO. And there is the redefinition of the Atlantic relationship, which covers all these areas.

As you know, and on behalf of the President, I proposed a New Atlantic Declaration of Principles in a speech I gave in April.

There was some uncertainty in Europe on how and in what form to respond; several months were spent in internal discussions within Europe -- whether the proper forum would be NATO, a series of bilateral negotiations with the Europeans, or a series of talks between the United States and the Common Market.

The result has been that after some months of going all these routes, the European opinion crystalized; it was decided that these economic matters -- and close political considerations relevant to economic matters -- and those political considerations relevant to Europe as an entity, should be discussed by the Nine, as a unit, with the United States. It was also decided that security issues -- and those political issues relevant to security matters -- should be discussed in the NATO Council.

And then, of course, bilateral channels have remained open throughout this process.

With respect to the declaration that the European Nine have developed, and that was presented to me yesterday on behalf of the Nine, by Foreign Minister Andersen of Denmark, let me say that the United States recognises that this first attempt by Europe to speak with one voice on a political matter in Trans-Atlantic relationships is an event of the greatest significance.

The United States in the post-war period has consistently supported the emergence of a European identity, and we therefore welcome the fact that Europe has now organized itself well enough so that it can speak to us with one voice. It may be that in historical retrospect, this meeting of the European Nine in Copenhagen will be seen as one of the decisive events of the post war period.

At the same time, the United States, of course, reserves the right to its own opinion with respect to the outcome of these deliberations. They were not presented to the United States on a "Take it or leave it" basis.

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They were presented to us in a spirit of partnership as the opening of a dialogue. Therefore, this Saturday, the political directors of the mine, and Assistant Secretary Stoessel, are going to meet for a discussion in which we will blend our ideas -- or attempt to blend our ideas -- with those of Europe, in this declaration of economic and political principles.

Secondly, as you know, there are discussions taking place right now in NATO, dealing with the definition of future allied relationships, they concern security and political aspects of security.

There is general agreement that these discussions will be energetically pursued within the context of the NATO council. We expect to make a significant contribution to this.

What I want to underline here, is that we are not engaged in an adversary procedure. We are engaged in a process in which a traditional friendship is intended to be given new vitality.

The trip of the President is not an end in itself. The trip of the President will certainly take place in the near future, But our concern is to produce documents that will have some historic significance. We believe that we are now well on the way towards accomplishing what we have set out to do earlier this year. The discussions have been useful and they will proceed in a constructive spirit.

It was of course inevitable in the conversations with Japan that the relationship of Japan to these various efforts, should be a subject of conversation.

Since the Japanese Foreign Minister and Prime Minister are going to be visiting Europe in the next few weeks it would not be appropriate for me to comment, except to say that in my speech of April 23rd, we outlined the American point of view. We believe that at some stage of this process, some manner, it is important for Japan to participate.

The manner and the kind of declaration remains to be discussed, and I think will continue to be discussed between the Japanese and ourselves, and between the Japanese and the Europeans on the trip of the senior Japanese officials through Europe.

I will make no comment about the conversations with the representatives of the People's Republic of China and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.

As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko will meet the President on Friday, in Washington, and after that he and I will have a lunch. Therefore, we are still in the middle of our discussions, which cover the entire agenda of U.S.-Soviet relationships.

While I was here, I also met with the representatives of African nations, and with the representatives of the Arab States here at the U.N.

These meetings were not intended as pronouncements of new policy, but as expressions of our profound concern.

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We do not want to pretend to answers that have not yet been found. But we can pledge in both areas, that we will make an effort at understanding and an attempt to find just solutions.

I think now it would be best if I took your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this is not patently your talk with Andrei Gromyko, which you ruled out, but I would like to ask a question about his public speech in the assembly, in which he demands that Western nations stop meddling in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union -- and I think something in connection principally with the immigration policy of the Soviet Union.

The manner in which he spoke of it, left us uncertain as to whether this really meant any lessening of the spirit of detente, or whether it was simply a public gesture in a private game. Could you --

A. Ladies and Gentlemen, during my confirmation hearings, I was asked extensively about this issue. It is also an issue about which I plan to make a formal statement sometime in the next month or six weeks.

But for now, let me reiterate what I said then.

The United States, of course, has its own deeply held views about the human values at stake -- both in emigration policies and in internal policies.

The Foreign policy question we face is:

First, the degree to which our Foreign policy can directly affect others.

And secondly, the alternatives we in fact confront if our direct actions are ineffective.

There is a great tendency to assume that everything that has been achieved is now automatically permanent and can be drawn upon as if its capital were inexhaustible.

We have taken the position that we would not, as a government, take a formal, public position, but we have also taken the position that insofar as we have influence in other ways, we would use it to the limit of our capabilities.

Now you are all familiar with the fact that the emigration tax is not being enforced. On an unofficial basis we have brought many hardship cases that were submitted to us by various organisations here, to the attention of the various officials. Many of those have been permitted to emigrate.

So the choice we have to make is between a public stance and the influence that our general relationship gives us.

We believe that we have been quite effective.

But we should keep in mind that there is a point beyond which one cannot press a situation as it exists.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, according to a sworn statement -- a sworn affidavit made public in Washington yesterday, your former national security aid, David Young, cited your name an authority in requesting the Central Intelligence Agency to prepare a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg.

Can you tell us whether you authorized Young to use your name in such a manner?

A. First, I do not know whether David Young used my name in such a manner because all his affidavit said is "This is the impression of the man making that affidavit."

And I want to add that I have to choose my words here carefully, because you know David Young is under indictment, and I do not want to complicate his case.

In my confirmation hearings, both in public and in executive session, I stated my position very clearly.

I did not know of any of the activities of David Young after he left my staff and joined Mr. Ehrlichman's staff, except for one project on declassification, which was publicly announced.

I did not know about the request for a profile.

I never saw this profile, I never discussed this subject with David Young.

And therefore, if my name was used, which I cannot affirm, it was used without authority.

Q. Mr. Kissinger -- or Dr. Kissinger -- what significance does your upcoming African trip have specifically for black Americans who identify themselves very closely with Africa and its problems?

A. My upcoming African trip was promised for the year 1974 -- it is not a trip that I will take in the very immediate future.

The significance is that. At the highest level in the State Department and in the Administration, we are going to take a new look at our African policy. We want to see what useful role the United States can play in a Continent which is undergoing a very rapid change and which has many problems, some of which mentioned yesterday.

Q. You say there is a point beyond which the detente should not be pressed. I wonder if you could outline what you think might happen if the Congress revokes or blocks the most-favoured-nation status for the Soviet Union in the new trade Bill.

A. I don't want to speculate about Soviet actions. I have stated previously that the most favoured nations clause was part of a general arrangement with the Soviet Union in negotiations extending over a period of many years. If now the most favoured nations clause is blocked, then the most serious question has to be raised about the degree to which other countries -- in this case the Soviet Union, can rely on a complex negotiation and about the performance of the United States, over a period of time, of its commitment. There was no reason to suppose that the time that this most favoured nations issue was discussed with the Soviet Union that the

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type of problem that is now blocking it could be the subject of conditions in Congress. It had never been so used in any previous case where most-favoured-nations status was requested for a Communist country. Therefore, it would certainly be a significant setback in the policy that we are pursuing.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there's been some talk about the convocation of a special conference on the Middle East. I was wondering whether the United States favours such a conference in the near future.

A. The United States position on the Middle East has been that we should avoid at this time any very dramatic moves until we have had an opportunity to discuss with the parties what the possibilities are and how far they are prepared to go in moving towards a just peace in the Middle East. And I think the calling of a conference before one has determined the framework and has some understanding as to objectives would be putting the cart before the horse.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the other day in the General Assembly you said the United States is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Can you tell us more precisely what you meant by that "more central role"?

A. Well, as you know, the issue of peacekeeping has been deadlocked in these negotiations between the belief of some -- that has included us -- that the Secretary-General should have very wide discretionary authority and the belief of others that the Security Council should control even the day-to-day operations of such a force.

Q. Mr. Secretary --

A. Just a minute; I'm not finished yet -- or do you want to comment on my remarks?

Q. No! (Laughter)

A. We are prepared now to take into account the view of those who want the Security Council to take a more active role -- although we cannot go all the way with them into the detailed day-to-day supervision. So my speech was to signal to the other parties concerned -- permanent members of the Security Council, and other interested parties -- that if they are willing to meet us in a co-operative spirit, if they are willing to work for a force that can act expeditiously, we will make a major effort to meet their common concerns. We are prepared to give the Security Council a greater role -- but not such a role that it can hamstring day-to-day operations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some of your views on the prospect of the Korean question debate this year at the U.N. -- particularly if the question begins to fall into another long series of international delays? Then would you welcome any chance of a higher dialogue negotiation between the major nation countries -- namely, among the Security Council members -- to avoid confrontation at the U.N. of the problem?

A. Our idea, with respect to all issues, is that there should be a great deal of private diplomacy -- that the United Nations can be most effective if no side pushes its view to an absolute and public extreme. These standard positions have hardened and compromises become extremely difficult.

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So, with respect to the Korean question, we believe that the South Korean Government, in its June 23rd proposal, has made some very constructive initiatives; it has advanced some very constructive initiatives. We believe they deserve the most serious consideration.

On our part, we would welcome quiet discussions -- among the permanent members, as well as among other interested parties -- and we hope that everyone concerned will use this debate as a means of conciliation rather than of confrontation.

Q. Mr. Secretary -- Dr. Kissinger, you said the President's speech would take place in the very near future, and you say --

A. The President's what?

Q. Excuse me -- the President's trip would take place in the very near future -- and it was hoped that it could produce documents of very major significance. Should we link the two at the same time?

A. No. Of course, a great deal depends on what you mean by "very near future." What I'm saying is we now have a process, and we have the outline of the ideas that can form the outcome of that process.

You should clearly link in your mind that the President's trip will have to result from progress in these talks. And, again, I want to stress: we're not looking for a publicity manoeuvre; we're not simply looking for just a document that everyone can sign -- because that's relatively easy to achieve and we're within sight of achieving this already.

We have made a very serious proposal. It is based on our conviction that Atlantic relationships have basically changed in the last 25 years, partly as a result of the success of previous policies. We think that in order to give a new impetus to them -- in order in a period of detente to reaffirm the significance of friends -- we have to develop a new vision of the future.

This is not done in the American interest; it is done in the common interest. That is what we consider a "document of historic significance."

We believe that it is achievable, we believe that some progress has been made; that process will now continue, as I think Mr. McCloskey has already pointed out. I plan to be in England about October 15th to give a speech to the Pilgrims. On that occasion I plan to meet with several of my colleagues of the European Foreign Ministers. And we believe that we are now well under way, but we're not setting any artificial deadline. The outcome of the deliberations will determine the timing of the President's trip.

Q. Dr. Kissinger --

A. Yes.

Q. -- If there is a delay in arriving at a consensus between the United States and Europe on shared goals, are you concerned at all that this will have an effect in slowing detente between the United States and the Soviet Union in the sense that the subjects of detente are basically the question of European security and of mutual and balanced force reductions, which are the matters being discussed between the United States and Europe?

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A. We believe, as detente progresses, that the redefinition of relationships with our friends in both Europe and Asia becomes very important, because so much of the original relationship was based on the fear of military aggression, which presumably would be lessened by the progress of detente.

Now, whether you can reverse this and say that if these negotiations slow down, detente should also slow down -- that, I think, is much more problematical. Therefore, I would rather phrase it positively; that it is the duty of statesmanship in this period to see to it that relations among friends keep pace with relationships among former adversaries. And it does not make any sense that we should make slower progress with our friends than we are making with our adversaries. We don't accept that proposition, and there's no reason for you to believe that that is what is going to happen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you envisage detente with Cuba as part of your definition of the policy force in Latin America?

A. Well, I've stated our view with respect to Cuba before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I think we will first have to discuss this question fully with our friends in Latin America before we can address this question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the average American regards the efforts of Dr. Henry Kissinger as being a prime motivation for working towards a resolution of the Vietnam war. Now, as you become Secretary of State and you turn your attempts to an area of the world like the Middle East, the average American might think that you could go in again and bring about what other people have not been able to accomplish.

As you look toward that troubled spot as you looked toward Vietnam, how do you see your role and could you bring about something like that?

A. Well, first, while I think it has been pointed out that humility is not my most distinctive trait -- (laughter)

-- I do think it is important that foreign policy in this phase not be identified with one individual or with virtuoso performances.

When this Administration came into office, we faced a series of emergency situations that had to be dealt with by emergency measures. But if we are going to build truly, we have to construct a more permanent peace through more regular procedures and in a less personalized way.

Now, with respect to the Middle East, it would be a great mistake to assume that any one man can pull a rabbit out of the hat. The difficulties in the Middle East occurred not because the parties don't understand each other but, in some respects, because they understand each other only too well.

(laughter)

And we cannot substitute ourselves for the parties concerned. Even in Indochina -- as our critics have often pointed out -- it took four years to bring about a settlement -- which, also incidentally, was the period of time that it took France to disengage in Algeria.

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-9-

In the Middle East, we are prepared to use our influence to urge the parties towards a spirit of compromise -- to encourage them in the process of negotiation. But you cannot expect -- and no one should ask us -- to produce all the formula and all the will as a substitute for that of the party.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Senate voted today to reduce U.S. forces abroad 40 per cent in the next two years. Is that a good idea, and how will it affect the U.S. position and negotiating capability in the talks on the mutual and balanced force reduction and the limiting of strategic weapons.

A. Well, as you know, the Administration strongly opposes this type of resolution. It will be impossible to negotiate an agreement for the reduction of forces when the United States unilaterally accomplishes what the negotiations are supposed to bring about. It will be very difficult -- if not impossible -- to convince our allies of the steadiness of American policy when the United States again unilaterally, before our discussions have well advanced, reduces its forces in Europe.

And I might point out that it is somewhat contradictory to be asked at one and the same time to conduct a foreign policy designed to bring about a transformation of the Soviet system and to cut one's forces for defence.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, you mentioned -- in your growing relationship with Europe -- you mentioned your concern with the countries of Japan and in Asia. Canada is one of the largest -- if not the largest -- trading partners with the United States today. Where do we fit in with your plans for Europe?

A. Well, as you know -- shall I repeat the question? As you know, I met with your Foreign Minister, and this obviously was a subject of conversation.

Procedurally, in Canada -- as we are now envisioning the procedure -- there will be at least two declarations -- one between the United States and the Common Market, and another dealing with the United States and NATO.

With respect to the U.S. association with the Common Market, Canada is technically not part of it. We will proceed in closest consultation with Canada with respect to this, and we are open-minded about an association that Canada may wish to make to such a declaration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now what are your relations with Nigeria?

A. Well, obviously, it was impossible to cover every country in the world in the speech. I tried to convey that we will deal with Africa with understanding and with concern. Nigeria is, of course, one of the most important countries in Africa. It was visited by the Secretary of State two years ago.

We understand that your President is visiting here, and we are hoping that he can also pay a call on us in Washington.

So we consider Nigeria as an important, potentially decisive country in Africa.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. (End transcript)

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
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(48) MY TELNO 945: KISSINGER'S SPEECH

1. THE SPEECH HAS NOT GONE DOWN WELL WITH THE MEMBERSHIP AT LARGE. THIS IS PERHAPS MAINLY BECAUSE IT ATTEMPTED TO COVER TOO MUCH GROUND. KISSINGER'S OPENING PLEDGE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD SEEK TO WORK THROUGH AND WITH THE UNITED NATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE HAS BEEN WELCOMED AS AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE AMENDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S SCARCELY CONCEALED DISREGARD OF THE ORGANISATION IN RECENT YEARS. THE UNDERTAKING TO PURSUE DETENTE WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD, AND TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH ASIA AND AFRICA, HAVE ALSO BEEN TAKEN AS AN EARNEST OF GOOD INTENTIONS. BUT THE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAVE STRUCK MOST DELEGATIONS AS AN ANTI-CLIMAX, AND AS TENDING TO CONFIRM THAT THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT CHANGED ITS BASIC ATTITUDE TO THE U.N. AS ENUNCIATED BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE 1970 ASSEMBLY AND THAT IT STILL CONSIDERS THAT THE ORGANISATION SHOULD CONFINE ITSELF FOR THE MOST PART TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS AND LEAVE THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES TO SUPER-POWER DIPLOMACY. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE REACTION OF THE NEW YORK TIMES THAT THE SPEECH "SHOWED LITTLE READINESS TO ENTRUST THE WORLD ORGANISATION WITH REALITIES OTHER THAN WORDS".

2. IN ADDITION KISSINGER'S SURVEY OF PROBLEMS SOLVED AND PROBLEMS AWAITING SOLUTION, AS WELL AS SOME OF HIS PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION, HAVE GIVEN WIDESPREAD OFFENCE IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ARABS ARE INDIGNANT AT HIS LISTING THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN EXAMPLE OF A CRISIS THAT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY DISPOSED OF. THE NON-ALIGNED ARE FURIOUS AT HIS STIGMATIZATION OF NON-ALIGNMENT AS A THIRD KIND OF BLOC POLITICS. THE EUROPEANS FOUND HIS REFERENCE TO PROMOTING CONCILIATION IN EUROPE BOTH CURSORY AND A TRIFLE PATRONISING. THE BRAZILIANS ARE UPSET THAT HE SINGLED OUT THE MEXICAN PROPOSAL FOR AN ECONOMIC CHARTER AND IGNORED THEIR PET THEME OF COLLECTIVE ECONOMIC SECURITY. AND PEOPLE

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ARE PERPLEXED ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO WORLD FOOD PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS. HIS DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR JAPAN HAS ANNOYED ALL OTHER COUNTRIES WITH SIMILAR AMBITIONS, AND EVEN THE JAPANESE FEEL THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN MORE TACTFULLY EXPRESSED. IT SEEMS TO BE ONLY THE RUSSIANS WHO HAVE NO FAULT TO FIND WITH THE SPEECH.

3. OBVIOUSLY ONE CANNOT HOPE TO PLEASE EVERYONE, AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR ANY SPEECH DRAFTED IN THE SHORT TIME AVAILABLE TO LIVE UP TO THE INTENSE EXPECTATIONS GENERATED BY KISSINGER'S PUBLIC DEBUT AS SECRETARY OF STATE. AS JAMES RESTON PUTS IT IN HIS COLUMN TODAY HE HAS AT LEAST REVIVED A LITTLE HOPE AROUND THE U.N. THAT MAYBE (AFTER WATERGATE) THE UNITED STATES WAS GOING TO THINK AND TALK ABOUT ITS IDEALS AGAIN, EVEN IF IT COULDN'T ACHIEVE THEM.

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Thank you. We also have copies
of Mr. Davies (to mark atlix
up passages of interest
to the Department).
R.E. 1/10.

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1 We have now received from the US Embassy the text of Dr Kissinger's statement at his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 7 September. A copy is attached. The statement outlines Dr Kissinger's general views on foreign policy.

2 Following his opening statement Dr Kissinger replied to questions from the Committee. We have not yet received a complete text of the replies to questions but have seen an uncorrected verbatim account. Some of the more interesting points from this account are contained in the attached extracts.

G R Archer
North America Department
K233 Tel MA440

25 September 1973

Encl

Mr. [unclear] 1/10
Mr. Clark 1/10
Mr. Henry 1/10
Mr. Evans 1/10

of particular interest is the Year
of Europe section. Also Kissinger's intention
to involve career diplomats more closely
in policy making.

W.G.E. 2/10

P.A. gl
6/11

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Mr. Chairman, we have come to experience in recent years that peace at home and peace abroad are closely related. How well we perform in foreign policy depends importantly on how purposeful we are at home. America has passed through a decade of domestic turbulence which has deepened divisions and even shaken our national self-confidence in some measure. At the same time, profound changes have occurred in the world around us, a generation after World War II. Our era is marked by both the anxieties of a transitional period and the opportunities of fresh creation.

These challenges, though they appear as practical issues, cannot be solved in technical terms; they closely reflect our view of ourselves. They require a sense of identity and purpose as much as a sense of policy. Throughout our history we have thought of what we did as growing out of deeper moral values. America was not true to itself unless it had a meaning beyond itself. In this spiritual sense, America was never isolationist.

This must remain our attitude.

This is why our international policies must enlist the contributions of our best people regardless of political persuasion. Our task is to define -- together -- the contours of a new world, and to shape America's contribution to it. Our foreign policy cannot be effective if it reflects only the sporadic and esoteric initiatives of a small group of specialists. It must rest on a broad national base and reflect a shared community of values.

With good will on all sides, I deeply believe we can reach this goal. There is no dispute about many of the fundamental objectives of national policy. We are at a crucial point of transition in the international order, with major changes in the global structure promising a more peaceful world:

- Successful post-war policies have helped our friends to new strength and responsibilities. We shall work constructively and openly with our partners in Europe and Japan to give new impetus to associations based on shared purposes and ideals. We shall always remember that the vitality of our friendships is the necessary condition for the lowering of tensions with our opponents.
- We have developed fresh relationships with adversaries that can ease us away from confrontation toward cooperation. Tensions have been reduced in many areas. For the first

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time since the end of World War II, all great nations have become full participants in the international system. There is the hope that the arms race can be arrested and the burden of armaments reduced.

- Our most anguishing and divisive problem, the Vietnam war, is behind us. We achieved a negotiated settlement last January. The Congress has since expressed its view on how to terminate our military participation in the last area of conflict -- Cambodia. As you gentlemen know, the Administration differs with that view. But it will not attempt to circumvent it.
- We face unprecedented issues which transcend borders and ideologies and beckon global cooperation. Many traditional assumptions need adjustment. We have viewed ourselves as blessed with unlimited agricultural surpluses; today we must contemplate scarcity in relation to world needs. We have assumed self-sufficiency in energy; now we face increasing needs for external supply at least for an interim period. Environmental problems used to be considered national issues, if they were considered at all; now many must be met internationally if they are going to be met at all. We need to explore new conceptual frontiers to reflect the new reality produced by both technology and human aspirations: that our planet has become a truly global society.

This Administration will continue to adapt America's role to these new conditions. But we cannot take for granted what has been begun. We cannot let irretrievable opportunities slip from our grasp. Just as we have benefitted from the efforts of our predecessors, so must we build for our successors. What matters to other countries -- and to the world -- is not so much the work of one Administration as the steadiness of America. So the nation is challenged to render our purposes durable and our performance reliable. This we achieved during most of a generation after the Second World War. We need to continue to do so.

This will require mutual effort and mutual understanding. We will do our part. The President has charged me with helping him to shape a foreign policy that can endure because it is carried in the hearts as well as the minds of Americans.

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The first necessity is a broader-based participation within the Executive Branch. During the last four years, there were many delicate initiatives that required a high degree of secrecy and concentration of effort. Crucial foundations were laid. Now we need to build on these foundations a more permanent structure that we can pass on to succeeding Administrations. Durability in foreign policy is achieved in the final analysis through the deep and continuing involvement of the dedicated professionals of the State Department and Foreign Service, who will manage our foreign affairs long after this Administration has ended. Thus one of my principal responsibilities as Secretary of State will be to infuse the Department of State with a sense of participation, intellectual excitement and mission.

more open
government

As you know, the President has asked me to retain my position as Assistant to the President if I am confirmed as Secretary of State. I believe this will benefit the coherence and effectiveness of our foreign policy. The Secretary of State will be clearly the principal foreign policy advisor to the President. The locus of authority and the chain of authority will be unambiguous. Bureaucratic friction will be minimized. As the President said in announcing my appointment, the unity of position will underline the traditional principal role of the Department of State in the policy-making process.

There must be, as well, a closer relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches. It is the President's objective to make policy more accessible to the scrutiny and the views of the Congress. This is the fundamental answer to the question of executive privilege. As you gentlemen know, over an extended period of time when I was fully covered by this principle, I met regularly with the members of this Committee, both individually and as a group, and most frequently with the Chairman. I did so partly because I valued this association on personal grounds, but also because of my conviction that this nation faced no more urgent requirement than to promote mutual respect where a consensus was unattainable.

In my new capacity, I shall be prepared to testify formally on all my activities. In other words, I shall testify with respect to all matters traditionally covered by Secretaries of State and on my duties as Assistant to the President concerning interdepartmental issues. I will not claim executive privilege in either capacity except for the one area customarily invoked by Cabinet officers, that is, direct communications with the President or the actual deliberations of the National Security Council.

We will, of course, need to determine together which subjects should be treated in public and which in executive session.

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In short, as a result of my combined position, the Committee should receive substantially more information than it has in the past. We will have acted positively on one of your most central concerns.

This process of greater cooperation will not be confined to formal testimony. If confirmed, I will propose to meet immediately with the Chairman and the ranking member to work out procedures for enabling the Committee to share more fully in the design of our foreign policy.

I will follow a similar approach with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the leaders of both branches of Congress as well as with other Congressional groupings of proper jurisdiction.

This prompts the question, what do we mean by bipartisanship? We do not ask for rubber stamping and we cannot expect unanimity. Serious people obviously will continue to have differences. Where profound disagreements exist, it would be self-defeating to paper them over with empty formulae. We in turn cannot give up basic principles, nor can we promise to act only when there is bipartisan agreement, though this will be our preference. But we shall work to shape a broad consensus on our national goals and to confine differences to tactical issues. When our views differ, we shall strive not to press the debate to a point that tears the overall fabric of the national consensus. We will seek to maintain a climate of mutual trust so that arguments can center on methods, not motives. We hope that this restraint will be mutual. In this manner, our foreign policy debate can avoid the extremes of civil war and sterile accord for its own sake.

If our foreign policy is to be truly national, we must deepen our partnership with the American people. This means an open articulation of our philosophy, our purposes, and our actions. We have sought to do this in the President's Annual Reports to the Congress on foreign policy. Equally, we must listen to the hopes and aspirations of our fellow countrymen. I plan, therefore, on a regular basis, to elicit the views of America's opinion leaders and to share our perspectives freely.

Mr. Chairman, I have sketched an agenda for seeking a more durable peace abroad and a cooperative climate at home. Both objectives point to the urgent need for reconciliation. Americans have recently endured the turmoil of assassinations and riots, racial and generational confrontations, and a bitter, costly war. Just as we were emerging from that conflict, we were plunged into still another ordeal.

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These traumatic events have cast lengthening shadows on our traditional optimism and self-esteem. A loss of confidence in our own country would inevitably be mirrored in our international relations. Where once we ran the risk of thinking we were too good for the world, we might now swing to believing we are not good enough. Where once a soaring optimism tempted us to dare too much, a shrinking spirit could lead us to attempt too little. Such an attitude -- and the foreign policy it would produce -- would deal a savage blow to global stability.

But I am hopeful about our prospects. America is resilient. The dynamism of this country is irrepressible. Whatever our divisions, we can rally to the prospects of building a world at peace and responsive to humane aspirations. In so doing, we can replenish our reservoir of faith.

This is our common challenge:

- To distinguish the fundamental from the ephemeral.
- To seek out what unites us, without stifling the healthy debate that is the lifeblood of democracy.
- To promote the positive trends that are the achievements not just of this Administration but also of those who came before.
- To shape new initiatives that will serve not just the next forty months but also the decades to follow.

A few years before he died, one of our most distinguished Secretaries of State, Dean Acheson, entitled his memoirs "Present at the Creation." He chose that title because he was one of the leading participants in the creation of the post-war international system. The challenge before our country now is whether our generation has the vision -- as Dean Acheson's did more than two decades ago -- to turn into dynamic reality the hopeful beginnings we have made toward a more durable peace and a more benevolent planet.

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Committee, I am confident that working together we can speed the day when all of us will be able to say that we were "present at the creation" of a new era of peace, justice and humanity.

Thank you.

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EXTRACTS FROM REPLIES BY DR KISSINGER DURING THE
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON HIS CONFIRMATION AS
SECRETARY OF STATE 7-11 SEPTEMBER 1973

are
interesting

// THE YEAR OF EUROPE

"It is still the Year of Europe.

The so-called Year of Europe has remained the concentration and very high priority, indeed the highest priority of the Administration.

In understanding the progress that can be made with respect to it, one has to understand that there are several processes going on simultaneously.

There is the change in the strategic relationships that is produced by the growth of the Soviet strategic arsenal.

There is the change in economic relationship as between Europe and the United States from a position of dominance by the United States to one where the Europeans are at one and the same time dealing with us as an individual nation and yet attempting to form a unified European identity that can speak with one voice.

And finally, there is the problem of how to relate any discussions that we undertake with the Europeans to the discussions that may be going on with the Japanese.

Now, all of these processes are being handled simultaneously, and that requires some rather complex orchestration. The Europeans decided after initially dealing with us on a bilateral basis that they wanted to use the occasion of our initiative to crystallize also their own unified view of the political future of the Atlantic community, and as a result, for about two months

/we have

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we have not publicly pressed them in order to give them an opportunity to crystallize those views.

The European Foreign Ministers of the European Community are meeting today and tomorrow in Copenhagen and I think you will find that after this meeting the process of the so-called Year of Europe will begin to assume form.

...I think the relationship really has to be trilateral, it has to include Japan, the United States and Europe.

...As to whether it is called a charter or a declaration, we have no overwhelming preference. Also, as we have studied the problem more deeply with the Europeans, it has emerged that some of the problems are handled in one set of institutions and other problems are handled in other institutions, which makes it more difficult to come up with an all-embrasive document.

Secondly, Japan can join in certain aspects of these deliberations, but Japan would find it more difficult, for example, to join a document, to adhere to a document that included various defence discussions, and therefore the direction in which we may be going is a document that deals with the economic and political matters in relation to the Nine; a document as far as defence is concerned which includes the NATO countries; with the Japanese, perhaps, joining the political and economic document; and finally, there could be a brief all-embracing declaration which relates all these documents to each other. This is the general direction in which we seem to be going right now."

/NATO

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NATO

"An organisation which had been built for 20 years on the assumption of overwhelming massive retaliation, and that now has to be adapted to the conditions in which a first strike by either side becomes extremely difficult to conceive."

BURDEN SHARING

"With respect to the expenditure of our forces, especially in Europe, we are engaged in negotiations with the Europeans in order to reduce and, in fact, to eliminate the balance of payments drain that is produced by these forces."

US TROOPS IN EUROPE

"A significant unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Europe would have a disastrous effect on our whole structure of Atlantic relationship which we are in the process of redefining in this so-called Year of Europe at a time when, as the newspapers report today, the Europeans for the first time have formed themselves or have produced a united answer to our proposal of last April, and it would have very serious consequences.

I believe, and we are in the process of doing it, that we must assess NATO strategy within the framework of NATO. We must ease our financial burden. But in the absence of agreed reductions, we cannot reduce our forces unilaterally or should not reduce our forces unilaterally."

MBFR

"The negotiations for mutual force reductions will start on October 30, and we hope that very substantial progress can

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be made during the course of the next year which will then produce some reduction of United States forces. We would be opposed to the unilateral reduction of United States forces in the absence of such an agreement."

SOVIET UNION

"I am certainly dismayed by the conditions that Academician Sakharov reports, and yet we have as a country to ask ourselves the question whether it should be the principal goal of American Foreign Policy to transform the domestic structure of societies with which we deal or whether the principal exercise of our Foreign Policy should be directed towards affecting the Foreign Policy of those societies.

Now I recognise there is a certain connection between domestic policy and Foreign Policy, but if we adopt as a national proposition the view that we must transform the domestic structure of all countries with which we deal, even if the Foreign Policy of those countries is otherwise moving in a more acceptable direction, then we will find ourselves massively involved in every country in the world."

RADIO FREE EUROPE

"The Soviet Union obviously does not like Radio Free Europe and they do some things which we do not like. But it has not interfered with the detente."

MEN FOR SOVIET UNION

"I believe it would be a set-back to the design of our foreign policy if the Congress did not grant most favoured nation status to the Soviet Union."

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SALT II

"I agree with you about the crucial importance of SALT II and as you know from our discussions there is almost no subject as to which I have given more time and I hope thought than the problem of strategic arms limitation, and I agree that in the absence of a SALT-II agreement, a permanent agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, a spiraling of the arms race is inevitable because we will be driven to reply to the new Soviet developments in MIRV's in our strategic programmes and then the situation is going to arise in which the interaction is going to be almost impossible to stop."

TAIWAN

"I do not believe that the difficulties which may have existed with the People's Republic have very much to do with our policy towards Taiwan."

CHINA

"There are always stories that Prime Minister Chou En-Lai is coming to the United States. I do not believe that that is likely to happen, certainly not this year, and there are no discussions going on at this moment leading to his visit to the United States. We would be delighted to receive him, but he has not engaged in any foreign travel recently, and there is the additional complication that he is reluctant to come to Washington while there is the embassy of Nationalist China located here."

THAILAND AND KOREA

"We would like to review the requirements for defence of both of these countries with one of which we have a treaty

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in the light of changing circumstances. It is our intention that if the detente develops, and if peace returns to Southeast Asia we hope that reductions, that substantial reductions of American forces may be possible."

MIDDLE EAST

"The position of the United States with respect to the Middle East conflict has been that we cannot substitute for some form of negotiations between the parties; that we, on the other hand, would be prepared to be helpful if the two parties began some movement towards accommodation, and, as the President pointed out in his press conference, it is the view of this administration that both sides have to make some movement in order to achieve a settlement. Now, it is true that we attach importance and considerable importance to a peaceful resolution of the Middle East issue. But it is also true that we must not attempt to do things that are not in our power to do, and what we shall do is to use our good offices energetically, where we see any prospect of progress, but American policy cannot of itself substitute for the actions of the parties most immediately concerned."

RHODESIA

"The Administration will support the repeal of the Byrd amendment."

AFRICA

"I have asked some Ambassadors to be brought back from the countries south of the Sahara in order to give me their judgment on what the best United States philosophy should be in that area. National security machinery [has been started] on various parts of Africa which have happily been coming to

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fruition at this point, so I think one will see more energy devoted to these problems from now on."

AMBASSADORIAL VACANCIES

"I intend to fill every vacancy within two months after my confirmation."

GREECE

"I have not had an opportunity to review the exact implications of new Greek decisions since Greece has become a republic. On the surface they seem encouraging and they seem to reflect some of the recommendations we made when Ambassador Tasca called on the Greek government prior to the referendum, and therefore I see no reason to proceed with the home porting arrangements that now exist."

EXPORT CONTROLS

"Now, it sometimes happens and I think it happened in the case of Soybeans, that a decision is taken on extremely economic grounds in which the decision is taken so rapidly that the foreign policy agencies do not get either adequate warning or an adequate opportunity to express themselves. When that happens it is a mistake, and I will do my best to prevent this as Secretary of State and I believe very firmly in controls the foreign policy [aspects] must be brought to the attention of the President before he decides on it."

ECONOMIC POLICY

"I have met very frequently informally with Secretary Shultz, but these informal meetings are no substitute for a regular relationship, and a greater influence by the Department of State on the decisions that are made in the international monetary field, because those decisions really affect

/domestic

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domestic policies and ultimately the international position of all of the countries concerned and, therefore, it would be my intention, if confirmed, to strengthen the economic side of the State Department, and to work out arrangements by which they play a more active role in the formulation of our policies, both in the international monetary field and in trade negotiations."

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 945 OF 24/9/73 INFO WASHINGTON MOSCOW
PEKING BONN PARIS UKMIS GENEVA.

MY I P T : KISSINGER'S SPEECH

1. FIRST REACTIONS HAVE BEEN MIXED, TO SAY THE LEAST. I SHALL
REPORT FURTHER WHEN WE HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE CROSS-SECTION.

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H T A Overton Esq
North America Department
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Your reference

Our reference

Date 17 September 1973

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Dear Hugh,

WIRE TAPPING

In a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the United States Attorney-General Elliot L Richardson, has defined the criteria that he will apply in authorising any application for electronic surveillance for the protection of national security. They are as follows:

"To protect the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power.

To obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

Or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities."

2. The tapping of telephones for purposes other than in the interests of national security, eg for the prevention or detection of crime, may now, after the Supreme Court judgment of 1972, only be instituted on a court order.

Yours ever

J A N Graham


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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 944 OF 24/9/73 INFO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PEKING
BONN PARIS AND UKMIS GENEVA.

28TH U N GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS THE SECOND SPEAKER IN THE GENERAL
DEBATE WHICH BEGAN TODAY. AFTER REAFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE
THAT THE UNITED STATES ATTACHED TO THE UN AND DECLARING THAT
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WOULD HAVE AS ITS GOAL, BEYOND THE
BILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND PRAGMATIC AGREEMENTS OF RECENT YEARS, A
COMPREHENSIVE INSTITUTIONALISED PEACE, HE CITED AMONG EXAMPLES
OF QUOTE CRISES THAT HAVE BEEN PUT BEHIND US UNQUOTE:

AGREEMENT ON BERLIN;

CEASE-FIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST;

THE ENDING OF THE VIETNAM WAR;

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROAD WEB OF CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION; CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE

BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA;

CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHER COUNTRIES, IN THE CSCE, IN THE
SUB-CONTINENT, AND BY THE GERMANY'S AND THE KOREANS.

YET SUSPICION PERSISTED. SOME JUSTIFIED THE RELAXATION OF
TENSIONS AS A TACTICAL INTERLUDE BEFORE RENEWED STRUGGLE. OTHERS
SUSPECTED THE EMERGENCE OF A TWO-POWER CONDOMINIUM. AND AS TENSION
BETWEEN THE TWO REGIONAL BLOCS EASED A THIRD GROUPING INCREASINGLY
ASSUMED THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A BLOC - THE ALIGNMENT OF THE
NON-ALIGNED.

2. THE US ASKED THE ASSEMBLY TO MOVE WITH THEM FROM DETENTE
AMONG THE BIG POWERS TO COOPERATION AMONG ALL NATIONS AND
FOR THEIR PART MADE THE FOLLOWING PLEDGES:

TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA.

TO PROMOTE POSITIVE TRENDS ELSEWHERE IN ASIA: UNCERTAIN PEACE
IN INDOCHINA MUST BE STRENGTHENED;

TO PURSUE VIGOROUSLY THE BUILDING OF CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS
WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

TO STRIVE TO PROMOTE CONCILIATION IN EUROPE, AND THE NEGOTIATIONS
BEGINNING NEXT MONTH TO SEEK A REDUCTION OF THE OPPOSING
MILITARY FORCES IN THAT DIVIDED CONTINENT.

TO GIVE NEW VIGOR TO THEIR POLICY OF PARTNERSHIP IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

/ TO HONOUR

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TO HONOUR THEIR PLEDGE TO PROMOTE SELF-DETERMINATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN DIGNITY ACROSS THE CONTINENT OF AFRICA. TO PRESS ON WITH STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. TO SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE WORLD-WIDE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

IN MAKING THESE EFFORTS THE US HAD NO DESIRE FOR DOMINATION, WOULD NEVER ABANDON THEIR ALLIES OR FRIENDS, AND WOULD WORK THROUGH THE UN AS WELL AS THROUGH BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS. THEY ALSO RECOGNISED THEIR SPECIAL OBLIGATION, AS A PERMANENT MEMBER, TO JOIN IN THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS IN THOSE PARTS OF THE WORLD NOW TORN BY STRIFE SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. BUT PROGRESS ON THE TRADITIONAL AGENDA WAS NOT ENOUGH. THE MORE WE SUCCEEDED IN SOLVING POLITICAL PROBLEMS THE MORE OTHER CHALLENGES EMERGED. DR KISSINGER WENT ON TO LIST THE FOLLOWING "ILLUSTRATIVE AREAS FOR COMMON ACTION" AND PLEDGED THAT THE US WOULD SUBMIT PROPOSALS AIMED AT THEIR RESOLUTION:

(I) PEACEKEEPING

THE TIME HAD COME TO AGREE ON GUIDELINES. TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK THE US WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER HOW THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD PLAY A MORE CENTRAL ROLE IN THE CONDUCT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. IF ALL COUNTRIES SHOWED A COOPERATIVE APPROACH, THE UN COULD ACHIEVE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD THIS SESSION.

(II) MEMBERSHIP

THE TIME HAD COME FOR NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA TO BE OFFERED THEIR RIGHTFUL PLACE IN THE UN WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO UNIFICATION.

IN THE SAME SPIRIT THE US SUPPORTED THE PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP OF JAPAN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

(III) FOOD SUPPLY

TO MEET THE GROWING THREAT OF SHORTAGE, THE US PROPOSED THAT A WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE BE ORGANIZED UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES IN 1974 TO DISCUSS WAYS TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE FOOD SUPPLIES, AND TO HARNESS THE EFFORTS OF ALL NATIONS TO MEET THE HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION RESULTING FROM NATURAL DISASTERS.

THAT NATIONS IN A POSITION TO DO SO OFFER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE CONSERVATION OF FOOD. THE UNITED STATES WAS READY TO JOIN WITH OTHERS IN PROVIDING SUCH ASSISTANCE.

(IV) DEVELOPMENT

THIS ASSEMBLY SHOULD INITIATE A SEARCH FOR NEW SOLUTIONS, FREE OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION AND RHETORIC. THE UNITED STATES WOULD PARTICIPATE WITH PRE-CONDITIONS, AND WERE WILLING TO EXAMINE SERIOUSLY THE MEXICAN PROPOSAL FOR A CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

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(V) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

THE WORLD COMMUNITY MUST FIND THE MEANS FOR THE COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY RESOURCES, CONFRONT THE PROBLEMS OF POPULATION GROWTH AND EMBARK ON A NEW SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY.

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TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 937 OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1973.

FOR MISS BOOKER, NEWS DEPARTMENT, FROM GORDON LENNOX.

AT MY PRESS BRIEFING TODAY, COMMENTING ON THE RECORD ON DR KISSINGER'S SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, I SAID THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AGREE BROADLY WITH DR KISSINGER'S CATALOGUE OUTLINED IN HIS SPEECH OF THE PROBLEMS FACING THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

2. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AGREE WITH HIS REALISM ABOUT DETENTE. THEY APPRECIATE THE PRIORITY WHICH HE GAVE IN HIS SPEECH TO STRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES' TRADITIONAL ALLIES AND FRIENDS AND THEY AGREE WITH DR KISSINGER'S CALL FOR IMAGINATIVE THINKING FREE FROM IDEOLOGY ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF THE RICH AND THE POOR IN THE WORLD. I ADDED THAT SIR ALEC, IN HIS OWN SPEECH, TO THE ASSEMBLY ON WEDNESDAY PLANS TO DEVELOP SOME OF THE THEMES OUTLINED BY KISSINGER.

3. I WAS ASKED IF SIR ALEC AGREED WITH THE CALL FOR A WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE. I REPLIED: "HE AGREES BROADLY WITH DR KISSINGER'S SENTIMENTS ON THIS QUESTION".

4. ASKED ABOUT US APPROVAL FOR JAPAN'S PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I REPLIED: "WE TOO ARE GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE DESIRE FOR JAPAN'S PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL".

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Friday, September 21, 1973

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TEXT
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UNITED STATES EMBASSY, LONDON

ADMINISTRATION STATEMENT TO CONGRESS ON CHILEAN COUP

Following is the text of a statement on the Chilean coup by Jack B. Kubisch, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on September 20th before the Subcommittee for Inter-American Affairs of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs:

(Begin text)

If you wish, Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to give you a brief summary of the current situation in Chile as we understand it, although I assume that most of the members present have a good idea of the general conditions in the country now and events leading up to the coup.

However, perhaps I should take this opportunity at the outset to comment on false charges from some quarters that the United States Government had advance knowledge of or participated in some way in the overthrow and death of President Allende.

I wish to state as flatly and as categorically as I possibly can that we did not have advance knowledge of the coup that took place on September 11th. In the light of what I consider to be some rather imprecise reporting on the matter, I want to distinguish between our receiving reports about the possibility of a coup in Chile and our having advance knowledge that a coup would take place.

The facts are that we had received many reports over a long period of time about the possibility of a coup in Chile. Such reports and speculations were rife in Chile itself. Indeed, President Allende himself had commented publicly about them and there was even a report in a Santiago daily newspaper on September 11th that a coup by the Chilean armed forces was scheduled for that very day.

All of the earlier reports that had speculated about or predicted coup attempts turned out to be false except the last one, which was received in our offices Tuesday morning, September 11th, after the coup had already begun.

However, there was no contact whatsoever by the organizers and leaders of the coup directly with us and we did not have definite knowledge of it in advance.

In a similar vein, either explicitly or implicitly, the United States Government has been charged with involvement or complicity in the coup. This is absolutely false. As official spokesmen of the United States Government have stated repeatedly, we were not involved in the coup in any way.

I would at this point like to comment also on the subject of United States-Chile economic relations during the past several years.

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In my opinion, the position of the United States Government was quite correct and fully understandable. The United States had no desire to provoke a confrontation with the Allende government. On the contrary, strong efforts were repeatedly made to seek ways to resolve our differences, although there were expropriations without compensation by the Chilean Government of over \$700 million of American private investment during this period. In addition, Chile defaulted on over \$100 million in debt to the United States Government in the same period.

The facts are that there were no embargoes or restrictions placed on trade with Chile. United States firms continued to be major suppliers of food, parts and equipment for the Chilean economy. Bilaterally, we continued a variety of programmes, such as A.I.D. People-to-People assistance, Food for Peace assistance, the Peace Corps, and scientific and cultural exchanges. We continued to disburse normally on the remaining A.I.D. loans after Dr. Allende ascended to office. While there were no new bilateral development loans, it would be noted that we had cut back sharply on A.I.D. development lending in Latin America, including Chile, even before the Allende government took office. In any case, the Chilean Government did not request any new development loans.

In the international field multilateral banks continued to disburse existing loans to Chile totalling \$83 million from August 1971 - August 1973, this sum representing an increase in annual disbursements as compared with the three years prior to Dr. Allende's coming to power.

However, the economic policies themselves that were pursued by the Allende government resulted in the steadily deteriorating economic situation. The unwillingness of the government to modify its policies made inevitable that international lending agencies would curtail their programmes for Chile and, in any case, the United States could not have voted favourably for some of this assistance because of legal restrictions.

The Paris Club, consisting of various creditor nations, concluded there was little that could be done for Chile unless the government adopted policies they could support. I repeat, however, that it was not the United States, but the institutions, themselves, which made their decisions.

In sum, it is untrue to say that the United States Government was responsible -- either directly or indirectly -- for the overthrow of the Allende regime.

Much concern has naturally been shown for the human tragedy that has resulted from recent events in Chile. The American people and their government have traditionally demonstrated such concern for the suffering of others throughout the world. The United States has given active support in numerous ways to alleviating suffering and furthering the respect of human rights. With regard to Chile, we have already expressed regret at the loss of human lives and at the death of President Allende.

We have also been concerned with reports of violations of human rights in Chile. However, to my knowledge, many of these reports are unsubstantiated and not necessarily indicative of the policies to be followed by the new Government of Chile once the situation there has fully stabilized.

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Moreover, I understand that the Chilean authorities have already given the U.N. Human Rights Commission assurances with regard to the refugees in that country.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, in closing I would like to emphasize once again that the situation in Chile is an evolving one. As the new government begins to set out its economic, social and other policies, we will endeavour to formulate our own policies to respond to the realities of the new situation.

We were not responsible for the difficulties in which Chile found itself, and it is not for us to judge what would have been best or will now be best for the Chilean people.

That is for Chileans themselves to decide, and we respect their rights to do this. If in the tasks that face them now, we can be of help, and if our help is wanted by Chile, I am sure we will do our best to provide it in the spirit of understanding and friendship that the American people have long felt for the people of Chile. (End text)

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Head of Chancery

Mr Moberly

Mr Powell

"THE NEXT PHASE IN FOREIGN POLICY"

1. Mr Cape passed on to me the attached Brookings collection of essays which you had asked him to look through. The general standard of these essays is very high, and they are well worth reading. The one which I personally found best was that by Mr Gelb (chapter 12) on "Domestic Change and National Security Policy".

2. My chief impression from reading these essays is of the great degree to which the writers' ideas consist essentially of a further development of the Nixon doctrine and of the Administration's foreign policy as set out in the President's annual reports to Congress. With one exception, these essays do not strike out in a markedly different direction from that in which the Administration is proceeding. I think therefore that one could describe this collection of essays as a good expression of the kind of new academic consensus on US foreign policy which may - unless untoward events intervene - build itself on the foundations laid by the Nixon doctrine. (The one exception I have mentioned concerns the subject of aid to the Third World.) Pursuing this line of thought, I note particularly that Dr Owen's conclusion (page 330) that "creation of a working community of developed nations, which would include the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, should be our first order of business" bears a marked similarity to the main idea in Dr Kissinger's speech on 23 April. The Administration's initiative in this sense has indeed rather dated parts of these essays, and particularly Mr Newhouse's one (chapter 3) on "The United States and Western Europe". Both Mr Newhouse and Dr Owen are, incidentally, more disparaging about the prospect of European political unity than will be popular among committed European leaders.

3. Mr Moberly may be interested by the strong emphasis placed in Mr Halperin's and Mr Clough's essays (chapters 2 and 4) on the importance of US/Japan relations and on the principle that Japan should be treated as the focus of US national security interests in East Asia.

4. As noted above, the main field in which this collection of essays diverges from the current trend of the Administration's policy, is that of aid to developing countries: there is a clear call for a much greater US contribution, through multilateral institutions, to the world aid effort. But the writers who advocate this do not address

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/themselves

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themselves sufficiently to the fact that this idea is contrary to the current mood of Congress and the country, though they recognize it in some places. Incidentally, the idea that "the United States should continue to move away from the notion of a special hemispheric community, towards a policy that treats Latin America simply as part of the developing world" (page 322, argued more fully in chapter 6) seems to me to fly too much in the face of the existence of the inter-American system of institutions.

5. Less attention than I would have expected is given to the international aspects of the energy problem facing the United States. In particular, Mr Hunter's essay (chapter 5) on "US Policy in the Middle East" seems to me rather weak in its consideration of the effect of US oil import needs on US policy in the area, though otherwise I thought that essay an especially good one.

6. A copy of this book has already been sent to Mr Overton and I do not think we need do more than that to bring it to the attention of the FCO. The essays are rather for us to use as appropriate as background to our reporting.

W J A Wilberforce

W J A Wilberforce

25 June 1973

cc Mr Cape

Minister

I agree with Mr Wilberforce's comments, in particular where he says that this book could be described as "a good expression of the new academic consensus on US foreign policy". I too was struck by Mr Newhouse's rationale for the Kissinger approach to US/European relations.

2. I also agree with Mr Wilberforce that Mr Hunter's essay on US policy in the Middle East struck me as rather weak. He remarks, for example, that it is becoming increasingly clear that something short of a total solution [in the Middle East] may be possible, and refers at another point to local efforts to promote a partial settlement and even suggests that the Soviet leaders "have already concluded that there

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should be a partial settlement"; I do not believe any of this. I think, moreover, that Mr Hunter, although he acknowledges that American dependence on Middle East oil will grow (pages 81-2) - he puts the figure by the end of the decade at about 20 percent of US consumption, which I think is a good deal lower than most other authorities - gives insufficient weight to this aspect in his consideration of the problem. He does, however, deal effectively with the argument that an overwhelmingly strong Israel is the best guarantee of stability in the area and makes the interesting suggestion that the US and the Soviet Union should together try to reach agreement on the limitation of arms supply.

3. Another view that I find interesting, and one which I think is not universal in the academic work, is the emphasis both by Mr Newhouse in Chapter 3 and Messrs Gelb, Kuzmack and Kahan in Chapters 10 and 11, on the importance of not reducing overall the West's military capability in Europe for fear of destabilising the present peace there; and not reducing conventional capability in order not to undermine the credibility of the nuclear deterrent.

JAN Graham
JAN Graham
16 July 1973

Copies to Mr Wilberforce

Mr Pike	}	with copy of minute under reference.
Mr Reeve		
Mr Ling		
Mr Overton NAD FCO)		

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER
AND THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER AT 10.30 A.M. ON
FRIDAY 8 JUNE 1973 AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET

Sec. of State

Mr. ~~Guthrie~~

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NAD

SEND

Present:

The Prime Minister

Sir John Addis

Mr. R.T. Armstrong

Lord Bridges

H.E. Mr. Chi Peng-fei
Minister of Foreign Affairs

H.E. Mr. Sung Chih-kuang
Ambassador of the C.P.R.

Miss Wang Hai-jung
Assistant Minister of
Foreign Affairs

Mr. Wang Tung
Director of the Western
European Department

BILATERAL QUESTIONS

The Prime Minister welcomed Mr. Chi Peng-fei to London. He fully understood why Mr. Chi had been obliged to cancel his earlier visit, because of the Vietnam Conference. He had now chosen a much better season.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had told Mr. Heath of the valuable talks on the previous day, and the Prime Minister understood that they had covered a lot of ground.

Mr. Chi thanked the Prime Minister. He brought a message of special respect and regards from his own Prime Minister. The Prime Minister was glad to receive this message. He had been grateful to Mr. Chou En-lai for seeing the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, who had given

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Mr. Heath a detailed account of his talks in Peking. Indeed, Mr. Heath heard from time to time that the Chinese Prime Minister had mentioned Mr. Heath's own speeches to his English guests. Mr. Chi said that his Prime Minister highly appreciated Mr. Heath's speech to the Conservative Party Conference in 1971, and also respected his personal determination over accession to the European Economic Community and the contribution which he had made to the unity of Europe. China "assessed highly" these achievements and successes of British policy under Mr. Heath's leadership. He extended once again the invitation from Chou En-lai to the Prime Minister to visit China during the latter part of this year. Perhaps October would be possible.

The Prime Minister was delighted to accept the invitation. The exact date could be discussed further through diplomatic channels. He looked forward to this visit with keen anticipation. He mentioned that the Conservative Party Conference was held annually in October, and he would be expected to make another important speech at it. Mr. Chi said that these matters could be considered further as Mr. Heath had suggested. The other visits arranged included those by President Pompidou in September and by Mr. Whitlam in late October.

EUROPEAN QUESTIONS

The Prime Minister said that British entry to the E.E.C. was a factor of major importance, both for Britain and for other countries. The period taken for the British application to succeed was not long by historical standards, but was not short either when measured by the life span of an individual politician.

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Inside the Community, efforts would now have to be concentrated on the achievement of European unity: the target date of 1980 had been laid down in the Summit Communiqué for the achievement of union. Europe wished to keep its independence, and to use its influence to expand world trade and maintain monetary stability. In the past, the Americans had always steadily supported the idea of European unity, as the Chinese Government were now doing. The formation of the U. S. A. had been easier than the European union would prove to be: all the Nine European nations had a long history, and this process would take time. All things considered, it was remarkable that so much could be settled without argument. Mr. Chi remarked that the trend to unity was clear to see, and the Prime Minister agreed that all the pressures were working in that direction.

Mr. Chi said that China wanted to see a strong Europe, united on its political, economic and defence objectives. This would have a good effect on the world. But to the Chinese observer, it seemed that the sense of "false peace" was too readily apparent in Western Europe. European friends who came to China seemed to believe that a state of permanent peace could be maintained. Subjective desires of this kind were quite understandable, but the Chinese did not think that this was an objective possibility at present.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Turning to the Chinese experience, Mr. Chi explained that China was still engaged in negotiations over her frontier with her northern neighbours. When they had met at Peking airport in 1969, Chou En-lai and Kosygin had

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reached a provisional oral agreement that China and Russia should work to conclude an agreement on this matter, and that Vice-Ministers should meet and negotiate to this end. The two Prime Ministers had further agreed three principles at the same meeting: first, to maintain the status quo on the border; secondly, to avoid armed conflict between their two nations; and thirdly, that the armed forces of both sides should separate by withdrawing from the border. Since that date, talks had proceeded for three years without result. He believed the reason to be that a decision had been taken to disregard the conclusions reached by Chou En-lai and Kosygin at their airport meeting, and that this decision was made at Kosygin's meetings with his two principal Soviet colleagues following his return to Moscow. (Mr. Chi did not mention any names; presumably he meant Brezhnev and Podgorny.) Subsequently, although the Soviet Government had sent a Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs to Peking for talks, the Russians had increased their forces on the border. In such circumstances the negotiations could not succeed. The current Russian line was to seek to isolate a single problem, renunciation of the use of force, and to leave the territorial issues on one side. China thought that this amounted to Soviet pressure on her, and not the other way round. Further, China pointed to the existence of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance which still remained in force, so far as the Chinese were concerned. They did not see the need for another instrument and asked the Russians whether they too regarded the Treaty as having continuing validity. If it was not valid, it was up to the Russians to say so.

The Chinese impression was that the Russians wanted to bring about a fraud. Talks had gone on for nearly four years now, and none of the three points agreed orally between

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the two Prime Ministers had led to substantive agreement between the Vice-Ministers. The Russians had built up a force of one million men in the border regions and the Mongolian People's Republic was subjected to what amounted to military occupation. The Russians intended to use these troops to exert pressure on China, and to force the Chinese to sign. This China had no intention of doing. For one thing, China noticed that her "respected northern neighbour" did not match its words with deeds, and felt free to tear up agreements signed earlier. He noted that the Russians had been suffering some troubles at home, and that the international reputation of the U.S.S.R. was not improving as Soviet ambitions were exposed. This explained why the Russians were turning to other tactics to cover up their true intentions, for example by the "peace posture". China could not overlook the fact that after fifty years of socialist production in the Soviet Union, their military expenditures were the highest in the world, and that although the U.S.S.R. produced 100 million tons of steel each year, the Russians still had to import more steel to complete the programme of building submarines, battleships and nuclear weapons. China saw the contrast with Russian talk about peace very clearly. In spite of this talk about peaceful negotiation, the increase in Soviet forces was continuing, and the preparation of a surprise attack was the only possible explanation.

Mr. Chi repeated that the Chinese experience led his Government to consider the actuality of Soviet deeds as well as the words of her spokesmen, which China was bound to regard with suspicion. He recalled that in 1961, almost all Chinese

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industrial projects depended on Soviet help, and that after the withdrawal of two thousand Russian experts, Chinese factories had been obliged to stop work. This had caused substantial difficulties, but as Chairman Mao and Chou En-lai had said, it was also a healthy experience as it had forced China to be self-reliant and to build socialism independently. China would refuse to allow the Soviet Union to exert pressure on her again. While the Russians were still talking about peace, they had a firm grasp of their nuclear weapons. Soviet ambitions were much more extensive and deceptive than those of the United States and correspondingly more dangerous. He believed that there were still some Marxists in Europe, as well as Revisionists and Social Democrats, and that the Russians were using such people to spread a false feeling of security. At the same time, as they were following this line in Europe, the Russians were supporting revolutionary postures elsewhere to achieve their aims. But he expected that the world would come to perceive the true nature of Russian designs, as had been shown by the Egyptian expulsion of Soviet military advisers. Mr. Chi noted that in the Middle East the Russians were contriving a continuous increase in the population of Israel by exporting Soviet Jewry, and were also expanding their influence at a weak point through the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. It was not just that the Russians wished to contend with the United States: they wanted to establish their own hegemony in the world. A correct understanding of this matter could not be obtained, and a false sense of security avoided, without a fundamental viewpoint on the whole matter.

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Concluding his initial exposé, Mr. Chi said that Chairman Mao and Chou En-lai had a high assessment of the British stand on these matters. It seemed that Mr. Heath alone in Europe spoke clearly on this point. Other European leaders took a so-called balanced position - he would prefer not to specify his meaning more exactly. Perhaps such people were clear in their minds, but they seemed not to wish to make their words equally clear. The Prime Minister agreed that valid judgements could only be made from a viewpoint permitting a total view. The British historical experience, and the transformation from Empire to Commonwealth association, helped us to see things in the world context. Britain also had the experience of bitter lessons arising from past complacency, and this helped to maintain our vigilance. Sometimes our allies said that we were taking a very hard line, and Moscow did not often pat us on the head. The British position on C.S.C.E. was clear. We were prepared to agree with the Russians, providing the result improved the security of the nations subscribing to the agreement.

The Prime Minister asked for Mr. Chi's assessment of the current Soviet threat to China. His own impression was that the Soviet leaders had a healthy respect for the Chinese conventional capability. Mr. Chi agreed that this had to be taken into account. There had been a time when China had not stationed a single soldier on her Russian frontier. Chairman Mao's policy for self-defence lay in his slogan "dig tunnels deep". It was clear that the Russian nuclear capability, and China's inability to obtain advance notice of

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her attacks, presented a severe threat: but the Chinese could at least fight them underground. In the Second World War, the theory that modern cities could be easily destroyed, and were unable to defend themselves, had been disproved. Chairman Mao's slogan showed that this whole attitude was one of self-defence, but Moscow attacked China and tried to portray it as a threat. This was inconceivable unless the Russians thought the Chinese were tunnelling all the way to Moscow. The Chinese were also seeking to lay in a storage of grain against Soviet attack. Finally, China made it a principle that she would never seek to establish a hegemony of her own: the Chinese did not want their country to be a super power.

interesting

The Prime Minister asked how successful the Chinese had been in building up stores of grain. He wondered if the Russians knew of this policy; it might perhaps deter them. Mr. Chi said that some reserves had been put by. In 1972 China had imported five million tons of grain, and had exported four million tons elsewhere, for example to Africa, and to Vietnam of which she was the source of supply. But China had not experienced a good grain harvest in 1972; the yield had been four per cent down on the previous year. Replying to a question by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chi agreed that the prospects for the current year were better, and that some (but not many) of China's grain reserves had been used last year. He noted that the question of grain supply was a large problem in the U.S.S.R., which had imported twenty-eight million tons in 1972, and had ordered a further fourteen million tons for delivery in 1973 and 1974. By contrast, China could be self-sufficient in grain.

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Taking up Mr. Chi's reference to Soviet internal problems, the Prime Minister asked whether he was thinking of the Soviet economy, or differences within the Russian leadership. Mr. Chi disclaimed any exact information: because of the tense relations, the Chinese Embassy in Moscow was closely watched. But he deduced from a number of assessments which had come to his notice that there were differences in the highest quarters of the U.S.S.R. And he thought it indisputable that the Soviet Union was experiencing great economic problems in the development of her agriculture and industry. The agreements recently concluded with the Federal German Republic showed that the Russians needed the means of production as well as foreign technology. It was inconceivable to him that these problems had not been settled so long after the establishment of the Soviet State.

JAPAN

The Prime Minister mentioned his interest in the future course of Japanese policy and his meeting with Mr. Tanaka shortly before the latter had gone to Peking. Japan was powerful, her strength in population and world trade was steadily increasing, but the question was: in which direction would Japan move? Would she co-operate with the other nations of the world, in negotiations over commercial and monetary problems? Or would Japan seek to dominate other countries? Mr. Chi felt it would be difficult for Japan to continue a line of policy which disregarded the world situation around her, seeing that the Japanese were so dependent on the import of raw materials. Although Japan was powerful in economic terms, they were "a sort of processing factory",

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and he found the basis of Japanese power weak. To Chinese eyes, the strength of Japan was abnormal rather than solidly based. The second question, in China's mind, was the future military defence of Japan. Limitations dating from the end of the Second World War had made it impossible for the Japanese to develop their own military arm, and it did not seem that the United States would like Japanese military strength to develop to any extent. His impression was that the pattern of Japanese trade was unlikely to produce a very favourable current of opinion towards Japan, for example in South East Asia. China had frequent contacts with friends from Japan, and constantly reminded such Japanese to draw the correct lessons from their defeat in the last war, and of the need to have policies which matched the world situation. China had also encouraged Japan to construct an external policy based on the equality of nations and mutual benefit between them; it was not enough to proceed on the basis of self-interest, as the whole international trade picture needed to be looked at. Mr. Chi saw Japan at the cross-roads and could not determine the path which they would follow. He hoped they would make the right choice. But favourable conditions did exist: Japanese people remembered the last war, and developments of a military kind would encounter internal opposition.

Chinese relations with Japan had been normalised to some extent, although the overall relationship between the two nations remained to be settled. He thought that the Japanese were much interested in this matter, and for their part the Chinese authorities also hoped to see favourable

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developments. But China had told Japan that the present Japanese approach left something to be desired. The Japanese had shown interest in buying Chinese raw materials; the Japanese had asked them to clarify, and modify, their policy in some respects first, hoping thereby to exercise an influence on Japanese policy. Replying to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Chi said that Japan wished to invest capital in China but the Chinese were not in favour of this and would not allow it.

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The Prime Minister was glad that China's relations with the United States had been resumed, and that Mr. David Bruce had gone to Peking. Mr. Bruce was a personal friend and enjoyed a high reputation in Britain. Mr. Chi said that he had found Mr. Bruce a very thoughtful person. The Prime Minister described him as the American with the clearest understanding of what Europe meant. Mr. Chi said that he had been in Europe for a long time. The Prime Minister agreed: Mr. Bruce had been associated with the formulation of the Marshall Plan, long before he had become Ambassador in Paris and later in London.

The Prime Minister asked whether Mr. Chi now expected China's relations with America to develop quickly, or over a long period. Mr. Chi said that the progress made since President Nixon's visit to China, and the Shanghai Communiqué in February, had been quicker than had been anticipated by the Chinese. For example, China had not expected that the liaison office would be established so soon. This suggestion had been put forward during Dr. Kissinger's visit in February,

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and seemed to correspond to wishes of both sides. The original suggestion had been to set up a trade office, but the American approach had been put in a flexible way and the liaison office which had been agreed represented a new form of international contact. He judged that future developments might also be quicker than the Chinese had thought likely. Now that contacts existed it would be easier to solve particular issues. The main issue was the end of the war in Indo-China, and the establishment of true peace there. There was also the problem of Taiwan. No doubt the Americans had their own plans about the tempo of improving relations, and the steps by which they would bring this about, and doubtless they would also be influenced by the evolving situation. Mr. Chi thought the Americans had come to realise that the Indo-Chinese war had brought them into grave difficulties at home and abroad, and that the gains by no means compensated for these. The United States was dragged down in that area, to the advantage of the "other super power". All in all, he saw this as a lesson to the United States. The Prime Minister said that he was sure that the United States wished to end the war in Indo-China. On this point, he knew the Chinese view that the provisions of the Paris agreements must be fully respected. But it was obvious that there were some difficulties in reaching this result. Mr. Chi agreed. China hoped to see the agreements ~~being~~ put into full effect. The main difficulty at present was over Cambodia. In spite of the problems in Vietnam, there was a basic cease-fire there. But the Americans were still bombing Cambodia, and were indeed using B52s to do so. He did not think that such wanton bombing

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would help President Nixon and noted that Congress had already suspended its approval of defence expenditure in Cambodia, and that many Americans (he thought) were unhappy about what was going on in Cambodia.

The Prime Minister asked how a stable Government could be created in Phnom Penh. Mr. Chi said it was necessary to get Prince Sihanouk involved in negotiations to this end. Sihanouk, as a neutral and nationalist, corresponded to the objectives of peace and neutrality which commanded general agreement over the whole of Indo-China. The trouble was that the Americans refused to negotiate with him. Sihanouk had made it clear that any negotiations about the future of Cambodia must take place between him and the Americans, and he refused to talk to General Lon Nol.

The Prime Minister wondered whether China and the United States could not both exert influence on Sihanouk and Lon Nol, and thus involve the four parties principally concerned. Mr. Chi claimed that China would have no influence in such a situation. If the Americans wished the Chinese to pass on any views to Sihanouk, they should do so. He repeated that Sihanouk was absolutely opposed to negotiation with Lon Nol, and said that as Cambodian head of state, Prince Sihanouk had promised a pardon to everyone except the General. Mr. Chi mentioned in passing that the Prince, after his visit to North Africa, was now resting in Albania before undertaking a visit to Yugoslavia. The Prime Minister said that, in the circumstances described, the stalemate would probably drag on for some time. Mr. Chi thought that the Americans were

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still pondering their difficulties, and could not change their policy at once for prestige reasons, but he did not think that General Lon Hol was a very helpful ally for the United States. The Prime Minister said that this was sometimes the case with allies. Mr. Chi said that, in the Chinese view, the ally could be disposed of in the present case.

The guests having assembled for the Prime Minister's reception, the conversation concluded at 12 noon.

B.

8 June 1973

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P. 4 81
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TO SAVING FCO TELNO SAVING 90-OF 7 JUNE 1973 INFORMATION SAVING TO
 BUENOS AIRES, BRASILIA, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA, CARACAS, LIMA, LA PAZ,
 MEXICO CITY AND QUITO.

UNITED STATES MILITARY SALES TO LATIN AMERICA

1. While giving evidence to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 5 June, Mr Rogers urged the Committee to support the President's programme for Latin America, including the recommendation that unilateral restrictions on sales of military equipment should be lifted (see para 3A of my telegram saving 67 of 8 May). He stated that "President Nixon has recently exercised the waiver authority granted him by Congress to find five Latin American countries eligible to purchase the F-5E fighter aircraft. These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela. But we must also raise the ceiling which current legislation imposes upon military sales and grants. This ceiling is offensive to the Latin Americans who consider it an attempt to control their sovereign right to determine their own defence requirement. The only result of the ceiling has been to encourage the Latin Americans to make their purchases outside the United States. I hope the Committee will support the legislation that is needed. We must avoid the kind of political alienation that could occur if Latin American governments were to feel that the United States is not prepared to operate on a mature partnership basis with them."

2. In answer to Representative Wayne Hays who said that he could not understand the willingness to sell jet aircraft to Chile, Mr Rogers stressed that the waiver did not mean that a sale was imminent but only that negotiations were possible. This move is
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in line with the general Administration policy of attempting to maintain contacts with Chile, in particular with the Chilean military⁷.

3. The New York Times reports an Administration official as having said that the Administration had decided that the United States' previous policy of trying to dissuade Latin American governments from buying advanced military equipment had failed, and that the United States as a result was losing markets in military equipment to France and other countries. In addition, the official had added that the Administration had decided that sales of jet aircraft provide additional leverage in negotiating with Latin American countries. The sales would be financed by military credits.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

4 June, 1973

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Thank you for your letter of 22 May enclosing a copy of President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report.

In this useful account of American achievements and future objectives, I particularly welcome the confirmation of American support for the Atlantic Alliance. It is clearly of the very greatest importance that we should not sacrifice the best assurance we all have of future peace and prosperity by premature reduction of our joint efforts for common defence. Equally, we must ensure that our economic problems are worked out in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation. I trust that the basis for this will be established in the course of 1973.

(ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME)

His Excellency,
The Honourable Walter H. Annenberg.

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Mr Overton


Private Secretary

PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT

- A. 1. The United States Ambassador wrote to the Secretary of State on 22 May forwarding a copy of President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report. The President sent a copy of his Report direct to the Prime Minister, who has acknowledged this.
- B. 2. In the circumstances, it would appear sufficient to send Mr Annenberg a very short letter acknowledging the receipt of the Report. A draft is attached.



G R Archer
North America Department



My in Overton
H.S.

Enc.

30 May 1973

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10 Downing Street
Whitehall

26 May 1973

Thank you for your letter of 10 May enclosing
your message to the Congress on Foreign Policy.

I am glad to have a copy of this document which
sets out your objectives in the foreign policy field
in such a clear and authoritative way.

(SGD) E.H.

P.C.
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The President of the United States of America

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May 22, 1973

I have been asked by President Nixon to forward you the enclosed copy of his Report to Congress, "U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's - Shaping a Durable Peace".

Sincerely,

Enclosure

Enter gl 29/5.

NAD

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To:

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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS
 LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Note: spell US, UN, DR. out
 in this DR.

SUMMARY

During the last two years President Nixon's low key approach to Latin America has been maintained. The Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs has been left to implement this with little guidance from above. Latin American criticisms of this, and of United States trade and aid policies.

(paragraphs 2 to 5) Bilateral relations with Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Panama etc - no crises and no conspicuous successes

(paragraphs 6 to 9) Still no real policy for the Caribbean.

3. (paragraph 10). No change on Cuba (paragraphs 10-11)

4. Conclusion: following intensive criticisms of United States policy at recent OAS and United Nations meetings, the Administration may pay a little more attention to the presentational aspects of its policies. But there is not likely to be any change in the President's basic policy (paragraph 12)

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BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON

14 May 1973

The Rt Hon Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP
etc etc etc

Sir

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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

1. United States policies towards Latin America have recently received even more criticism than usual as the result of two golden opportunities for the critics. The first was the United Nations Security Council meeting at Panama at which the United States was driven into using its veto, and the second the annual Meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States which has just ended in Washington. Moreover President Nixon has recently delivered his Annual Report on Foreign Policy to Congress including a chapter on relations with Latin America (my telegram no. 67 Saving of 8 May). It may therefore be appropriate to review the progress of United States policies in this area during the last two years, and to look at prospects for the future.

2. In his despatch of the 20th of January, 1971, Mr Millard described the low key approach to Latin America adopted by President Nixon in contrast with the grandiose programmes

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and proclamations of the Kennedy era and the paternalism which had characterised United States relations with the Latin Americas in the past. He argued that on the whole this approach had served United States interests well. The last two years have seen little change in United States policies. Indeed in his report President Nixon makes a virtue of this approach. In truth already in the latter part of President Johnson's term, United States' interest in Latin America had waned as developments in South-East Asia claimed more and more attention. President Nixon and Dr Kissinger, with Vietnam and relations with China and the Soviet Union requiring their full attention, and Western Europe, Japan and the Middle East next in the queue, have had little opportunity or disposition to devote much time to the Western Hemisphere, a point brought home to us by the delays in obtaining the green light from the White House for negotiations on future United States' relations with the Bahamas. In consequence the State Department has been left to play the hand, with little support, inspiration or guidance from above. Mr Rogers and his senior staff have also been preoccupied with other questions, so that the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Mr Charles Meyer, who has now left the Administration, has been left to do his best on the basis of the existing guidelines. Mr Meyer's task has not been an enviable one, especially if one bears in mind the extent of United States investment in the area and the ability

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of the companies concerned to lobby the Congress and other departments of the Administration for action in support of their interests, even when this is arguably not in the overall interest of the United States. But on balance, Mr Meyer, an executive on leave of absence from Sears Roebuck, a firm to which he has now returned, managed to weather these pressures surprisingly well.

3. As Mr Millard remarked, the Nixon style does not readily commend itself to Latin Americans. With certain exceptions (notably Brazil) the pride of the United States' friends in Latin America has been hurt by what they have interpreted as a down-grading of the importance of Inter-American affairs, rather than flattered by President Nixon's assurances (reiterated in his speech to the OAS General Assembly and again in his Foreign Policy Report) that the day of paternalism has ended and the groundwork been laid for a new "mature partnership". The record (notably of ITT's dealings in connection with Chile) appears to show that this Administration has resisted attempts to persuade it to intervene on behalf of United States private interests, as former Administrations might have done. However, this has not prevented Latin American critics in Cuba, Chile, Peru, and elsewhere, from complaining of intervention in their economies by United States interests, or from pillorying the United States Administration

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when it has refused to support resolutions loaded against the foreign investor, like that adopted by the meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IAESC) in Bogota earlier this year. The tougher Administration position on compensation for expropriation adopted in 1971 at Mr Connally's prompting and again endorsed in the President's Foreign Policy Report, which requires inter alia that the United States should oppose loans from multilateral organizations to offending countries, has certainly complicated the task of those concerned with United States relations with Latin America and the Caribbean; and it was particularly tactless to send Mr Connally, who was identified not only with this, but also with the import surcharge referred to below, on a tour of Latin American countries in 1972 following his resignation as Secretary of the Treasury.

4. A more legitimate and substantial criticism of United States policy by the United States' southern neighbours relates chiefly to trade and aid. They complain that United States aid terms have sometimes forced them to buy goods from the United States at high prices which they can obtain much more cheaply elsewhere. A more general and important complaint is about the barriers which hamper Latin American exports to the United States, especially of raw materials and light manufactures. The

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Latin Americans were incensed at the Administration's failure to grant them any form of special exemption from the 10% import surcharge imposed as part of President Nixon's emergency economic measures in August 1971, despite the fact that Latin America as a whole had been running an annual trade deficit with the United States of between a half and one billion dollars. (We in Western Europe could of course make a similar complaint) The Latin Americans have also groused at the United States Government's failure to grant generalised preferences to the developing countries. The United States Administration for their part can justifiably claim that given the protectionist mood of the Congress it would until now have been counter-productive to have asked for authority to implement their promise of Generalised Preferences, since the outcome might well have been the adoption of measures to increase further the barriers to trade. The Latin Americans like others, stand to benefit from the provisions of the Trade Bill that has now been submitted, and Mr. Rogers in his speech at the OAS Assembly, while welcoming the increase in Latin American trade with Europe and with Japan, invited the Latins to make common cause with United States in fighting for the elimination of preferential arrangements which discriminated against them in favour of

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the EEC's associates. But it is possible that some Latin American and Caribbean countries will be hit by the President's proposals for changes in the taxation of United States subsidiaries abroad that manufacture for the United States market, while the raw material exports of some other Latin American countries will suffer from the recent decision to run down United States stockpiles.

5. The Latin Americans have also complained of cuts in United States aid, pointing to the reduction in the commitments of United States Official Development Assistance to Latin America, which fell from a total of \$2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -billion in the three fiscal years ending in 1969 to under \$2-billion in the 3 succeeding years. Total United States commitments also fell during the same period, but Latin America suffered a larger proportionate reduction than other areas, largely because of action by the Congress, which cut the Administration's requests. Spokesmen for the United States Government, on the other hand, point out that the United States has not reduced its commitment to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) despite Congressional reluctance to vote the necessary funds (a point made in the President's Report), and argue that the picture painted by Latin Americans is misleading because it does not take into account the greater United States emphasis

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on lending through multilateral channels, and the fact that Latin America received nearly \$2-billion more multilateral aid in 1970-72 than in the previous 3-year period. Latin America has also received a substantial volume of Eximbank credit. The bulk of these flows has gone to the richest countries - Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela - and the United States authorities have recently taken steps to limit the volume of soft funds provided by the IDB to those countries and to grant the lesser countries of Latin America preferential access to soft loans. In accordance with the same policy the bilateral aid programme for Brazil has recently been cut back. The overall picture is therefore one of the United States Administration attempting to maintain total United States financial assistance to Latin America at about the same level, with a larger proportion channelled through multilateral institutions and some preference for the poorer countries, in the face of increasing Congressional reluctance to vote funds for aid.

6. On the other side of the coin, economic nationalism in a number of Latin American countries and restrictive foreign investment codes in others have discouraged the flow of private United States investment to Latin America. While comprehensive figures are not available for the whole of Latin America, there has been a reduction in total investments covered by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation since the beginning of 1972. But United States business has continued to invest

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heavily in those countries that welcome, or at least tolerate, foreign investments, notably in Mexico and Brazil, and, according to Mr Rogers, half of United States private investment in the developing world is still in Latin America.

7. In its bilateral relations with Latin America and the Caribbean during the last two years the United States Government has managed to avoid any major crisis; but at the same time it can claim no conspicuous success and, as I indicated below, it has a number of nagging bilateral disputes with several Latin American countries. Over its relations with Chile, regarded by most observers as a test case, the Administration has continued to maintain a low profile, judging that any attempt at spectacular intervention against the left-wing parties would be counter-productive. The Administration even reacted comparatively mildly to the expropriation of major United States investments, and has shown itself ready to explore in bilateral discussions whether the Chilean Government is prepared to show enough willingness to discuss adequate compensation, which would allow United States participation in measures to ease Chile's acute credit problems. But the prospect of any solution emerging from such talks seems slender, and will deteriorate further if the Allende Government is pushed by press revelations and the subsequent Senate Committee investigation into expropriating further ITT assets.

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8. United States bilateral relations have been best with Brazil and seem likely to continue to prosper if, as seems probable, the Brazilian economy continues to expand and to attract United States' investment. An elegant interim solution has been found to the Brazilian/United States fisheries dispute, President Medici's visit to Washington last year was judged a success, and President Nixon has half committed himself to a return visit, probably in the course of the visit to Latin America that he has promised to pay later this year. One problem in choosing an itinerary must be that there are few other countries which he could visit without fear of provoking anti-American demonstrations of the kind of which he has unpleasant memories from his Latin American tour as Vice-President.

9. Relations with Mexico have also been good on the whole following President Nixon's meeting with President Diaz at Puerto Vallarta in 1970. But President Echaverria's return visit to the United States last year, when he lectured the Congress and Mexican Americans on the misdeeds of the United States, did little to improve his country's image here. With the Argentine, relations have also been good, but the victory of the Peronistas raises a question mark over the future. A minor success has been the settlement, after many vicissitudes, of a long-standing dispute with Bolivia over the expropriation

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of the Gulf Oil Company's assets. But there appears to be no prospect for a solution, at any rate before the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, (if then) to the dispute with Ecuador, Chile and Peru over their claims to regulate fishing within 200 miles of their coast lines. In fact the vicious circle is complete: the 3 Latin countries have bound themselves not to reach separate settlements with the United States on this issue; it appears that Ecuador will not negotiate until the United States' ban on military aid is lifted; and the United States Congress will not lift the ban until negotiations have started. In the meantime relations with Ecuador and Peru could deteriorate further when the United States Government notifies them officially in the near future that in accordance with United States law, fines imposed on United States fishermen caught within the 200 mile limit are liable to be deducted from the United States bilateral aid programme. There also seems to be no settlement in sight on the issue of compensation for the expropriation of the International Petroleum Corporation's assets in Peru which continues as an irritant on United States relations with that country. Finally, in this catalogue of major bilateral disputes, mention must be made of the intermittent negotiations for the revision of the treaty relating to the Panama Canal. The only effects of President Torrijos's use of the Security Council are the irritation of President Nixon and a diminution of the

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chances of his ever being persuaded to stake a part of his prestige on an attempt to carry through the Congress, with its strong Canal Zone lobby, any revision of the Treaty satisfactory to Panama.

10. The United States is still without any special policy for the Caribbean. We know that the President is intermittently alarmed by the possible dangers involved in the emergence in the area of mini-states unable to stand on their own feet and a possible prey for forces hostile to the United States. In consequence the Administration continues to hope that somehow or other we, the Dutch and the French, can be persuaded to maintain the ^{Roman} ~~status quo~~, and is dismayed when this does not happen, as over Grenada. But it is very difficult to get this general apprehension translated into positive action, especially when this conflicts with particular United States commercial interests as we have seen in the arguments over generalised preferences, reverse preferences and dollar area quotas. On this latter the Americans just do not believe our pretensions. And, as I have already mentioned, there was delay in securing decisions even on a matter of clear strategic and political importance to the United States, that of the future United States relationship with the Bahamas.

11. United States policy towards Cuba remains unchanged, despite much speculation to the contrary. Admittedly there is a growing feeling in the United States, which was reinforced by the conclusion of the agreement with Cuba to curb hijacking, that existing relations are anachronistic given the current

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United States attitude towards China and the Soviet Union. But there is a strong lobby in the Congress and elsewhere, especially in the Republican party, which is opposed to change, and we are told that the President personally shares this view. There is little economic or political incentive for the United States to alter its present stance. The Cuban régime is hardly an advertisement for Communism, or Soviet tutelage. Castro himself hardly seems to welcome the prospect of any rapprochement. I do not therefore foresee any change in the near future. In the longer term, pressure for a modification may increase owing to the trend among other members of the Organization of American States to establish, or re-establish, diplomatic and trading relations with Cuba despite the OAS embargo policy. But there is still a majority in the OAS for maintenance of the Embargo and my estimate is that the present policy is likely to continue during the remainder of President Nixon's term of office.

12. The extent of the criticisms of the United States during the recent meetings of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Bogota, of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America at Quito, and to some extent at the UN Security Council Meeting at Panama and in the general debate at the OAS General Assembly, led to some speculation that the United States might soon have to face the prospect of a major crisis in Latin America if they persisted with their present policies. But

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Latin American unanimity in criticising the United States is nothing new, although it has not recently been pushed so far as at Bogota and at Panama. Meanwhile the United States Government's reaction in refusing to vote for the Bogota resolution and vetoing at Panama may have given the Latin Americans pause. At any rate, at the recent OAS Assembly, in connection with which at the start there were even unofficial suggestions in the United States press that the United States should withdraw from the Organization, the proceedings ended quietly and with a much greater degree of agreement than had been expected following the welcome given by the United States Delegation to the proposals for a radical re-examination of the Organization.

13. The foregoing may have painted what appears to be a gloomy picture. In fact, I doubt if it is as bad as it looks. Over the course of years, successive Administrations in the United States have recognised that in their dealings with Latin America, it is virtually impossible for them to win. If they pursue active policies of intervention, they are accused of paternalism and neo-colonialism. If they adopt a low profile they are accused of neglect and lack of interest. I see little reason to assume that this Administration will move far from the approach which it has adopted over the last four years, although it may pay a little more attention in future to the presentational aspects of its policies. In a message to the IAESC meeting at Bogota, President Nixon promised that inter-American

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American cooperation would receive priority attention from the Administration over the next four years, and the US Secretary of State's visit to Latin America this month falls into the same pattern. But it can be taken as axiomatic that the countries of Latin America will criticise United States policy whatever it may be. President Nixon's current policy is in line with his overall doctrine. It has not yielded any striking success, it has so far managed to escape any major crisis. Preoccupied as he is with more pressing problems elsewhere, there is little incentive for the President to make radical changes in a policy which has served him reasonably well; and I do not think that he will do so.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Latin America and the Caribbean.

ck
I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant

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
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*Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Secret)
Whitehall (Secret) Distribution***UNITED STATES**
14 May, 1973**UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA
THE CARIBBEAN***Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs***SUMMARY**

During the last two years President Nixon's low key approach to Latin America has been maintained. The Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs has been left to implement this with little guidance from above. Latin American criticisms of this, and of United States trade and aid policies. (Paragraphs 2-5.)

2. Bilateral relations with Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Panama, etc.—no crises and no conspicuous successes. (Paragraphs 6-9.)

3. Still no real policy for the Caribbean. No change on Cuba. (Paragraphs 10-11.)

4. Conclusion: Following intensive criticisms of United States policy at recent OAS and United Nations meetings, the Administration may pay a little more attention to the presentational aspects of its policies. But there is not likely to be any change in the President's basic policy. (Paragraph 12.)

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(Confidential—Eclipse)*Washington,*

Sir,

14 May, 1973.

United States policies towards Latin America have recently received even more criticism than usual as the result of two golden opportunities for the critics. The first was the United Nations Security Council meeting at Panama at which the United States was driven into using its veto, and the second the Annual Meeting of the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States which has just ended in Washington. Moreover President Nixon has recently delivered his Annual Report on Foreign Policy to Congress including a chapter on relations with Latin America (my Telegram No. 67 Saving of 8 May). It may therefore be appropriate to review the progress of United States policies in this area during the last two years, and to look at prospects for the future.

2. In his despatch of 20 January, 1971, Mr. Millard described the low key approach to Latin America adopted by President Nixon in contrast with the grandiose programmes and proclamations of the Kennedy era and the paternalism which had characterised United States relations with the Latin Americas in the

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past. He argued that on the whole this approach had served United States interests well. The last two years have seen little change in United States policies. Indeed in his report President Nixon makes a virtue of this approach. In truth already in the latter part of President Johnson's term, United States interest in Latin America had waned as developments in South-East Asia claimed more and more attention. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, with Viet-Nam and relations with China and the Soviet Union requiring their full attention, and Western Europe, Japan and the Middle East next in the queue, have had little opportunity or disposition to devote much time to the Western Hemisphere, a point brought home to us by the delays in obtaining the green light from the White House for negotiations on future United States relations with the Bahamas. In consequence the State Department has been left to play the hand, with little support, inspiration or guidance from above. Mr. Rogers and his senior staff have also been preoccupied with other questions, so that the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Charles Meyer, who has now left the Administration, has been left to do his best on the basis of the existing guidelines. Mr. Meyer's task has not been an enviable one, especially if one bears in mind the extent of United States investment in the area and the ability of the companies concerned to lobby the Congress and other departments of the Administration for action in support of their interests, even when this is arguably not in the overall interest of the United States. But on balance, Mr. Meyer, an executive on leave of absence from Sears Roebuck, a firm to which he has now returned, managed to weather these pressures surprisingly well.

3. As Mr. Millard remarked, the Nixon style does not readily commend itself to Latin Americans. With certain exceptions (notably Brazil) the pride of the United States friends in Latin America has been hurt by what they have interpreted as a down-grading of the importance of Inter-American affairs, rather than flattered by President Nixon's assurances (reiterated in his speech to the OAS General Assembly and again in his Foreign Policy Report) that the day of paternalism has ended and the groundwork been laid for a new "mature partnership". The record (notably of ITT's dealings in connection with Chile) appears to show that this Administration has resisted attempts to persuade it to intervene on behalf of United States private interests, as former Administrations might have done. However, this has not prevented Latin American critics in Cuba, Chile, Peru, and elsewhere, from complaining of intervention in their economies by United States interests, or from pillorying the United States Administration when it has refused to support resolutions loaded against the foreign investor, like that adopted by the meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IAESC) in Bogota earlier this year. The tougher Administration position on compensation for expropriation adopted in 1971 at Mr. Connally's prompting and again endorsed in the President's Foreign Policy Report, which requires *inter alia* that the United States should oppose loans from multilateral organisations to offending countries, has certainly complicated the task of those concerned with United States relations with Latin America and the Caribbean; and it was particularly tactless to send Mr. Connally, who was identified not only with this, but also with the import surcharge referred to below, on a tour of Latin American countries in 1972 following his resignation as Secretary of the Treasury.

4. A more legitimate and substantial criticism of United States policy by the United States southern neighbours relates chiefly to trade and aid. They complain that United States aid terms have sometimes forced them to buy goods from the United States at high prices which they can obtain much more cheaply

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elsewhere. A more general and important complaint is about the barriers which hamper Latin American exports to the United States, especially of raw materials and light manufactures. The Latin Americans were incensed at the Administration's failure to grant them any form of special exemption from the 10 per cent import surcharge imposed as part of President Nixon's emergency economic measures in August 1971, despite the fact that Latin America as a whole had been running an annual trade deficit with the United States of between a half and one billion dollars. (We in Western Europe could of course make a similar complaint.) The Latin Americans have also groused at the United States Government's failure to grant generalised preferences to the developing countries. The United States Administration for their part can justifiably claim that given the protectionist mood of the Congress it would until now have been counter-productive to have asked for authority to implement their promise of generalised preferences, since the outcome might well have been the adoption of measures to increase further the barriers to trade. The Latin Americans like others, stand to benefit from the provisions of the Trade Bill that has now been submitted, and Mr. Rogers in his speech at the OAS Assembly, while welcoming the increase in Latin American trade with Europe and with Japan, invited the Latins to make common cause with United States in fighting for the elimination of preferential arrangements which discriminated against them in favour of the EEC's associates. But it is possible that some Latin American and Caribbean countries will be hit by the President's proposals for changes in the taxation of United States subsidiaries abroad that manufacture for the United States market, while the raw material exports of some other Latin American countries will suffer from the recent decision to run down United States stockpiles.

5. The Latin Americans have also complained of cuts in United States aid, pointing to the reduction in the commitments of United States Official Development Assistance to Latin America, which fell from a total of \$2 $\frac{3}{4}$ billion in the three fiscal years ending in 1969 to under \$2 billion in the three succeeding years. Total United States commitments also fell during the same period, but Latin America suffered a larger proportionate reduction than other areas, largely because of action by the Congress, which cut the Administration's requests. Spokesmen for the United States Government, on the other hand, point out that the United States has not reduced its commitment to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) despite Congressional reluctance to vote the necessary funds (a point made in the President's Report), and argue that the picture painted by Latin Americans is misleading because it does not take into account the greater United States emphasis on lending through multilateral channels, and the fact that Latin America received nearly \$2 billion more multilateral aid in 1970-72 than in the previous three-year period. Latin America has also received a substantial volume of Eximbank credit. The bulk of these flows has gone to the richest countries—Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela—and the United States authorities have recently taken steps to limit the volume of soft funds provided by the IDB to those countries and to grant the lesser countries of Latin America preferential access to soft loans. In accordance with the same policy the bilateral aid programme for Brazil has recently been cut back. The overall picture is therefore one of the United States Administration attempting to maintain total United States financial assistance to Latin America at about the same level, with a larger proportion channelled through multilateral institutions and some preference for the poorer countries, in the face of increasing Congressional reluctance to vote funds for aid.

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6. On the other side of the coin, economic nationalism in a number of Latin American countries and restrictive foreign investment codes in others have discouraged the flow of private United States investment to Latin America. While comprehensive figures are not available for the whole of Latin America, there has been a reduction in total investment covered by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation since the beginning of 1972. But United States business has continued to invest heavily in those countries that welcome, or at least tolerate, foreign investments, notably in Mexico and Brazil, and, according to Mr. Rogers, half of United States private investment in the developing world is still in Latin America.

7. In its bilateral relations with Latin America and the Caribbean during the last two years the United States Government has managed to avoid any major crisis; but at the same time it can claim no conspicuous success and, as I indicated below, it has a number of nagging bilateral disputes with several Latin American countries. Over its relations with Chile, regarded by most observers as a test case, the Administration has continued to maintain a low profile, judging that any attempt at spectacular intervention against the Left-wing parties would be counter-productive. The Administration even reacted comparatively mildly to the expropriation of major United States investments, and has shown itself ready to explore in bilateral discussions whether the Chilean Government is prepared to show enough willingness to discuss adequate compensation, which would allow United States participation in measures to ease Chile's acute credit problems. But the prospect of any solution emerging from such talks seems slender, and will deteriorate further if the Allende Government is pushed by Press revelations and the subsequent Senate Committee investigation into expropriating further ITT assets.

8. United States bilateral relations have been best with Brazil and seem likely to continue to prosper if, as seems probable, the Brazilian economy continues to expand and to attract United States' investment. An elegant interim solution has been found to the Brazilian/United States fisheries dispute, President Medici's visit to Washington last year was judged a success, and President Nixon has half committed himself to a return visit, probably in the course of the visit to Latin America that he has promised to pay later this year. One problem in choosing an itinerary must be that there are few other countries which he could visit without fear of provoking anti-American demonstrations of the kind of which he has unpleasant memories from his Latin American tour as Vice-President.

9. Relations with Mexico have also been good on the whole following President Nixon's meeting with President Diaz at Puerto Vallarta in 1970. But President Echaverria's return visit to the United States last year, when he lectured the Congress and Mexican Americans on the misdeeds of the United States, did little to improve his country's image here. With the Argentine, relations have also been good, but the victory of the Peronistas raises a question mark over the future. A minor success has been the settlement, after many vicissitudes, of a long-standing dispute with Bolivia over the expropriation of the Gulf Oil Company's assets. But there appears to be no prospect for a solution, at any rate before the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (if then) to the dispute with Ecuador, Chile and Peru over their claims to regulate fishing within 200 miles of their coast lines. In fact the vicious circle is complete: the three Latin countries have bound themselves not to reach separate settlements with the United

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States on this issue; it appears that Ecuador will not negotiate until the United States' ban on military aid is lifted; and the United States Congress will not lift the ban until negotiations have started. In the meantime relations with Ecuador and Peru could deteriorate further when the United States Government notifies them officially in the near future that in accordance with United States law, fines imposed on United States fishermen caught within the 200-mile limit are liable to be deducted from the United States bilateral aid programme. There also seems to be no settlement in sight on the issue of compensation for the expropriation of the International Petroleum Corporation's assets in Peru which continues as an irritant on United States relations with that country. Finally, in this catalogue of major bilateral disputes, mention must be made of the intermittent negotiations for the revision of the treaty relating to the Panama Canal. The only effects of President Torrijos's use of the Security Council are the irritation of President Nixon and a diminution of the chances of his ever being persuaded to stake a part of his prestige on an attempt to carry through the Congress, with its strong Canal Zone lobby, any revision of the Treaty satisfactory to Panama.

10. The United States is still without any special policy for the Caribbean. We know that the President is intermittently alarmed by the possible dangers involved in the emergence in the area of mini-States unable to stand on their own feet and a possible prey for forces hostile to the United States. In consequence the Administration continues to hope that somehow or other we, the Dutch and the French, can be persuaded to maintain the *status quo*, and is dismayed when this does not happen, as over Grenada. But it is very difficult to get this general apprehension translated into positive action, especially when this conflicts with particular United States commercial interests as we have seen in the arguments over generalised preferences, reverse preferences and dollar area quotas. On this latter the Americans just do not believe our pretensions. And, as I have already mentioned, there was delay in securing decisions even on a matter of clear strategic and political importance to the United States, that of the future United States relationship with the Bahamas.

11. United States policy towards Cuba remains unchanged, despite much speculation to the contrary. Admittedly there is a growing feeling in the United States, which was reinforced by the conclusion of the agreement with Cuba to curb hijacking, that existing relations are anachronistic given the current United States attitude towards China and the Soviet Union. But there is a strong lobby in the Congress and elsewhere, especially in the Republican Party, which is opposed to change, and we are told that the President personally shares this view. There is little economic or political incentive for the United States to alter its present stance. The Cuban régime is hardly an advertisement for Communism, or Soviet tutelage. Castro himself hardly seems to welcome the prospect of any rapprochement. I do not therefore foresee any change in the near future. In the longer term, pressure for a modification may increase owing to the trend among other members of the Organisation of American States to establish, or re-establish, diplomatic and trading relations with Cuba despite the OAS embargo policy. But there is still a majority in the OAS for maintenance of the Embargo and my estimate is that the present policy is likely to continue during the remainder of President Nixon's term of office.

12. The extent of the criticisms of the United States during the recent meetings of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Bogota, of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America at Quito, and to some

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13. The foregoing may have painted what appears to be a gloomy picture. In fact, I doubt if it is as bad as it looks. Over the course of years, successive Administrations in the United States have recognised that in their dealings with Latin America, it is virtually impossible for them to win. If they pursue active policies of intervention, they are accused of paternalism and neo-colonialism. If they adopt a low profile they are accused of neglect and lack of interest. I see little reason to assume that this Administration will move far from the approach which it has adopted over the last four years, although it may pay a little more attention in future to the presentational aspects of its policies. In a message to the IAESC meeting at Bogota, President Nixon promised that inter-American co-operation would receive priority attention from the Administration over the next four years, and the United States Secretary of State's visit to Latin America this month falls into the same pattern. But it can be taken as axiomatic that the countries of Latin America will criticise United States policy whatever it may be. President Nixon's current policy is in line with his overall doctrine. If it has not yielded any striking success, it has so far managed to escape any major crisis. Preoccupied as he is with more pressing problems elsewhere, there is little incentive for the President to make radical changes in a policy which has served him reasonably well; and I do not think that he will do so.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Latin America and the Caribbean.

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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

SUMMARY

During the last two years President Nixon's low key approach to Latin America has been maintained. The Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs has been left to implement this with little guidance from above. Latin American criticisms of this, and of United States trade and aid policies (paragraphs 2 to 5). Bilateral relations with Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Panama etc - no crises and no conspicuous successes (paragraphs 6 to 9). Still no real policy for the Caribbean (paragraph 10). No change on Cuba (paragraph 11). Conclusion: following intensive criticisms of United States policy at recent OAS and United Nations meetings, the Administration may pay a little more attention to the presentational aspects of its policies. But there is not likely to be any change in the President's basic policy (paragraph 12).

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BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON

14 May 1973

The Rt Hon Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP
etc etc etc

Sir

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

1. United States policies towards Latin America have recently received even more criticism than usual as the result of two golden opportunities for the critics. The first was the United Nations Security Council meeting at Panama at which the United States was driven into using its veto, and the second the annual Meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States which has just ended in Washington. Moreover President Nixon has recently delivered his Annual Report on Foreign Policy to Congress including a chapter on relations with Latin America (my telegram no 67 Saving of 8 May). It may therefore be appropriate to review the progress of United States policies in this area during the last two years, and to look at prospects for the future.

2. In his despatch of the 20th of January 1971 Mr Millard described the low key approach to Latin America adopted by President Nixon in contrast with the grandiose programmes

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and proclamations of the Kennedy era and the paternalism which had characterised United States relations with the Latin Americas in the past. He argued that on the whole this approach had served United States interests well. The last two years have seen little change in United States policies. Indeed in his report President Nixon makes a virtue of this approach. In truth already in the latter part of President Johnson's term, United States' interest in Latin America had waned as developments in South-East Asia claimed more and more attention. President Nixon and Dr Kissinger, with Vietnam and relations with China and the Soviet Union requiring their full attention, and Western Europe, Japan and the Middle East next in the queue, have had little opportunity or disposition to devote much time to the Western Hemisphere, a point brought home to us by the delays in obtaining the green light from the White House for negotiations on future United States' relations with the Bahamas. In consequence the State Department has been left to play the hand, with little support, inspiration or guidance from above. Mr Rogers and his senior staff have also been preoccupied with other questions, so that the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Mr Charles Meyer, who has now left the Administration, has been left to do his best on the basis of the existing guidelines. Mr Meyer's task has not been an enviable one, especially if one bears in mind the extent of United States investment in the area and the ability

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of the companies concerned to lobby the Congress and other departments of the Administration for action in support of their interests, even when this is arguably not in the overall interest of the United States. But on balance, Mr Meyer, an executive on leave of absence from Sears Roebuck, a firm to which he has now returned, managed to weather these pressures surprisingly well.

3. As Mr Millard remarked, the Nixon style does not readily commend itself to Latin Americans. With certain exceptions (notably Brazil) the pride of the United States' friends in Latin America has been hurt by what they have interpreted as a down-grading of the importance of Inter-American affairs, rather than flattered by President Nixon's assurances (reiterated in his speech to the OAS General Assembly and again in his Foreign Policy Report) that the day of paternalism has ended and the groundwork been laid for a new "mature partnership". The record (notably of ITT's dealings in connection with Chile) appears to show that this Administration has resisted attempts to persuade it to intervene on behalf of United States private interests, as former Administrations might have done. However, this has not prevented Latin American critics in Cuba, Chile, Peru, and elsewhere, from complaining of intervention in their economies by United States interests, or from pillorying the United States Administration

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when it has refused to support resolutions loaded against the foreign investor, like that adopted by the meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IAESC) in Bogota earlier this year. The tougher Administration position on compensation for expropriation adopted in 1971 at Mr Connally's prompting and again endorsed in the President's Foreign Policy Report, which requires inter alia that the United States should oppose loans from multilateral organizations to offending countries, has certainly complicated the task of those concerned with United States relations with Latin America and the Caribbean; and it was particularly tactless to send Mr Connally, who was identified not only with this, but also with the import surcharge referred to below, on a tour of Latin American countries in 1972 following his resignation as Secretary of the Treasury.

4. A more legitimate and substantial criticism of United States policy by the United States' southern neighbours relates chiefly to trade and aid. They complain that United States aid terms have sometimes forced them to buy goods from the United States at high prices which they can obtain much more cheaply elsewhere. A more general and important complaint is about the barriers which hamper Latin American exports to the United States, especially of raw materials and light manufactures. The

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Latin Americans were incensed at the Administration's failure to grant them any form of special exemption from the 10% import surcharge imposed as part of President Nixon's emergency economic measures in August 1971, despite the fact that Latin America as a whole had been running an annual trade deficit with the United States of between a half and one billion dollars. (We in Western Europe could of course make a similar complaint). The Latin Americans have also groused at the United States Government's failure to grant generalised preferences to the developing countries. The United States Administration for their part can justifiably claim that given the protectionist mood of the Congress it would until now have been counter-productive to have asked for authority to implement their promise of Generalised Preferences, since the outcome might well have been the adoption of measures to increase further the barriers to trade. The Latin Americans like others, stand to benefit from the provisions of the Trade Bill that has now been submitted, and Mr Rogers in his speech at the OAS Assembly, while welcoming the increase in Latin American trade with Europe and with Japan, invited the Latins to make common cause with United States in fighting for the elimination of preferential arrangements which discriminated against them in favour of

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the EEC's associates. But it is possible that some Latin American and Caribbean countries will be hit by the President's proposals for changes in the taxation of United States subsidiaries abroad that manufacture for the United States market, while the raw material exports of some other Latin American countries will suffer from the recent decision to run down United States stockpiles.

5. The Latin Americans have also complained of cuts in United States aid, pointing to the reduction in the commitments of United States Official Development Assistance to Latin America, which fell from a total of \$2 $\frac{3}{4}$ -billion in the three fiscal years ending in 1969 to under \$2-billion in the 3 succeeding years. Total United States commitments also fell during the same period, but Latin America suffered a larger proportionate reduction than other areas, largely because of action by the Congress, which cut the Administration's requests. Spokesmen for the United States Government, on the other hand, point out that the United States has not reduced its commitment to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) despite Congressional reluctance to vote the necessary funds (a point made in the President's Report), and argue that the picture painted by Latin Americans is misleading because it does not take into account the greater United States emphasis

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heavily in those countries that welcome, or at least tolerate, foreign investments, notably in Mexico and Brazil, and, according to Mr Rogers, half of United States private investment in the developing world is still in Latin America.

7. In its bilateral relations with Latin America and the Caribbean during the last two years the United States Government has managed to avoid any major crisis; but at the same time it can claim no conspicuous success and, as I indicated below, it has a number of nagging bilateral disputes with several Latin American countries. Over its relations with Chile, regarded by most observers as a test case, the Administration has continued to maintain a low profile, judging that any attempt at spectacular intervention against the left wing parties would be counter-productive. The Administration even reacted comparatively mildly to the expropriation of major United States investments, and has shown itself ready to explore in bilateral discussions whether the Chilean Government is prepared to show enough willingness to discuss adequate compensation, which would allow United States participation in measures to ease Chile's acute credit problems. But the prospect of any solution emerging from such talks seems slender, and will deteriorate further if the Allende Government is pushed by press revelations and the subsequent Senate Committee investigation into expropriating further ITT assets.

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8. United States bilateral relations have been best with Brazil and seem likely to continue to prosper if, as seems probable, the Brazilian economy continues to expand and to attract United States' investment. An elegant interim solution has been found to the Brazilian/United States fisheries dispute, President Medici's visit to Washington last year was judged a success, and President Nixon has half committed himself to a return visit, probably in the course of the visit to Latin America that he has promised to pay later this year. One problem in choosing an itinerary must be that there are few other countries which he could visit without fear of provoking anti-American demonstrations of the kind of which he has unpleasant memories from his Latin American tour as Vice President.

9. Relations with Mexico have also been good on the whole following President Nixon's meeting with President Diaz at Puerto Vallarta in 1970. But President Echaverria's return visit to the United States last year, when he lectured the Congress and Mexican Americans on the misdeeds of the United States, did little to improve his country's image here. With the Argentine, relations have also been good, but the victory of the Peronistas raises a question mark over the future. A minor success has been the settlement, after many vicissitudes, of a long standing dispute with Bolivia over the expropriation

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chances of his ever being persuaded to stake a part of his prestige on an attempt to carry through the Congress, with its strong Canal Zone lobby, any revision of the Treaty satisfactory to Panama.

10. The United States is still without any special policy for the Caribbean. We know that the President is intermittently alarmed by the possible dangers involved in the emergence in the area of mini-states unable to stand on their own feet and a possible prey for forces hostile to the United States. In consequence the Administration continues to hope that somehow or other we, the Dutch and the French, can be persuaded to maintain the status quo, and is dismayed when this does not happen, as over Grenada. But it is very difficult to get this general apprehension translated into positive action, especially when this conflicts with particular United States commercial interests as we have seen in the arguments over generalised preferences, reverse preferences and dollar area quotas. On this latter the Americans just do not believe our pretensions. And, as I have already mentioned, there was delay in securing decisions even on a matter of clear strategic and political importance to the United States, that of the future United States relationship with the Bahamas.

11. United States policy towards Cuba remains unchanged, despite much speculation to the contrary. Admittedly there is a growing feeling in the United States, which was reinforced by the conclusion of the agreement with Cuba to curb hijacking, that existing relations are anachronistic given the current

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United States attitude towards China and the Soviet Union. But there is a strong lobby in the Congress and elsewhere, especially in the Republican party, which is opposed to change, and we are told that the President personally shares this view. There is little economic or political incentive for the United States to alter its present stance. The Cuban regime is hardly an advertisement for Communism, or Soviet tutelage. Castro himself hardly seems to welcome the prospect of any rapprochement. I do not therefore foresee any change in the near future. In the longer term, pressure for a modification may increase owing to the trend among other members of the Organization of American States to establish, or re-establish, diplomatic and trading relations with Cuba despite the OAS embargo policy. But there is still a majority in the OAS for maintenance of the Embargo and my estimate is that the present policy is likely to continue during the remainder of President Nixon's term of office.

12. The extent of the criticisms of the United States during the recent meetings of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Bogota, of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America at Quito, and to some extent at the UN Security Council Meeting at Panama and in the general debate at the OAS General Assembly, led to some speculation that the United States might soon have to face the prospect of a major crisis in Latin America if they persisted with their present policies. But

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Latin American unanimity in criticising the United States is nothing new, although it has not recently been pushed so far as at Bogota and at Panama. Meanwhile the United States Government's reaction in refusing to vote for the Bogota resolution and vetoing at Panama may have given the Latin Americans pause. At any rate, at the recent OAS Assembly, in connection with which at the start there were even unofficial suggestions in the United States press that the United States should withdraw from the Organization, the proceedings ended quietly and with a much greater degree of agreement than had been expected following the welcome given by the United States Delegation to the proposals for a radical re-examination of the Organization.

13. The foregoing may have painted what appears to be a gloomy picture. In fact, I doubt if it is as bad as it looks. Over the course of years, successive Administrations in the United States have recognised that in their dealings with Latin America, it is virtually impossible for them to win. If they pursue active policies of intervention, they are accused of paternalism and neo-colonialism. If they adopt a low-profile they are accused of neglect and lack of interest. I see little reason to assume that this Administration will move far from the approach which it has adopted over the last four years, although it may pay a little more attention in future to the presentational aspects of its policies. In a message to the IAESC meeting at Bogota, President Nixon promised that inter-
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American cooperation would receive priority attention from the Administration over the next four years, and the US Secretary of State's visit to Latin America this month falls into the same pattern. But it can be taken as axiomatic that the countries of Latin America will criticise United States policy whatever it may be. President Nixon's current policy is in line with his overall doctrine. It is has not yielded any striking success, it has so far managed to escape any major crisis. Preoccupied as he is with more pressing problems elsewhere, there is little incentive for the President to make radical changes in a policy which has served him reasonably well; and I do not think that he will do so.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Latin America and the Caribbean.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant

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
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END

(35)

Mr Overton

Mr. Stanley

P. 2
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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

1. Lord Cromer's despatch of 14 May (copy attached) deals with United States policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean over the last two years. It will be of interest to a number of departments within the FCO and to our missions in Latin America, the Caribbean and other developing countries. I recommend that it should be printed.
2. The despatch covers the main points of current concern in US/Latin American relations including criticism of the US aid programme, the problems of investment in Latin America and fisheries disputes.
3. Lord Cromer comments that whilst the Administration was anxious to retain the status quo in the Caribbean it is difficult to get this desire translated into positive action over such questions as preferences and dollar area quotas.
4. The conclusion of the despatch is that the President's current policy has not yielded any striking success, but that whilst the President is preoccupied with more pressing problems elsewhere there is little incentive for him to make radical changes.

G R Archer
G R Archer

North America Department

24 May 1973

cc LAD
Caribbean Dept
WIAD
TRD

Hy to Overton
27/5.

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